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INTRODUCTION
Over the last two years much intellectual energy has been devoted to the analysis 
of, and the potential solutions to, the constitutional impasse resulting from the 
failure to ratify the treaty signed in Rome on 18 June 2004. Th  e  European  Council 
held in Brussels in June 2007 gave a conclusion to that eﬀ  ort by drafting a mandate 
which was to be “the exclusive basis and framework” for the work of a forthcoming 
Intergovernmental Conference drafting a “Reform treaty”. Th   at conclusion was 
rightly considered to be a great success for the German presidency. 
Th   e fact is that, over that two year period, much less attention has been given to the 
practical implementation of new institutional proposals included in the proposed 
treaty. Even a cursory examination indicates that the implementation of some of 
these proposals is likely to be uneasy, and in some cases could be a source of future 
problems or diﬃ   culties. Th   is is why three Brussels based think-tanks have thought 
it useful to join eﬀ  orts in analysing potential implications of the most signiﬁ  cant 
proposals in the ﬁ  eld of institutions. Seven issues have been identiﬁ  ed, shared out 
and debated in working groups, and this publication contains the results of that 
collective eﬀ  ort.
Our aim is to highlight, and if possible, clarify potential problems. We have worked 
on the basis of the Reform Treaty approved at Lisbon in October 2007, without 
wishing to cross the lines of the presidency or to pre-empt the conclusions of the 
ongoing process.
As in any collective eﬀ  ort, the three institutions involved share the general conclu-
sions to which they come, but do not necessarily feel bound by speciﬁ  c formula-
tions in each of the chapters. Th   ey hope that this collective eﬀ  ort will ﬁ  nd some 
resonance among political leaders and public opinion. 5
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THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT:
REASSESSING THE INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
Broadly speaking, the prerogatives of the European Parliament were increased 
by the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TECE)
[1], then the Reform 
Treaty
[2]. Th   e EP would not only exercise, jointly with the Council, legislative and 
budgetary functions but also the functions of political control and consultation 
and elect the President of the Commission. 
Th   e mandate of the June 2007 European Council maintains those modiﬁ  cations 
and the aim of this paper is to determine to what extent new institutional provisions 
will change the role and functioning of the European Parliament, thereby aﬀ  ecting 
the institutional balance, and what are the problems that may occur.
1. LEGISLATIVE POWERS
With regards to its legislative powers, the EP has seen its prerogatives enlarged, 
and put on an equal footing with those of the Council of Ministers. Th  e  co-deci-
sion procedure becomes the ordinary legislative procedure for the adoption of 
legislative acts. Th   e Constitution extends the co-decision procedure to virtually all 
ﬁ  elds of action of the Union where the Council has to decide by qualiﬁ  ed majority 
voting. Th   is represents around forty new areas
[3] and is particularly relevant in the 
area of Freedom, Security and Justice where the normal legislative procedure is 
extended to frontier controls, asylum, immigration, judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, minimum rules for the deﬁ  nition of and penalties in areas of serious crime, 
incentive measures for crime prevention, Eurojust, police cooperation, Europol 
and civil protection.
Signiﬁ  cant changes also apply to agricultural policy and external trade. Th  ere  are 
however still a number of exceptions to the rule of co-decision. 
Moreover an “emergency brake” allows, in some cases, a Member State who 
  considers that a draft European legislation would aﬀ  ect fundamental aspects of its 
[1]   Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ C 310/01, 16 December 2004.
[2]   Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, CIG 
1/1/07 REV 1.
[3]   Thirty of the existing legal basis have been modifi  ed to submit their use to the co-decision procedure, and thirteen 
new legal basis have been introduced with the use of the co-decision procedure. 8
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legal system to refer the matter to the European Council thereby suspending the 
co-decision procedure. Th   is applies to criminal matters
[4] and social security
[5].
1.1 What Are the Consequences for the Union’s Legislative Capacity?
Th   e European Parliament’s legislative powers will be increased in quantitative terms. 
Th   ere is a risk that, as a consequence, the work of the Parliament would suﬀ  er in 
qualitative terms. Th   is would have a negative impact on the legislative procedure 
and on the image of the Parliament.
In order to avoid that risk some internal reform of the functioning of the EP is 
needed, particularly with regard to the functioning of its legislative committees. 
According to some MEPs an increased work load and more participants has led, in 
the committees, to a deterioration in working conditions and practices. 
Working procedures and practices in all parliamentary committees should be 
examined and streamlined. For instance:
more sub-committees could be established;
the timing of interventions within the committees could be better 
organised;
as also interventions during the legislative debate;
the working period of parliamentary committees could be increased.
But it is to be expected that changes brought by the extension of the co-decision 
procedure will aﬀ  ect some committees more than others. Presumably the LIBE 
committee (Civil Liberties, Justice and Home aﬀ  airs) would be most aﬀ  ected 
because the extension of co-decision and QMV to the area of Security and Justice 
will change the nature of the debate. 
In another area, Article 188n of the Reform Treaty
[6] gives Parliament power of 
consent over any international agreement in ﬁ  elds which are subject internally 
to the ordinary legislative procedure: this could have considerable impact on the 
workload of the INTA committee (International trade).
Th   e co-decision procedure itself should be looked at again and streamlined, with 
the objective of improving the current practice. 
[4]   See Articles 69e § 3 and 69f § 3 of the Reform Treaty, CIG 1/1/07 REV 1, pp. 65-67.
[5]   See Article 42 of the Reform Treaty on Free Movement of Workers, CIG 1/1/07 REV 1, p. 55.
[6]   See Article 188n of the Reform Treaty, CIG 1/1/07 REV 1, pp. 107-108.
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Th   e question of giving to the European Parliament a right of legislative initiative 
was debated in the Convention. Neither the TECE nor the Reform Treaty make 
proposals in that direction, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that the matter 
could arise again. Th   ere are arguments pro and contra. On the one hand, if one 
million voters can propose legislation to the Commission, why should a given num-
ber of MEPs not be given the same right? On the other, such a right of initiative 
for the EP would further weaken the Commission’s exclusive powers of legislative 
initiative, which have been an important element of the institutional balance since 
the beginning of the Community. Th   e question is a theoretical one at the current 
stage but, if it were to be addressed, the exact wording of the provision would be 
of fundamental importance.
1.2 The Enhanced Role of the European Parliament in the New 
Comitology Procedure
A Council decision adopted in 2006 has enhanced the role of the European Parlia-
ment in the comitology procedure
[7]. Th   is innovation has no direct link with the 
Reform Treaty but it will, in practice, be implemented at the time the treaty’s new 
legislative procedures come into force. It is therefore worthwhile to consider them 
in conjunction.
Th   e aim of the decision is clearly to increase the role of Parliament in comitology 
procedures, a point which had been requested by Parliament for some time. To 
that end the Commission is requested to inform it on a regular basis of committee 
proceedings in general, to transmit documents related to those activities and to 
inform it whenever the Commission transmits to Council proposals for measures 
to be taken. 
Moreover the decision creates a new comitology procedure: the regulatory pro-
cedure with scrutiny. Th   at procedure shall apply whenever the Commission puts 
forward measures of general scope designed to amend, delete or supplement non-
essential elements of an instrument adopted under the co-decision procedure.
Under this new procedure, whenever the competent committee approves measures 
proposed by the Commission they must be forwarded to Council and Parliament. 
Th   ese institutions then have a three month period in which they can oppose the 
draft measures if they consider that the draft exceeds the implementing powers 
[7]   Council Decision 2006/512/EC amending Decision 1999/468/EC laying down procedures for the exercise of imple-
menting powers conferred on the Commission10
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foreseen in the basic instrument or do not respect the principles of subsidiarity or 
proportionality. Council shall act by qualiﬁ  ed majority and Parliament by a major-
ity of its component members. If no opposition is manifested the draft measures 
shall be adopted by the Commission. 
A similar procedure applies if the committee does not approve the measures pro-
posed by the Commission. It can then transmit its draft successively to the Council, 
who has a two month time limit to oppose it, and then to Parliament, who has a 
four month limit to do so. In the absence of opposition the draft measures can be 
adopted by the Commission. 
It is obviously too early to assess the implications of this new addition to the comi-
tology procedures but it could lead to a much greater involvement of Parliament in 
the implementation of legislation. Th   e procedure is clearly more democratic, but 
also more time consuming (time limits can be extended if this is justiﬁ  ed by the 
complexity of the measures, and they usually are complex) than present arrange-
ments, and this may work against speedy implementation of legislation. Th  e  need 
for Parliament to ﬁ  nd a majority of its component members to oppose a draft 
text is likely to act as a brake. Regular use of the scrutiny procedure would imply 
that Parliament streamline its internal committee procedures, a point which has 
already been made above. Th   ere is scope for litigation on the implementation of 
this new procedure and the Court may be called upon to settle disputes as it has 
done in the past
[8]. 
2. BUDGETARY POWERS
As far as the adoption of the budget is concerned, Articles 268 and 279b of the 
Reform Treaty
[9] extend the full co-decision procedure to the whole annual budget. 
Th   e distinction between compulsory and non compulsory expenditure is done 
away with as the Reform Treaty gives the ﬁ  nal word to the EP for all categories 
of expenditures. Th   e EP preserves hereby an important increase of its powers, 
which was one of the more hotly debated issues in the 2004 IGC. But there is also 
now, as a form of compensation, an obligation to present a multiannual ﬁ  nancial 
framework setting the amounts of the annual ceilings as well as the appropriations 
for the various expenditure and payment categories.
[8]   See ECJ, Case No C-378/00 and Case No C-122/04.
[9]   See Articles 268 and 279b of the Reform Treaty, CIG 1/1/07 REV 1, pp. 135-143.The European Parliament:  Reassessing the Institutional Balance
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What Are the Consequences for the Union’s Capacity to Adopt a 
Budget?
A balance must be made between the increase in the Parliaments budgetary powers, 
where the EP has the last word, on the one hand, and the constraints resulting from 
the new rules on ﬁ  nancial perspectives, where it is the Council that will have the ﬁ  nal 
word, even if the European Parliament is not devoid of inﬂ  uence in this ﬁ  eld. 
Th   e European Parliament has been living with the constraints of ﬁ  nancial perspec-
tives approved by the Council since the early nineties. Th   is has not prevented it from 
exercising considerable inﬂ  uence on expenditure within the imposed framework. 
Some observers believe that with the new multiannual ﬁ  nancial framework, the 
European Parliament would have less room for maneuver left. Th   at is not a majority 
view in the European Parliament itself. Experience will tell.
What is clear is that the European Parliament will not, by itself, be in a position to 
impose a more sensible budget on the Union. It will have to respect the overall limit 
ﬁ  xed by the multiannual framework. As has always been the case, any substantial 
reform in the budgetary ﬁ  eld implies a decision of the Council, where a zero sum 
mentality pervades all discussion of the subject.
However at ﬁ  rst sight the arrangement proposed is relatively balanced and does not 
introduce radical change to the present situation. It should not have a signiﬁ  cant 
impact on the Union’s capacity to adopt a budget. 
3. POWERS OF REVIEW
Under the current Treaties, the EP’s power of scrutiny consists in the power to 
approve the designation of the President of the Commission
[10], to set up a par-
liamentary commission of inquiry, and to vote a motion of censure against the 
Commission.
[10]   See also the chapter on the European Commission in this issue.12
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Under the new provisions (Article 9
[11] read with Article 9d
[12] of the Reform 
Treaty):
the EP elects the President of the Commission on a proposal from the Euro-
pean Council, taking into account the elections of the EP and after having 
held the appropriate consultations,
it approves the composition of the Commission, previously chosen by the 
designated President from a short list of three candidates chosen by the 
Member States,
the powers relating to commissions of inquiry and censure of the Commis-
sion are maintained. 
A Declaration No 6 on Article 9d (6) and (7) of the Treaty on European Union 
annexed to the Reform treaty
[13] states that:
“Th   e Conference considers that, in accordance with the provisions of the 
Treaties, the European Parliament and the European Council are jointly 
responsible for the smooth running of the process leading to the election 
of the President of the European Commission. Prior to the decision of the 
European Council, representatives of the European Parliament and of the 
European Council will thus conduct the necessary consultations in the frame-
work deemed the most appropriate. Th   ese consultations will focus on the 
backgrounds of the candidates for President of the Commission, taking 
account of the elections to the European Parliament, in accordance with the 
ﬁ  rst subparagraph of Article 9d (7). Th   e arrangements for such consultations 
may be determined, in due course, by common accord between the European 
Parliament and the European Council.”
What Are the Consequences for the Institutional Balance?
Being “commonly responsible” does not necessarily imply that both institutions will 
be involved to the same extent in the process leading to the election of the President 
of the Commission. Th   e present distinction between the role of the Council (to 
propose a candidate) and the role of the EP (to elect the candidate) is a clearer one. 
Th   e new role of the EP in this procedure could be interpreted as a mere ratiﬁ  cation 
of a choice already made. Some authors see it not only as a continuation of current 
practices but rather “along the lines of a more standard model of parliamentary govern-
[11]   See Article 9 of the Reform Treaty, CIG 1/1/07 REV 1, p. 10.
[12]   See Article 9d of the Reform Treaty, CIG 1/1/07 REV 1, pp. 14-15.
[13]   See Declaration No 6 on Article 9d (6) and (7) of the Treaty on European Union, CIG 3/1/07 REV I, p. 7. 
•
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ment, where the head of state, such as the Dutch or Belgian monarch, or the German or 
Italian president, oﬃ   cially ‘nominates’ the leader of the party that won the election as 
the formateur of the government”
[14]. Th   ere is a certain ambiguity in the formulation 
which time will doubtless clarify.
Parliament will certainly want to make optimal use of the new formulations. It is 
currently expected that the main political parties at European level will designate 
their candidate for the presidency of the Commission in the campaign prior to the 
next elections to the European Parliament in 2009. Th   e personality of the candi-
date could presumably become a signiﬁ  cant element in the political debate. Th  e 
party winning the election would obviously put forward its candidate for the post 
of president of the Commission. Th   is approach needs however to be reconciled 
with the treaty text which says that it is for the European Council to propose a 
candidate. 
In any case it seems clear that there will be a link between the majority resulting 
from European Parliament elections and the appointment of the President of the 
Commission. Th   at link is not entirely new: in 2004 Parliament already considered 
that the nomination of the president of the Commission should reﬂ  ect its composi-
tion, even if that consideration was not entirely endorsed by the European Council. 
With the new provisions that link is more clearly reaﬃ   rmed. It will strengthen 
the hand of the Parliament vis-à-vis the European Council and, at a later stage, in 
relations with the President designated and the Commission.
However, such politicization of the appointment of the position of the Commis-
sion president implies potential problems in that it also brings with it mistrust by 
those on the other side of the political spectrum. For instance, because President 
Barroso was perceived as neo-liberal, he in the end had to bend over backward not 
to appear so, and instead to appear non-partisan, which is the traditional stance 
of the Commission president. A partial solution to this problem would be that 
once appointed, the Commission President should not be expected to be a partisan 
president, but rather, much as in national grand coalition governments, to be a 
more bi-partisan, or non-partisan, one.
Another issue to be considered is the case where the Council would have a majority 
diﬀ  erent from that of the European Parliament, which can easily be the case if Euro-
pean elections occur at half term points. Double politicization of this sort would 
[14]   S.  HIX, A. G. NOURY and G. ROLAND, Democratic politics in the European Parliament (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2007).14
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undoubtedly contribute to a real political debate and the creation of a “European 
political space”. But it might well aﬀ  ect the functioning of the Union.
Whatever its impact on the functioning of the institutions, European citizens may 
well consider that politicization of the designation of the Commission President 
increases democracy, transparency and accountability of the institutions, and is 
therefore a welcome development.
4. THE NEW COMPOSITION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Th   e composition of the Parliament is another important issue which was in the 
mandate of the 2007 IGC. Th   e June 2007 European Council decided to raise the 
number of MEPs for the next legislature, 2009-2014, from 736 to 750. Th  e  draft 
reform treaty establishes a new procedure for determining the composition of 
the European Parliament under which there is an overall limit of 750 seats, with 
a maximum of 96 and a minimum of 6 per Member State, and the principle of 
“degressive proportionality”. Although, in practice, seats have always been allocated 
in accordance with a degressive proportionality principle, this is the ﬁ  rst time this 
principle has been clearly established in the treaties. However, the European Coun-
cil mandate did not provide for any deﬁ  nition of this principle. According to the 
proposal of the EP on its composition
[15], the “degressive proportionality” concept 
implies that any distribution of seats should obey a series of principles, including 
the principle of “European solidarity”, the principle of “justiﬁ  ed ﬂ  exibility”, and 
the principle of “national representation”. 
Under the Reform Treaty
[16], Parliament’s new composition is to be decided by 
the European Council acting by unanimity, on the basis of Parliament’s proposal 
and after obtaining its consent. Th   e October European Council decided to have 
751 Europarliamentarians.
Th   e composition of the European Parliament will in future require adjustment so 
as to take account of demographic changes and/or future enlargement. Th  is  could 
well lead to diﬃ   cult political debate between Member States, especially when 
new enlargements imply a loss in the number of parliamentary seats allotted to 
incumbent members.
[15]   Report on the composition of the European Parliament (2007/2169(INI)), European Parliament, Committee on Con-
stitutional Aff  airs, 3.10.2007, Final A6-0351/2007. Rapporteurs: Alain LAMASSOURE and Adrian SEVERIN.
[16]   See Article 9a of the Reform Treaty, CIG 1/1/07 REV 1, p. 11.The European Parliament:  Reassessing the Institutional Balance
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It should also be noted that the European Parliament itself asked for an overall 
revision of its composition at the in time for the 2014-2019 parliamentary term, 
in order take account of demographic changes. It also stresses the need to establish, 
in the near future, a more stable and fairer system for deciding on the allocation 
of seats, thereby avoiding “the traditional political horse-trading between Member 
States”. 
However diﬃ   cult those debates may be they should not impair the functioning of 
the Parliament. Th   ey are basically political problems between Member Sates, not 
institutional problems stricto sensu.
5. OTHER ISSUES
Parliament has a number of other competences where problems of application might 
arise. It must for instance give its consent to the agreement allowing the secession 
of a Member State
[17]. What happens if it refuses its consent? A Secession War?
Two Cases Are Worthy of Consideration: Enhanced Cooperation and 
Treaty Revision.
Enhanced cooperation: Article 280 speciﬁ  es that the initial authorisation of a 
projected enhanced cooperation requires prior consent of the European Parliament 
(except in the ﬁ  eld of CFSP where the Parliament is simply consulted)
[18]. Th  ere 
is no further indication in the treaty on the role of Parliament once an enhanced 
cooperation has been approved. Th   e relevant articles have never been implemented 
so that we have no indication as to how it would work in practice. However article 
10 of the Reform Treaty
[19] states that participants “may make use of its (the Union’s) 
institutions and exercise those competences by applying the relevant provisions of the Con-
stitution”. In practice this means that participants in enhanced cooperation must 
[20] 
operate on the basis of a legal basis in the treaty, and apply the relevant procedures. 
When those procedures are legislative they imply the intervention of the Council 
(limited to participating Member States: article 280e) and the full Parliament. 
Th   is may be repugnant to Parliament (not wanting to be involved in legislation 
that applies only to some Member States) and most certainly to states involved 
[17]   See Article 35 of the Reform Treaty, CIG 1/1/07 REV 1, pp. 37-38.
[18]   See also the chapter on Enhanced Cooperation in this issue.
[19]   See Article 10 of the Reform Treaty, CIG 1/1/07 REV 1, p. 17.
[20]   See Article 280 e of the Reform Treaty, CIG 1/1/07 REV 1, p. 145.16
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in enhanced cooperation (who will not want their legislation to be dependent on 
the votes of parliamentarians who are not concerned). Th   is may well be one more 
obstacle on the already diﬃ   cult path to treaty based enhanced cooperation, at least 
when legislation is required, thereby increasing the temptation to operate outside 
the treaty framework. Th   e Treaty of Prüm
[21] may not be the last of its kind.
Treaty revision: Parliament is deeply involved in the treaty revision procedure. 
It can initiate such a revision (article 33). It is a major actor when the normal 
“  convention” procedure is applied, and its consent is necessary if the European 
Council decides not to call a convention. Th   at last point may well become a major 
political asset if, as many people believe, governments will, in future, want to avoid 
the convention procedure. In earlier treaty revisions Parliament had very limited 
inﬂ  uence: this has changed and it has now become a major actor. Future proponents 
of treaty revisions will have to take that fact into account in their evaluation.
CONCLUSION
Like all previous European treaties, texts presently in discussion result in a net 
increase of powers for the European Parliament. Th   is is very clearly the case through 
the extension of the co-decision procedure and it is likely to lead to an increased 
work load in the legislative committees whose internal functioning should be 
streamlined. Th   e new balance in budgetary powers has also strengthened Parlia-
ment’s role but should not aﬀ  ect the Union’s capacity to approve its budget. Th  e 
consequences of new provisions regarding the appointment of the President of 
the Commission are not entirely clear but it does seem that they will increase the 
inﬂ  uence of Parliament on the Commission and its President. Finally Parliament 
has become a major actor in the treaty revision procedures. None of these develop-
ments should be a source of major problems. Th   eir democratic content should be 
welcomed. But they should lead us to reassess the institutional balance which is 
undergoing appreciable change.
[21]   Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the French 
Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Austria on the stepping 
up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration. Treaty 
signed at Prüm — Germany on  27.05.2005, see Council Secretariat  07.07.2005, 10900/05. The European Parliament:  Reassessing the Institutional Balance
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Annex 1    Th   e European Parliament
(as envisaged by CIG 1/1/07 REV 1 October 2007: pp.  10-17)
Article 9a 
1.   Th   e European Parliament shall, jointly with the Council, exercise legislative 
and budgetary functions. It shall exercise functions of political control and 
consultation as laid down in the Treaties. It shall elect the President of the 
Commission. 
2.   Th   e European Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the Union’s 
citizens. Th   ey shall not exceed seven hundred and ﬁ  fty in number. Representa-
tion of citizens shall be degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold 
of six members per Member State. No Member State shall be allocated more 
than ninety-six seats. 
  Th   e European Council shall adopt by unanimity, on the initiative of the Euro-
pean Parliament and with its consent, a decision establishing the composition 
of the European Parliament, respecting the principles referred to in the ﬁ  rst 
subparagraph. 
3.   Th   e members of the European Parliament shall be elected for a term of ﬁ  ve 
years by direct universal suﬀ  rage in a free and secret ballot. 
4.   Th   e European Parliament shall elect its President and its oﬃ   cers from among 
its members.
Article 9c 
1.   Th   e Council shall, jointly with the European Parliament, exercise legislative 
and budgetary functions. It shall carry out policy-making and coordinating 
functions as laid down in the Treaties.
Annex 2  Financial provisions
  (as envisaged by CIG 1/1/07 REV 1 October 2007: pp. 10-17)
Financial provisions
Article 268 shall be amended as follows: 
(a)   in the ﬁ  rst paragraph, the words “…, including those relating to the Euro-
pean Social Fund, …” shall be deleted and the three paragraphs shall become 
paragraph 1; 18
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(b)   the second subparagraph shall be replaced by the following: 
  Th   e Union’s annual budget shall be established by the European Parliament 
and the Council in accordance with Article 272; 
(c)   the following new paragraphs shall be inserted: 
2.   Th   e expenditure shown in the budget shall be authorised for the annual bud-
getary period in accordance with the regulation referred to in Article 279. 
3.   Th   e implementation of expenditure shown in the budget shall require the prior 
adoption of a legally binding Union act providing a legal basis for its action 
and for the implementation of the corresponding expenditure in accordance 
with the regulation referred to in Article 279, except in cases for which that 
law provides. 
4.   With a view to maintaining budgetary discipline, the Union shall not adopt 
any act which is likely to have appreciable implications for the budget with-
out providing an assurance that the expenditure arising from such an act is 
capable of being ﬁ  nanced within the limit of the Union’s own resources and 
in compliance with the multiannual ﬁ  nancial framework referred to in Article 
270a. 
5.   Th   e budget shall be implemented in accordance with the principle of sound 
ﬁ  nancial management. Member States shall cooperate with the Union to 
ensure that the appropriations entered in the budget are used in accordance 
with this principle. 
6.   Th   e Union and the Member States, in accordance with Article 280, shall 
counter fraud and any other illegal activities aﬀ  ecting the ﬁ  nancial interests 
of the Union.
Th   e Union’s own resources
A Chapter 1 “Th   e Union’s Own Resources” shall be inserted before Article 269. 
Article 269 shall be amended as follows: 
(a)   the following new ﬁ  rst paragraph shall be inserted: “Th   e Union shall provide 
itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its 
policies.”; 
(b)   the last paragraph shall be replaced by the following two paragraphs: “Th  e 
Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall unani-
mously and after consulting the European Parliament adopt a decision laying The European Parliament:  Reassessing the Institutional Balance
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down the provisions relating to the system of own resources of the Union. 
In this context it may establish new categories of own resources or abolish an 
existing category. Th   at decision shall not enter into force until it is approved 
by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements. Th   e Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance 
with a special legislative procedure, shall lay down implementing measures 
for the Union’s own resources system insofar as this is provided for in the 
decision adopted on the basis of the third paragraph. Th   e Council shall act 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.”. 
Article 270 shall be repealed.
Multiannual ﬁ  nancial framework
Th   e following new Chapter 2 and new Article 270a shall be inserted: 
“Chapter 2 Th   e Multiannual Financial Framework 
Article 270a 
1.   Th   e multiannual ﬁ  nancial framework shall ensure that Union expenditure 
develops in an orderly manner and within the limits of its own resources. 
  It shall be established for a period of at least ﬁ  ve years. 
  Th   e annual budget of the Union shall comply with the multiannual ﬁ  nancial 
framework. 
2.   Th   e Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall 
adopt a regulation laying down the multiannual ﬁ  nancial framework. Th  e 
Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament, which shall be given by a majority of its component members. 
  Th   e European Council may, unanimously, adopt a decision authorising the 
Council to act by a qualiﬁ  ed majority when adopting the regulation referred 
to in the ﬁ  rst paragraph. 
3.   Th  e  ﬁ  nancial framework shall determine the amounts of the annual ceilings 
on commitment appropriations by category of expenditure and of the annual 
ceiling on payment appropriations. Th   e categories of expenditure, limited in 
number, shall correspond to the Union’s major sectors of activity. 
  Th  e  ﬁ  nancial framework shall lay down any other provisions required for the 
annual budgetary procedure to run smoothly. 
4.   Where no Council regulation determining a new ﬁ  nancial framework has 
been adopted by the end of the previous ﬁ  nancial framework, the ceilings 20
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and other provisions corresponding to the last year of that framework shall 
be extended until such time as that act is adopted. 
5.   Th   roughout the procedure leading to the adoption of the ﬁ  nancial framework, 
the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission shall take any 
measure necessary to facilitate its adoption.”.
See also Annexes in the Chapter on Enhanced Cooperation and the Chapter 
on the Commission.21
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THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION:
SMALLER, YET MORE LEGITIMATE?
 Concerning the European Commission, the Reform Treaty takes up all innova-
tions that were already included in the Constitutional Treaty (CT).
[1] Th  is  means 
essentially two important changes for the institution: Th   e election of the Com-
mission President by the European Parliament, and a reduction of the College of 
Commissioners to 2/3 of the number of Member States.
While these are the two reforms that most directly aﬀ  ect the Commission, they 
need to be appreciated in the wider context in which the Commission operates side 
by side with other (old and new) EU institutions and has seen its own role evolve 
over time. For this purpose the next section ﬁ  rst provides a characterization of the 
evolving place of the Commission in the EU institutional architecture. Th  is  will 
provide the background for the analysis of the two key reforms that follows, with 
most attention going to the reduction of the size of the College.
1. THE CONTEXT OF THE COMMISSION: THE EU’S FACILITATOR IN SEARCH OF 
LEGITIMACY
Th   e nature of the Commission and its role within the EU has often been contested. 
Th   e Commission certainly is not the EU’s government, given its clearly delineated 
scope of competences, the technical nature of most of its tasks and its absence of 
executive resources. Th   en again, the Commission is clearly more than just a General 
Secretariat. In sharp contradiction to Montesquieu’s doctrine of the trias politica, 
the Commission combines legislative tasks (in drafting legislation), with executive, 
regulative and adjudicative responsibilities. Th   e essence of the Commission’s role 
may be rather well captured by the opening sentence of the Commission article in 
the Reform Treaty: “Th   e Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union 
and take appropriate initiatives to that end”. However, the Commission’s role is 
bound to be contested as there are diﬀ  erent views of what constitutes the “general 
interest of the Union” and what initiatives are in fact required to that end. In 
particular, whilst it may be agreed that the Commission is essentially there to oil 
the wheels of European cooperation, opinions diverge on whether this requires the 
Commission to take the political lead or rather to adopt a more subservient role. In 
[1]   See Annex for the main provisions in the Reform Treaty pertaining to the Commission.24
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essence this involves the question whence the Commission derives its mandate or, 
in other words: what are the proper sources of the Commission’s legitimacy?
Unlike the Council or the European Parliament, the Commission does not have an 
electoral mandate. Instead the primary repository of its legitimacy lies in its inde-
pendence and objective expertise. Th   us the independence of the Commissioners is 
explicitly enshrined in the Treaty. Th   is independence is crucial for the Commission 
to fulﬁ  l its regulatory and adjudicative tasks. Complementary to this independence 
is the Commission’s claim to objective expertise. Th   e Commission constitutes the 
biggest service of civil servants exclusively dedicated to the European Union. For 
that reason, the Commission is supposed to have the capacity to adopt a general, 
pan-European perspective, in contrast to national politicians and policy makers 
that are unavoidably wed to their national perspectives. 
Th   is question of the Commission’s mandate is central to its relation with the 
Member States that are represented in the Council of Ministers and the European 
Council. Eventually the Member States can block any piece of legislation initiated 
by the Commission. Despite these constraints, it is generally agreed that the upsurge 
of European integration in the 1980s was actively coaxed by the Commission under 
the leadership of its President Jacques Delors. Th   e Commission operated as a key 
driving force behind such initiatives as the Single European Act, the Single Mar-
ket, European Union, and the initial steps towards Monetary Union. Th  is  active 
role could be legitimated on the basis of the claim that these initiatives indeed 
did embody general European interests and that the Commission was uniquely 
positioned and equipped to identify and develop them.
If the Commission’s scope expanded during the 1980’s and early 1990’s, over 
the last decade it has been re-focused again. On the one hand, in response to the 
acceleration of the 1980s and 1990s the Member States have tended to rein the 
Commission in again. Notably, where cooperation evolved in the second and 
third pillar of the EU (foreign policy and justice and home aﬀ  airs), the Member 
States have held the initiative to themselves or delegated executive tasks to the 
Council secretariat. On the other hand, the Commission itself has oﬄ   oaded a 
number of technical tasks to separate agencies. Under the present President Bar-
roso, the Commission has also again put the common market at the heart of its 
policy responsibilities. Still, the Commission continues to perform crucial tasks in 
furthering European integration, most notably in preparing key legislation and in 
preparing EU enlargement.
Besides its relation with the Council, the Commission’s relationship with the Euro-
pean Parliament has evolved as well. Over the last two decades, the EP has come to The European Commission: Smaller, Yet More Legitimate?
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model its relationship with the Commission ever more on the cabinet-parliament 
model as it exists in parliamentary systems. It has intensiﬁ  ed the scrutiny of the 
Commissioners, which culminated most dramatically in the resignation of the 
Santer Commission in 1999. Also the EP has claimed a voice in the appointment 
procedure of Commissioners by subjecting them to hearings upon their nomina-
tion, leading most notably to the retraction of the candidacy of Rocco Buttiglione 
in 2004. Parliament’s claims have been honored in subsequent Treaty revisions 
that have formalized Parliament’s right to approve (or reject) the nominees for 
Commission President and for the College.
To sum up, without an electoral constituency of its own, its independence and 
objective expertise have been crucial to the Commission’s ability to act. However, 
over the last decade, instead of pulling ahead of the Member States, the Commis-
sion’s eﬀ  ectiveness has come to depend more on its ability to align itself with the 
consensus within the Council. At the same time, the increased engagement of the 
European Parliament has come to impose an additional constraint on the Commis-
sion. Yet, this constraint may also be turned into a new source of political legitimacy. 
As the Commission’s independence has become contested and constrained, we thus 
see it shifting towards a more refocused and more political role.
Th   ese trends are conﬁ  rmed by the Reform Treaty. Th   e Reform Treaty formalizes 
the extension of the Commission’s powers in the domain of Justice and Home 
Aﬀ  airs, but it notably refrains from giving it any substantial competences in the 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy and in macro-economic aﬀ  airs. What is more, 
the Treaty establishes a full-time European Council President, who may be seen 
as an alternative source of power competing with the Commission. Furthermore, 
the Reform Treaty reinforces the position of the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy, who will be a member of the Commis-
sion, but who will also administer part of his responsibilities outside the purview 
of the Commission. Th   e Commission’s scope of competences thus remains clearly 
circumscribed and the presence of the new alternative sources of power may well 
serve to further keep these limits in check.
In this context, the two major reforms aﬀ  ecting the Commission itself relate directly 
to its relationship with the two main political institutions of the Union. Th  e  changes 
in the election of the Commission President conﬁ  rm the further politicisation of 
the relationship between Commission and European Parliament. Logically, this 
change in turn also aﬀ  ects the relationship of the Commission with the Member 
States in the Council. However, this latter relationship is likely to be even more 
aﬀ  ected by the second reform, the reduction of the size of the College.26
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2. AN ELECTED COMMISSION PRESIDENT
Already since the changes made by the Treaty of Nice, art 214.2 TEC states that 
the Commission President is nominated by the European Council with qualiﬁ  ed 
majority (not unanimity anymore) and that “the nomination shall be approved by the 
European Parliament”. Th   is provision gave the political parties in the EP consider-
able power which they already used at the ﬁ  rst possible occasion: After their victory 
in the European elections in 2004 the parties of the centre-right (i.e. EPP-ED 
and the liberals) demanded that the Commission’s President would have to come 
from their ranks in order to get parliament’s approval. Still, it was the European 
Council that decided on the candidacy of José Manuel Barroso. Basically, then, the 
election of the Commission President is the object of a kind of codecision between 
the European Council and the European Parliament.
Th   e Reform Treaty formalizes this situation but it also slightly reinforces the posi-
tion of the European Parliament, as it will turn the simple “approval” of the per-
son nominated by the Heads of State and Government (current provision in art. 
214.2 TEC) into an election of the “proposed candidate” by a majority of the EP’s 
component members. Th   e new provision also states explicitly that the European 
elections should be taken into account for the choice of the proposed candidate 
by the members of the European Council. Given the minor character of these 
changes, one might expect future Commission President appointments to follow 
the same logic of the 2004 procedure: the European Council selects the candidate 
whose political aﬃ   liation corresponds to that of the majority in the newly elected 
European Parliament, which subsequently conﬁ  rms the appointment in a formal 
election vote.
Although the Reform treaty might not change much in formal power relations, 
the new provision may allow the election procedures to gain more visibility in the 
broader public. If political parties decide to give support to a certain candidate of 
their political camp even before, the European election campaign could become a 
lot more personalized and tangible for many voters. With a view to the 2009 elec-
tions, one could imagine the EPP-parties campaigning on a second term of José 
Manuel Barroso. Much will then depend on the position of the other parties.
[2] If 
the victorious party-group in the EP-elections would tie its campaign to a speciﬁ  c 
candidate for the Commission Presidency, it would be very hard for the European 
Council not to endorse this candidate.
[2]   An appealing scenario of how such a politicised campaign could play out is sketched by Simon HIX in his forthcom-
ing book on What’s Wrong With the European Union and How to Fix It (Polity Press). The European Commission: Smaller, Yet More Legitimate?
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Note however that nothing in the present Treaties prevented the EP party groups 
to adopt such an approach in 2004. Th   e changes in the Reform treaty make hardly 
a diﬀ  erence, even if they slightly shift the balance in favor of the European Par-
liament taking the initiative in the procedure. Rather than depending on formal 
Treaty changes, whether the Commission President will be genuinely elected essen-
tially depends on the capacity of European party groups to turn the Commission 
President into a major cross-European issue in the EP-election campaigns and on 
the willingness of serious candidates to tie their fate to these campaigns. Up till 
now, the substantive coordination of EP-campaigns with European party-groups 
has been rather limited. It will not be easy for them to agree on any candidate. 
What is more, one may wonder whether serious candidates will thus want to risk 
their political reputation or rather leave their fate to the closed negotiations of the 
European Council.
Th   e Reform Treaty thus conﬁ  rms the existing trend of making the appointment 
procedure ever more liable to politicization. Th   e potential for politicization was 
initially opened up by making the nomination the object of qualiﬁ  ed majority 
voting, rather than “common accord”, in the European Council. Th  e  involvement 
of the European Parliament has further added to the potential for politicizing the 
appointment. Even if this potential is not fully played out for the time being, the 
consensual appointment of the Commission President is a forlorn opportunity. 
Obviously, however, politicization will undermine the Commission’s claim to 
independence and objectivity. A Commission President whose election is supported 
(only) by a majority of Member States will ﬁ  nd her claim to be a defender of the 
“Community interest” and “guardian of the treaties” compromised.
Already today, however, the Commission and its president are perceived by many 
as political player with an own agenda. Th   e fact that the president will be elected, 
will give the future oﬃ   ceholder a stronger position to formulate his/her political 
programme and defend it against resistance from all quarters. He/she will also ﬁ  nd 
it easier to choose (or to refuse) certain candidates for his team, although his/her 
choice will still have to be made in agreement with the diﬀ  erent capitals. Th  us,  over 
time we can expect the function of Commission President to trade-oﬀ   its claim to 
independence and objectivity to one of electoral (or rather EP-) support.
[3]
[3]   In the long term such developments will have clear eff  ects for the Commission’s ability to handle certain regulative 
and adjudicative tasks that rely essentially on its independence of specifi  c national and political interests (competition 
control, infringement procedures). One would expect a more politicised Commission to hive these responsibilities off   
to independent agencies.28
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3. THE REDUCTION OF THE COLLEGE SIZE
Th   e size of the College has been a hotly disputed issue since the mid-‘90s. Together 
with the voting weights in the Council it was one of the central elements to be 
tackled in view of the EU’s Eastern enlargement. In the Constitutional Conven-
tion the settlement for a reduction to 2/3 of the number of Member States was 
only accepted as integral part of the overall “package deal” on institutional reform. 
A majority of smaller Member States were strongly opposed to a reduction of 
the College beyond the number of Member States, as they were afraid of losing 
“their” Commissioner in an institution seen as a strategic partner by many smaller 
countries. Especially the new Member States insisted on having a person from their 
country in the College after they joined the Union. 
How sensitive and diﬃ   cult this issue has always been can be seen, if one takes a look 
back even further: Already the Corfu European Council in 1994 mentioned the 
future number of Commissioners as an explicit issue for the “Reﬂ  ection Group” 
that should prepare the ground for the 1996 IGC.
[4] However, the IGC itself came 
to no agreement on the size of the College, and the issue became thus one of the 
most prominent “Amsterdam left-overs”. In view of the imminent enlargement, 
an adaptation was made through the Treaty of Nice which led to the loss of the 
second Commissioner for the “big ﬁ  ve” (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the 
UK) in the ﬁ  rst Commission after the Eastern enlargement (i.e. the Barroso Com-
mission in November 2004). Th   e Treaty of Nice also introduced a “Protocol on 
Enlargement” according to which the ﬁ  rst new Commission following the EU’s 
enlargement to 27 Member States should consist of a lower number of Commis-
sioners than Member States. Th   e exact system would still have to be agreed among 
Member States, but the protocol already stipulates that any rotation would have 
to be “equal” for all Member States. “Equality” in this context means that not just 
the smaller, but all Member States would have to renounce to a Commissioner 
equally often, i.e. during every second or third legislature depending on the agreed 
size of the College.
Th   e Reform Treaty, following the Constitutional Treaty, is to retain the system of 
“equal rotation” and also determines the size of the College:
“Th   e Commission shall consist of a number of members, including its Presi-
dent and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Secu-
[4]   B ALDWIN, Richard, Trail to Failure: History of the Constitutional Treaty’s Rejection and Implications for the Future, CEPS 
Policy Brief No. 104, May 2006, at: http://shop.ceps.eu/BookDetail.php?item_id=1332.The European Commission: Smaller, Yet More Legitimate?
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rity Policy, corresponding to two thirds of the number of Member States, unless 
the European Council, acting unanimously, decides to alter this number 
[Emphasis added by the authors].”
Concerning the system of rotation resulting from this decision the Reform Treaty 
stipulates the following two principles:
(a)  Member States shall be treated on a strictly equal footing as regards deter-
mination of the sequence of, and the time spent by, their nationals as 
members of the Commission; consequently, the diﬀ  erence between the 
total number of terms of oﬃ   ce held by nationals of any given pair of 
Member States may never be more than one;
(b)  subject to point (a), each successive Commission shall be so composed as 
to reﬂ  ect satisfactorily the demographic and geographical range of all the 
Member States (Article 211, in CIG 1/07: p.112). [Emphasis added by 
the authors].
Diﬀ  erently from the “Protocol on Enlargement” introduced by the Treaty of Nice, 
however, the Constitutional Treaty and Reform Treaty both defer the introduction 
of the new system for a further ﬁ  ve years. It will thus only apply for the Commis-
sion coming to oﬃ   ce in 2014 instead of 2009.
3.1. What Could the Arrangement of the Reform Treaty Look Like in 
Practice?
Th   e new arrangement still leaves open a lot of concrete aspects. It could possibly 
draw some inspiration from the balance of the current rotation scheme for the 
Council Presidency and it could be considered that countries having the Presidency 
of the Council conﬁ  gurations
[5] should not have a Commissioner during the cor-
responding legislature. According to the treaty’s provisions the new rotation system 
“shall be established by a European decision adopted unanimously by the European 
Council” that has to respect the principle of equality among Member States and must 
satisfy demographic and geographical representation in each College. Under these 
provisions it is most likely that three ﬁ  xed groups will be established with a sound 
balance of Northern, Southern, Western, Eastern and Central European countries 
as well as a mix of small, intermediate and large Member States. Each College would 
[5]   The rotation mechanism will only be abolished for the European Council and the Foreign Aff  airs Council, see Art 
9c, Paragraph 9 of the revised TEU and Art 201 b(b) TFEU.30
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only be made up of Commissioners from two of the three country groups and they 
would rotate on an equal basis. Th   e three groups could look as follows:
Table 1 Possible Groups for a Rotating Commission Membership*
GROUP A B C
Germany (82.5), C France (60.9), W UK (60.4), W
Spain (43.8), S Poland (38.1), E Italy (58.8), S
Belgium (10.5), C Netherlands (16.3), C Romania (21.4), E
Czech Rep. (10.3), C Greece (11.1), S Portugal (10.6), S
Bulgaria (7.7), E Hungary (10.1), E Sweden (9.0), N
Finland (5.3), N Austria (8.3), C Slovakia (5.4), E
Ireland (4.2), W Denmark (5.4), N Slovenia (2.0), C
Latvia (2.3), E Lithuania (3.4), E Estonia (1.3), E
Malta (0.4), S Cyprus (0.8), S Luxembourg (0.5), C
TOTAL 167 million 154.4 million 169.4 million
N 111
W 111
S 222
E 233
C 322
* Name of country, population in million, broad geographical orientation (West, East, North, South, Central). Population 
fi  gures taken from: http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/index_en.htm
If a new Member State joins the Union it would probably be counted into the 
relatively weakest of the three groups or the one where it best ﬁ  ts to keep the geo-
graphical balance. Th   us Croatia with its 4.4 million citizens would be counted into 
either group A (due to geographical balance) or group B (due to the balance in 
population). Th   e same would be true for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia (2.05 million citizens). Th   e whole system would only have to be revised if a 
country with a greater population would join the EU (e.g. Turkey or Ukraine).
3.2. A Reasonable Solution?
Clearly, the current priority is to get the Reform Treaty agreed and ratiﬁ  ed, so politi-
cal leaders do not openly question the system of “equal rotation”. If the Reform 
Treaty is agreed, however, the issue of the exact settlement on the rotation system is 
very likely to become again a subject of major dispute — probably politicians from 
large Member States will raise the issue when a concrete solution has to be found The European Commission: Smaller, Yet More Legitimate?
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in 2012/13. (If the Reform Treaty is not ratiﬁ  ed, the “Protocol on Enlargement” 
will put the issue on the agenda already in 2008/09.)
As already stated above, both the Reform Treaty and the Protocol on Enlargement 
foresee that the new rotation system “shall be established by a European decision 
adopted unanimously by the European Council”, thus the potential for blockades will 
be abundant. In particular, there are major doubts whether, when it actually comes 
to it, the bigger Member States are really willing to give up on a Commissioner of 
their nationality for a certain period.
[6]
In terms of political practicality one must indeed ask how strong political support 
for the Commission would be from the respective capitals, if the College does not 
include a British (or French, German, Italian, Polish, Spanish) Commissioner. At 
ﬁ  rst sight this argument appears to reﬂ  ect a misunderstanding of the actual job 
proﬁ  le of a Commissioner: According to article 213 of the EC Treaty Commis-
sioners are supposed to be “completely independent in the performance of their duties” 
and “shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or from any other 
body”. While we do not intend to question that Commissioners take their mandate 
seriously, the practical importance of a good understanding between the govern-
ments of key Member States and the College should not be underestimated. Strong 
communicative links with the political leadership of the large countries are indis-
pensable to gain the necessary political support — especially for rather contested 
or even unpopular legislatives initiatives. Even Jacques Delors — who has widely 
been perceived as a particularly “strong” Commission President — depended on 
the support from France, Germany and Britain for his ambitious political agenda. 
During Delors’ time there were two Commissioners from each of these countries 
and it is diﬃ   cult to imagine that his Commission would have had the same success 
with the single market programme or the cohesion funds if there had not even been 
one member from the aforementioned countries in his College. 
Th   e sense of aﬃ   liation with Commission initiatives by key governments might even 
be more crucial today, due to the importance of new procedures that depend much 
less on “hard law” (regulations, directives and decisions), but on “soft” coordination 
mechanisms, like the “Open Method of Coordination”. For example, one of the 
[6]   Cf. European Commission, Bureau of Policy Advisers (BEPA), Group of Political Analysis (GPA): Institutional Settlement, 
Minutes of the Meeting on 27 February 2007, retrievable at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/experts_groups/
docs/summary_27_february_2007.pdf.32
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key problems of the Lisbon process identiﬁ  ed by the 2004 Kok-Report was a lack 
of ownership by Member States.
[7]
Th   e aspect of national support is also of particular relevance in view of the institu-
tional balance, and more concretely, the creation of the new permanent President 
of the European Council. Although he/she will be more of a “chairman” than a 
“president” due to his/her limited legal powers, the person in this position could 
still become very inﬂ  uential. Th   e Council President could even become a potential 
rival to the Commission President if he/she was to be a political heavy-weight who 
enjoys the trust and the respect particularly from leaders in large Member States. 
In such a constellation the Commission would inevitably lose political clout, if it 
did not have very good links with important capitals.
Th   e composition of the Commission has some bearing on its internal decision mak-
ing process. Article 219 TEC (amended by the Treaty of Nice) says that decisions 
can be taken by a simple majority of the number of Commissioners. In the seventies 
and eighties the Commission did in fact vote regularly if not frequently. Th  e  proce-
dure was not questioned. Presumably Member States felt that the balance within the 
Commission (including between big and small Member States) was approximately 
right. Possibly the principle that Commissioners do not represent a Member State 
was more widely accepted and understood. Today, according to President Bar-
roso, the Commission never votes. It is debatable whether this is a progress. But a 
situation in which Commissioners from 15 smaller Member States (representing 
20% of the population) could outvote the others, may explain the reluctance to 
push for a vote. A strong Commission will need to be decisive, innovative, proac-
tive even, at times, controversial. It is doubtful if consensus decision-making can 
by itself enable it to do that. It would be advantageous for the Commission to be 
composed in a way which does not in practice inhibit voting. 
3.3. Alternative Solutions?
Alternatives that put into question the system of “equal rotation” are neither com-
patible with the wording of the “Protocol on Enlargement” nor with that of the 
provisions in the Reform Treaty. Such solutions would thus necessitate Treaty 
changes, which will be diﬃ   cult to achieve. However, given the fact that the imple-
mentation of the current provisions also needs unanimous agreement, large Member 
States will have considerable means to put pressure on the smaller ones, too.
[7]   Facing the Challenge — The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment, Report from the High Level Group chaired 
by Wim KOK, February 2004, p. 17, retrievable at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/experts_groups/docs/sum-
mary_27_february_2007.pdf.The European Commission: Smaller, Yet More Legitimate?
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One alternative that might ﬁ  nd the support of the larger Member States would 
give them one Commissioner, while small Member States would only have “half 
a Commissioner”. Inevitably it would result in a system of “unequal” rotation. 
For example, in a Union of 27, the six largest Member States would always have a 
Commissioner, while the other 21 Member States would have to rotate on an equal 
basis for the 12 remaining ones. If a small Member State did not have a Commis-
sioner during the last legislature, it imperatively would have to have one during 
the following one. One can easily predict that such a system of “unequal rotation” 
would be an extremely diﬃ   cult sell in the smaller Member States, especially since 
many of them even accepted the “equal rotation” only as part of the institutional 
package deal in the Reform Treaty. In defence of this system it can be said, however, 
that it would to some extent bring the EU back to its old rule where large Members 
States also had twice as many Commissioners as the smaller ones. 
Another alternative has already been put forward in public. In a speech delivered in 
Brussels in September 2006 the French President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed that the 
composition of the College should be at the discretion of the future Commission 
President: “Mais pour sortir du blocage, pourquoi ne pas avoir l’audace de réﬂ  échir 
à une sorte de ‘saut conceptuel’, consistant à conﬁ  er la composition de la Commission 
à son president?”.
[8] Despite Sarkozy just being a candidate for his current oﬃ   ce at 
the time, his proposal was already a ﬁ  rst concrete signal of discontent from a large 
Member State. Th   e proposal was certainly not altruistic, as Sarkozy (probably 
rightly) assumes that a Commission President would not ignore a French Commis-
sioner candidate in order to ensure political support from the French government 
and high-level channels of communication with the French media. 
However such a proposal would automatically also strengthen the position of the 
Commission President, because without the constraints of formal quotas, he could 
make a more strategic choice. It would help the Commission President to get the 
best team and the necessary political support for his/her political programme. Such 
a choice would automatically have to include a geographically sound balance of 
nationalities anyway, but having Commissioners from all large Member States in 
the College would be strategically clever and make life for the Commission Presi-
dent easier when gathering support for controversial initiatives. Although smaller 
Member States strongly resent such logic, it would help to mitigate a potential 
antagonism between the new President of the European Council as the preferred 
[8]   Speech by Nicholas SARKOZY at the Robert Schuman Foundation and the Friends of Europe, Bibliothèque Solvay, 
Brussels, 8 September 2006, retrievable at:  http://www.robert-schuman.org/actualite/bruxelles/discours8sept.pdf 
(Sarkozy was then still just a candidate for his current offi   ce).34
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interlocutor of the larger Member States and the Commission President as advocate 
of smaller countries.
While no unanimous agreement on such an approach is forthcoming at this moment, 
things may look diﬀ  erent when a solution will be required by 2012/2013. Indeed 
if in the course of the 2009 EP-elections and in the run-up to the 2014 elections, 
the Commission President election would already have evolved into a much more 
politicised aﬀ  air, it would appear more logical for him or her to compose his or her 
own team. Th   e composition of the team could be subjected to speciﬁ  c principles 
to ensure demographic and geographic diversity and the regular presence of each 
nationality. And, obviously, the College would require the support of a (qualiﬁ  ed) 
majority of both the European Council and the European Parliament.
CONCLUSION
Th   e position of the European Commission in the EU’s architecture has always been 
a precarious one. In the absence of political constituency of its own, it essentially 
relied on its independence and expertise to sustain its claim to act as the “guardian 
of the general European interest”. With the evolution of European integration in 
general, as well as the evolution of the Commission in particular, its independence 
has come under increasing pressure. By now it is very hard not to see the Commis-
sion as a political player of its own in many of the ﬁ  elds it is active, with its own 
interests and its own political and, even, ideological aﬃ   liations.
Th   e two formal changes that the Reform Treaty envisages for the Commission 
rather conﬁ  rm its increasingly politicised nature. Th   e strengthening of the role 
of the European Parliament in the election of the Commission President, even if 
formally rather marginal, is likely to lead (sooner or later) to the position of the 
President being wed to the ideological majority in the Parliament. In turn, the 
heads of government in the European Council will no longer control the nomina-
tions for Commission President, but at most be able to block a truly unacceptable 
candidate.
Th   e intention to reduce the size of the College to two-thirds of the number of 
Member States may well be conducive to greater internal eﬃ   ciency of the body, but 
is also likely to further loosen the bond between the Member States and the Com-
mission. Especially Member States whose nationality is not present in the College 
may well come to approach the Commission with a certain suspicion. Th  e  gains 
coming from a reduced College are thus likely to come at the price of diminished 
political support from key governments and less visibility in the media of these The European Commission: Smaller, Yet More Legitimate?
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countries. Particularly, in view of the new permanent President of the European 
Council, the reduction of the college in combination with a system of equal rota-
tion could spur a dangerous trend where especially large Member States see their 
interests better observed by the new post. 
While the Commission needs not give up on its claim to speak for the general 
European interest, its claim to independence and objective expertise no longer suf-
ﬁ  ce to grant legitimacy to its initiatives. (Some) politicisation seems inevitable to 
derive legitimacy from a closer alignment to electoral support. Th  e  strengthening 
of the role of EP-elections in the election of the Commission President corresponds 
to this objective. At the same time, it is important to ensure that the procedure 
retains a balanced, “codecision” character that still allows the Member States to 
bring their interests to bear and prevents the Commission President from becom-
ing completely captured by the EP-majority. Under these circumstances there is 
also much to be said for allowing the incoming Commission President in 2014 to 
pick her or his own college subject to some well-set norms. In general, while the 
Commission can no longer position itself above the other institutions, its future 
legitimacy and eﬀ  ectiveness essentially rely on its ability to position itself between 
them in a well balanced way.36
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Annex   Th   e New Provisions on the European Commission and its 
President
(as envisaged by CIG 1/1/07 REV 1 October 2007: pp. 14-15)
Article 9d  Th   e European Commission and its President
1.   Th   e Commission shall promote the general interest of the Union and take 
appropriate initiatives to that end. It shall ensure the application of the Trea-
ties, and measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them. It shall 
oversee the application of Union law under the control of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union. It shall execute the budget and manage programmes. 
It shall exercise coordinating, executive and management functions, as laid 
down in the Treaties. With the exception of the common foreign and security 
policy, and other cases provided for in the Treaties, it shall ensure the Union’s 
external representation. It shall initiate the Union’s annual and multiannual 
programming with a view to achieving interinstitutional agreements. 
2.   Union legislative acts may be adopted only on the basis of a Commission pro-
posal, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. Other acts shall be adopted 
on the basis of a Commission proposal where the Treaties so provide. 
3.   Th   e Commission’s term of oﬃ   ce shall be ﬁ  ve years. 
  Th   e members of the Commission shall be chosen on the ground of their general 
competence and European commitment from persons whose independence 
is beyond doubt. 
  In carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission shall be completely inde-
pendent. Without prejudice to Article 9e(2), the members of the Commission 
shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or other institu-
tion, body, oﬃ   ce or entity. Th   ey shall refrain from any action incompatible 
with their duties or the performance of their tasks. 
4.   Th   e Commission appointed between the date of entry into force of the Treaty 
amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community and 31 October 2014 shall consist of one national 
of each Member State, including its President and the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy who shall be one of its 
Vice-Presidents. 
5.   As from 1 November 2014, the Commission shall consist of a number of 
members, including its President and the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy, corresponding to two thirds of the The European Commission: Smaller, Yet More Legitimate?
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number of Member States, unless the European Council, acting unanimously, 
decides to alter this number. 
  Th   e members of the Commission shall be chosen from among the nation-
als of the Member States on the basis of a system of strictly equal rotation 
between the Member States, reﬂ  ecting the demographic and geographical 
range of all the Member States. Th   is system shall be established unanimously 
by the European Council in accordance with Article 211 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.
6.   Th   e President of the Commission shall:
(a)   lay down guidelines within which the Commission is to work; 
(b)  decide on the internal organisation of the Commission, ensuring that it acts 
consistently, eﬃ   ciently and as a collegiate body; 
(c)  appoint Vice-Presidents, other than the High Representative of the Union for For-
eign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy, from among the members of the Commission. 
A member of the Commission shall resign if the President so requests. Th  e 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy 
shall resign, in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 9e(1), if the 
President so requests.
7.   Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after hav-
ing held the appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a 
qualiﬁ  ed majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for 
President of the Commission. Th   is candidate shall be elected by the European 
Parliament by a majority of its component members. If he or she does not 
obtain the required majority, the European Council, acting by a qualiﬁ  ed 
majority, shall within one month propose a new candidate who shall be elected 
by the European Parliament following the same procedure. 
  Th   e Council, by common accord with the President-elect, shall adopt the list 
of the other persons whom it proposes for appointment as members of the 
Commission. Th   ey shall be selected, on the basis of the suggestions made by 
Member States, in accordance with the criteria set out in paragraph 3, second 
subparagraph, and paragraph 5, second subparagraph. 
  Th   e President, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and 
Security Policy and the other members of the Commission shall be subject 
as a body to a vote of consent by the European Parliament. On the basis of 
this consent the Commission shall be appointed by the European Council, 
acting by a qualiﬁ  ed majority.38
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8.   Th   e Commission, as a body, shall be responsible to the European Parliament. 
In accordance with Article 201 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union, the European Parliament may vote on a censure motion on the 
Commission. If such a motion is carried, the members of the Commission 
shall resign as a body and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy shall resign from the duties that he or she carries 
out in the Commission.”39
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THE PRESIDENCY OF THE COUNCIL:
THE PARADOX OF THE NEW PRESIDENCY
 1. A ROTATING PRESIDENCY FROM THE BEGINNING
Nothing is more ordinary than the concept of presidency. Every body, association 
and institution, large or small, domestic or international, political or otherwise, 
has a presidency that is responsible both for representing it and for making sure 
it works properly. Th   e Council is a Union institution and obeys that rule; since 
the founding treaties were signed it has had a presidency held by each Member 
State in turn for six months. Th   e main functions of the presidency, as described 
systematically for the ﬁ  rst time in the 1979 report by the Th   ree Wise Men
[1], are to 
supervise the practical organisation of the proceedings of the Council, the European 
Council and the Council’s preparatory bodies, to represent the Council in dealings 
with the other institutions and with non-member countries, to play the part of 
an honest broker in negotiations and, within the limits of what is possible in the 
light of circumstances at the time and its partners’ good will, to set the Union’s 
political agenda.
It is traditional for analysts to lay stress on the radical evolution that has trans-
formed the function of the Presidency since its beginnings. Th   at is true only up 
to a point. In fact it is less the function itself that has evolved (there are numer-
ous examples of signiﬁ  cant Presidency initiatives taken during the early decades) 
than the context in which it has to be exercised. Th   e continuous expansion of the 
Union’s competences and responsibilities in the ﬁ  eld of external relations has to 
some extent automatically burdened the function of Presidency with a series of 
representational and organisational tasks which many consider to be routine and 
procedural rather than having any policy content.  In the same way the commit-
ments which the Council has assumed over the years with regard to the European 
Parliament have added to the list of the Presidency’s tasks a series of obligations in 
the form of appearances and various reports which consume an increasing amount 
of time and resources.  In the case of relations with the Parliament the obligations 
of the Presidency have increased through the expansion of the co-decision proce-
dure, which has extended the Presidency’s role as honest broker in the sphere of 
interinstitutional relations.
[1]   [BIESCHEUVEL, B., DELL, Edm. and MARJOLIN, R.], Report on European Institutions. Presented by the Committee of Three to 
the European Council (October 1979) (Luxembourg, Offi   ce for Offi   cial Publications of the European Communities, 1980) 
http://aei.pitt.edu/999/01/Committee_of_Three_Report_1979.pdf.42
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Another, perhaps even more signiﬁ  cant, reason for the strengthening of the Presi-
dency is the role it has been called upon to play in the various intergovernmental 
conferences which have succeeded each other at an ever increasing rate since the 
1980s (the Single Act, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice, the Constitutional Treaty). 
In fact, as a body provided for in the Treaty but not covered by its rules, the Inter-
governmental Conference gives to the Presidency a role which is more than it is 
due in that, assisted by the Council Secretariat, it plays a central role in preparing 
the proposals submitted to the negotiating table and in seeking consensus. Of 
course, that particular role in principle only exists during the Conference and the 
activities directly linked to it, but it is easy to see that some of the habits acquired 
on that occasion have inﬂ  uenced Presidential practice during the more routine 
work within the Union.
Accordingly, over the years, less by design than as a result of a combination of 
favourable circumstances the role of the Presidency has gradually increased until 
it has become a key element in the functioning of the life of the Union. Paradoxi-
cally, just as the political proﬁ  le of the Presidency function was becoming more 
ﬁ  rmly established, the six-month system was beginning to reveal its limitations, 
as well as the consequences of both its intrinsic defects and of the environment in 
which it had to operate.
Th   e weaknesses inherent in the six-month-rotating Presidency are suﬃ   ciently 
well known that there is no need to go over them in detail here.  Th  e  main  one 
is undoubtedly the shortness of the mandate and the resulting lack of continuity 
in both representation and action, defects which are particularly prejudicial to 
the conduct of the Union’s aﬀ  airs at a time when, in an ideal world, the constant 
development of its responsibilities require stronger and more sustained leadership. 
Th   at discontinuity, innate to the system, is sometimes exacerbated by an excessive 
“personalisation” of the function. In an attempt to compensate for the shortness of 
the mandate, the Presidency is exercised with greater intensity, leaving to disorgan-
ised and frequently unproductive activity, often driven by purely national concerns 
and interests.  In short, the Presidency mechanism inherited from the founding 
treaties has rapidly emerged as the nub of all problems, and a convenient explana-
tion (sometimes all too convenient) for the majority of the Union’s failings.
It has to be said that in addition to the defect intrinsic to the system, a further 
complicating factor has been added which is linked to the rapid expansion of the 
Union, the number of whose members has grown almost ﬁ  ve-fold. As a result, 
the rate at which the Presidency comes round has been reduced considerably. Th  e 
interval is now fourteen years, which has several adverse eﬀ  ects: ﬁ  rst, there is a lack The Presidency of the Council: The Paradox of the New Presidency
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of experience in the performance of the duties combined with loss of institutional 
memory — even in the case of the older Member States — and an almost irresis-
tible temptation to overexploit for domestic reasons an event which because it is less 
frequent has become more important politically. Furthermore, with twenty-seven 
nations around the negotiating table the Council is becoming more and more dif-
ﬁ  cult to manage and control.  In many respects, the Council of Ministers is today 
less like a conventional government cabinet than a small deliberative assembly whose 
interests are more and more varied. Th   is complicates considerably the Presidency’s 
task — particularly its traditional role as honest broker — in a political culture 
which is still very much dominated by the search for consensus.
2. ATTEMPTS TO ADAPT OVER TIME
Very early on, eﬀ  orts were made to remedy the more obvious defects of the Presi-
dency system, and in particular the lack of continuity and visibility, by trying to 
reconcile the sometimes contradictory requirement for permanence and legitimacy. 
Th   at is how an impressive (and often repetitive, because they were simply not 
followed up) series of recommendations were accumulated over the years. Th  ese 
took the form either of relatively binding measures, taken in the context of the 
revision of the Treaties or of less solemn decisions by the European Council (cf. 
Seville in 2002)
[2], resolutions by the General Aﬀ  airs Council and even, for more 
practical matters, simple conclusions by Coreper. Th   ose initiatives, of very varied 
scope and lacking any overall plan, covered both the external aspect of the exercise 
of the presidential function and the conduct of internal policies.
In the external ﬁ  eld, the principal innovation was the creation, in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, of the post of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, which was supposed to solve the recurrent problem of the lack of the single 
face and voice for the Union on the international stage.  Combined with the use of 
diﬀ  erent forms of troikas introduced ﬁ  rst in the 1980s (ﬁ  rst, the Presidency-in-oﬃ   ce 
with the preceding and succeeding Presidencies, then the Presidency-in-oﬃ   ce 
with the High Representative and the Commission, and the possibility of the 
subsequent Presidency) and backed up by the appointment of special envoys for 
problem regions, that reform has helped signiﬁ  cantly to increase the consistency 
and continuity of the Union’s external action.  Unquestionable diplomatic suc-
cesses in the prevention and solution of various conﬂ  icts, some of them right on 
the Union’s doorstep, testify to that.
[2]   European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Seville 21 and 22 June 2002.44
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As regards the Union’s internal policies, the Council has attempted to begin to 
solve the problem of the continuity of its action by trying to programme its activi-
ties and encourage cooperation between successive Presidencies. Th  e  ﬁ  rst step in that 
direction was the systematic preparation, at the beginning of each half year and for 
each session of the diﬀ  erent Council formations, of indicative agendas intended to 
inform delegations of the Presidency’s intentions in order to help them prepare 
properly and so improve the Institution’s collective eﬃ   ciency. Conscious that this 
innovation, however interesting, would have little eﬀ  ect as long as it was limited 
to a six-month time-frame, the Helsinki European Council (1999)
[3] proposed 
more systematic cooperation between the Presidency-in-oﬃ   ce and the following 
Presidency which could, in certain cases, go as far as a real sharing of tasks, although 
how and to what extent, was left to the discretion of the Presidency-in-oﬃ   ce, 
thereby considerably limiting its potential. Th   e Seville European Council (2002) 
in turn conﬁ  rmed and reinforced the practice of cooperation on programmes. It 
also speciﬁ  ed that the following Presidency could, before the start of its mandate, 
chair certain working parties in the case of dossiers that would occupy the Council 
for more than half a year, the most obvious example being the establishment of 
the Union’s annual budget. Finally, the chairs of certain technical working parties 
(albeit only a limited number) were entrusted to the Council Secretariat, with the 
possibility of extending that practice in the light of experience.
By way of concluding this brief survey of the eﬀ  orts that have been made to reform 
the Presidency function over more than two decades, it has to be admitted that, 
apart from the creation of the post of High Representative, the impact of which on 
the eﬀ  ectiveness of the Union’s external action has been undeniable, the impact of 
these initiatives, however useful, has been limited and even marginal.  Th  e  reason 
for this is twofold. On the one hand, despite constant criticism of the system, 
politicians have had diﬃ   culty focussing on a problem that has long been regarded 
as secondary in importance, and when they eventually did, it quickly became 
obvious that behind the solid consensus on the failings of the system, views dif-
fered considerably on how it should be reformed.  In fact, even if the drawbacks 
of the rotating Presidency were not challenged openly, resistance to abandoning 
the system of half-yearly rotation was still very strong — in particular on the part 
of many small Member States. Th   is view rested on good arguments, such as the 
importance of preserving the unity of the chain of command, the visibility of the 
Union in the Member States, and a sense of competitive rivalry in the contribution 
each could make in the cause of European integration.
[3]   European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki 10 and 11 December 1999.The Presidency of the Council: The Paradox of the New Presidency
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3. THE NEW CONCEPT
It is generally accepted that the European Convention that met in 2002 did not 
hold a real debate on the overall problem of the Council Presidency since attention 
quickly became focused exclusively on the ﬁ  xed Presidency of the European Coun-
cil, which was presented as a panacea, in particular by President Giscard d’Estaing, 
a long-term supporter of the creation of the post. Because this innovation, together 
with that of giving the chairmanship of the Foreign Aﬀ  airs Council to the High 
Representative, was part of the draft Constitutional Treaty, the Intergovernmen-
tal Conference conﬁ  ned itself to approving the package as a whole, and did not 
address the more speciﬁ  c question of the Council Presidency, the sole exception 
being a rather confused episode concerning the concept of the Team Presidency, 
the outcome of which was that the half-yearly system applied to other Council 
formations was simply continued. Th   e “false IGC” of June 2007 saw an attempt on 
the part of the UK to call into question the principle of the High Representative’s 
chairing the Foreign Aﬀ  airs Council, but to no avail.
Th   e main feature of the new Presidency concept is undoubtedly its deﬁ  nitively hybrid 
nature.  Successive IGCs were unable to decide between a functional approach, in 
which the Presidency would be completely detached from the Member States 
(institutionalised Presidencies and/or Presidencies elected intuitu personae), and a 
purely national approach in which Presidency responsibility is conferred entirely, for 
a short period (six months), to each Member State. Th   e new treaty proposes a mixed 
system which introduces an institutionalised and therefore long-term Presidency 
where the requirement for continuity is regarded as greatest (European Council and 
External Relations Council) but preserves the rotating system where continuity is 
considered less important. It should be noted in passing that paradoxically it is the 
bodies regarded as most “intergovernmental” that have acquired institutionalised 
Presidencies when the opposite might have been expected.
Th   e question that comes naturally to mind regarding any construction of this sort 
is whether it will have the eﬀ  ect of combining the advantages of the two systems 
or, on the contrary, whether it is more likely to combine the disadvantages. Th  is 
requires ﬁ  rst an analysis of the possible dangers of the new Presidency system before 
moving or to identify the conditions under which it could operate smoothly.46
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4. POSSIBLE WEAKNESSES 
Th  e  ﬁ  rst weakness of the system — although it is perhaps not what immediately 
springs to mind but it is still very real — has to do with the permanent nature of the 
new functions and the personalities of their holders (in a way, it is the other side of 
the coin).  If by chance these innovations were not to become properly integrated 
into the current institutional framework either for structural reasons or because 
of the persons chosen, the entire Presidency system would suﬀ  er for a long time, 
with serious consequences for the smooth functioning of the Council in particular 
and the Union in general.  One small but undeniable advantage of the present 
rotating system is that a bad Presidency (which can happen) cannot last more than 
six months, and one can always hope, based on experience, that the next one will 
be better.  At the risk of straying into the trivial or even politically incorrect, this 
consideration ought to be taken particularly seriously when the persons who are 
to occupy the posts are chosen.
Th   e second possible danger, which may be more obvious, is the destruction of what 
could be called the unity of the Presidency, which is undeniably one of the major 
advantages of the present system.  By introducing various diﬀ  erent ways in which 
the Presidency functions, the new arrangement cuts across the unity of the chain of 
command which results from the fact that for each six-month period one and the 
same country has total political and administrative responsibility for conducting the 
Presidency, which is, at least in theory, a guarantee of consistency and eﬃ   ciency. 
In the new system, on the other hand, the Presidency will be split up into no less 
than ﬁ  ve diﬀ  erent and somewhat unconnected levels of responsibility namely: 
(1) the President of the European Council, (2) the group of three Member States in 
the eighteen-month Presidency Team, (3) the Member State in the team holding the 
six-month Presidency, (4) the High Representative for foreign policy, President of the 
Foreign Aﬀ  airs Council, and (5) the President of the euro group.
Although it is diﬃ   cult to assess, this fragmentation could have a negative eﬀ  ect on 
the preparation of the European Council in that the latter normally draws on the 
proceedings of sectoral Councils, themselves coordinated by the General Aﬀ  airs 
Council, all bodies which, because they will still be in the hands of the six-month 
Presidency, will not in principle be controlled by the President of the European Council. 
Th   is inconsistency, which is not often brought out in commentaries supporting the 
new system, could, if care is not taken to prevent it, have the eﬀ  ect of completely 
disconnecting the European Council from the rest of the Union’s decision-making 
machinery, with the danger of either isolating it in a rather detached role consisting 
of issuing general political guidance, without any real grasp of the reality of the The Presidency of the Council: The Paradox of the New Presidency
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dossiers or, on the contrary, turning itself into an “autonomous” decision-making 
body directly responsible at its own level for all politically sensitive dossiers. Both 
cases would be regrettable.
Another potential disadvantage of the new system lies in the danger of a degree of 
dilution of responsibilities. As the Presidency is no longer held by a single body, col-
lectively answerable to national and European public opinion, each party involved 
in the new Presidency might be tempted to waste a great deal of energy on taking 
credit whenever there is a success and blaming others for failure, all devices that are 
unfortunately all too common in any political undertaking in which the responsi-
bilities of individual parties are not clearly deﬁ  ned. Th   e system almost guarantees 
some degree of rivalry, especially in the media, between the future permanent 
President of the European Council and the President of the Commission, each 
with his own band of supporters from among the Member States, seeing himself 
as legitimately responsible for the Union’s ﬁ  nal destiny.
Still in the area of potential rivalries, the new arrangement will probably introduce 
an additional complication in the representation of the Union’s external action 
because of the inevitable overlapping of the various duties (or at least of how they 
are perceived) of a large number of players likely to compete with the activities of 
the High Representative. Th   ese include in particular the President of the European 
Council (of whom the treaty states — foreshadowing likely future tensions — that 
he represents the Union externally at his or her level and in that capacity), those 
Commissioners with portfolios separate — trade policy? aid? — from that of the 
President of the Commission, never slow in exercising his own role in this area, 
and, last but not least, the representatives of the six-month Presidency (head of 
government and minister for foreign aﬀ  airs) who will be very reluctant to leave 
the stage completely and will try by any means, however artiﬁ  cial, to continue to 
exist.  Th   at’s a lot of heads for one body!
Finally, the new treaty will have the eﬀ  ect of placing the head of state or of govern-
ment of the Member State holding the six-month Presidency in a rather delicate 
and, frankly, unenviable situation.  As head of government, he will have to take 
direct or indirect political responsibility for the work done during his six months in 
all areas except external relations without, theoretically at least, having the slightest 
inﬂ  uence over the way in which it is handled at European Council level. Th   is is an 
uncomfortable position, particularly for the leader of a large country. Some com-
mentators, aware of this paradox, have even gone so far as to claim that the function 
of permanent President of the European Council would perhaps never have seen 
the light of day if by sheer luck, the six-month rotation had meant that the heads of 48
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state/government of certain large countries had been its ﬁ  rst victims! Th   at is prob-
ably a slight exaggeration, but it is a sign of the uneasiness that could be expected 
in the case of certain Presidencies and certain easily identiﬁ  able persons.
At the end of this brief survey and without wishing to be a prophet of doom, it is 
safe to say that, besides the risks linked to an excessive personalisation of power in a 
structure which is as complex and, in some ways, as fragile as the Union itself, the 
new Presidency model has systemic risks which need to be identiﬁ  ed and overcome 
if the reform is to bring real added value to the good governance of the Union.
5. THE PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
We have just seen that paradoxically, under the guise of unity and consistency, the 
new system will lead to a dispersal of the Presidency, with the inevitable risk that 
each time one of its components is weakened, the system as a whole will suﬀ  er. 
Given that this is the case, those responsible for implementing the reform will have 
a twofold task: ﬁ  rstly, to strengthen each part of the Presidency in terms of its basic 
function and, secondly, to strengthen the group dynamic whenever the Presidency 
as a whole is required to act.
Let us ﬁ  rst examine the role of the President of the European Council. Th  e  descrip-
tion of his or her tasks is set out in Article 9 b of the Reform Treaty, which stipulates 
in paragraph (6) that the European Council President:
“(a) shall chair it and drive forward its work, (b) shall ensure the preparation 
and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the 
President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General 
Aﬀ  airs Council, (c) shall endeavour to facilitate consensus (d) shall at his 
or her level and in that capacity ensure the external representation of the 
Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without 
prejudice to the powers of the Minister.”
In the same way, Article 9 c § 6 provides that the General Aﬀ  airs Council “shall 
prepare and ensure the follow-up to meetings of the European Council, in liaison with 
the President of the European Council and the Commission”.
Th   ese provisions, which have remained virtually unchanged compared to the text 
drawn up by the Convention, are the mirror-image of the highly delicate balance 
achieved during the negotiation between, on the one hand, those in favour of 
strengthening the Council by establishing a permanent Presidency at the highest 
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creating a post of High Representative coming under the Council via the Presidency 
of the General Aﬀ  airs Council and under the Commission as a full member of the Col-
lege (double hat). Th   is balance, which was the fruit of a long and diﬃ   cult negotia-
tion, initially between France and Germany, must be fully borne in mind if the 
operational provisions on the establishment of the two new ﬁ  gures (President and 
High Representative) are to be adopted without too much diﬃ   culty. To respect 
this balance is to acknowledge that the High Representative participates in both 
the Council and the Commission, but also that the permanent President of the 
European Council has real political substance and brings an added value to both 
the functioning of the Council in particular and the Union in general.
If we accept these premises, the well-worn conﬂ  icting notions of, on the one hand, 
a President who is simply a chairman, and on the other hand, a President in the 
fullest sense of the word, loses much of its relevance. In accepting the political balance 
described above, the Member States sought to rule out both the notion of a single 
ﬁ  gurehead, in a role limited to giving people the ﬂ  oor and making appropriate 
declarations, and that of a supreme ﬁ  gure of authority, ultimately responsible for 
the fate of the Union, along the lines of that foreseen in the French Constitution 
of 1958. How then do we deﬁ  ne his function if we discount these two extremes, 
both of which are equally unrealistic? Th   e answer lies in giving real eﬀ  ect to the 
provisions in the text of the Constitutional Treaty as agreed by Member States’ 
governments. Th   e terms used in the Treaty describe the role of the President of the 
European Council precisely and unambiguously around four main tasks: preparing 
the work, conducting debates (“he shall drive forward the work”), drawing up com-
mon conclusions (“he shall endeavour to facilitate consensus”) and following up the 
work (“he shall ensure the continuity”), in addition to the external representation of 
the Union, which is undoubtedly the point which is least clear.
Th   ese tasks correspond very broadly to those of the current six-month Presidency, 
with however the very important addition of the organisation of work in the 
medium and long-term, which is linked to the permanent nature of the function. 
It follows logically that the new-style President of the European Council must 
have, mutatis mutandis, the same means and the same resources as his predecessors, 
with regard both to his part in the institutional process and to the administrative 
instruments at his disposal. 
As far as his part in the institutional process is concerned, the President must have 
a status within the General Aﬀ  airs Council which allows him to perform the role 
conferred on him by the Treaty fully and eﬀ  ectively. Th   is clearly presupposes a 
right to intervene and to make proposals in all areas directly or indirectly related 50
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to the preparation and implementation of European Council decisions and the 
right to intervene ex oﬃ   cio in the same areas in all specialised Councils and in the 
GA Council. A refusal to grant the President these prerogatives or any limitation 
of their exercise would indirectly undermine the provisions in Article 9. 
Th   e President of the European Council must then be given the administrative 
and material resources needed to carry out his task. On the assumption that his 
responsibilities for preparing and following up conclusions will mutatis mutandis 
be identical to those of the current President, this means putting at his disposal a 
private oﬃ   ce and an administrative team responsible for advising him and for liais-
ing with others involved in the Presidency, with the other institutions, in particular 
the Parliament (which will probably make many more demands on him than on 
the six-month President!) and with the Member States. Th   is administrative team 
should have some degree of autonomy but should be situated within the Council 
Secretariat, whose logistical resources would be put at the disposal of the President. 
Th   e Secretariat would in eﬀ  ect be the only real interface (as well as a communication 
channel) between the permanent Presidency and the six-month Presidency, and 
will therefore play a more important role in the new system than hitherto.
6. THE NECESSITY OF COORDINATION
Having ensured that the President of the European Council has the prerogatives 
and resources needed to perform his tasks, it will be necessary to establish an 
appropriate way of ensuring cooperation between the permanent President and his 
rotating counterpart. Th   is is important if the outcome of the proceedings of the 
sectoral Councils is to be available to the permanent President early enough to feed 
into the discussions of the European Council. Even if it is not its main aim, this 
systematic cooperation with the six-month Presidency should also help to allevi-
ate the understandable frustration felt by the Head of State or of Government at 
no longer being in the Presidency chair, whilst also ensuring that he does not act 
as a rival to the President-in-oﬃ   ce, which the Heads of Government of the larger 
Member States might well be tempted to do.
More generally, it will be necessary to put in place eﬃ   cient consultation and coordina-
tion procedures for all those involved in the Presidency: the permanent President of 
the European Council, the Presidency of the Eurogroup if necessary, representatives 
of the rotating Presidency, the High Representative, the President of the Commis-
sion and the Secretary-General of the Council. Because of their vital importance for 
the coherence and smooth functioning of the Presidency, these procedures should, The Presidency of the Council: The Paradox of the New Presidency
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without being excessively formalised, at the very least consist of constant contacts 
between those in charge at the highest level and regular meetings, held as often as 
necessary (weekly?) with their direct counterparts (with, of course, a speciﬁ  c role 
for the Chairman of Coreper). Th   is will be the price to pay for a new system that 
is both viable and robust.
Another way of strengthening the coherence and predictability of the system as 
a whole would be to develop cooperation within the 18-month Presidency trio on 
the basis of the various relevant provisions in the new Treaty. Other than being of 
obvious importance for the continuity of the work, a judicious use of the potential 
provided by the Presidency trio system would also help smooth relations between 
the permanent President of the European Council and the six-month Presidency 
which, like it or not, will always be a potential source of tension.
Furthermore, the provisions on the planning of the Council’s work will have to be 
adapted to the new situation. A serious, indicative programme over two and a half 
years — covering at least the major topics on the political agenda — would have 
the advantage of being aligned with the term of the President’s period in oﬃ   ce 
and would represent a sort of contract between him and the rotating Presidencies, 
thereby helping pave the way for good cooperation. Against this background, 
the 18-month cycle loses some of its signiﬁ  cance, but should be retained since it 
is already included in the Treaty where it provides the basis for the work of the 
Presidency trio (see above).  Th   e President of the European Council will of course 
have to be very closely involved in all procedures relating to the planning of the 
Council’s work, whether it be a programme for two and a half years, one and a 
half years or six months.
Finally, the eﬀ  ectiveness of the Presidency will depend to a certain extent on the role 
given to the new General Aﬀ  airs Council, which from now on will be enshrined in 
the Treaty and separate from the Foreign Aﬀ  airs Council. Th   is coordination instru-
ment, which has until now never really been used for a number of reasons — not 
least the unproductive corporatism of the Foreign Aﬀ  airs ministers — could, if 
ﬁ  nally taken seriously, become the best way of guaranteeing the political coherence 
of the whole system.
Another factor in the success of the new formula will be the Council’s ability to 
reform its day-to-day working methods, which have particularly suﬀ  ered as a result 
of the increase in its members and will have to be adapted to the new situation. Last 
but not least, whilst the basic outline of the Presidency model is ﬁ  xed, it has several 
elements which can be adjusted which the Council will have to use with caution 
in the light of experience when considering, for example, the idea of widening 52
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the tasks of the General Secretariat on a case-by-case basis or extending the use of 
elected Presidencies.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, it seems that the original desire to put in place a single Presidency will, 
paradoxically, impose a sort of collegiality between the various participants, since 
the retention de facto of the six-month rotation will result in an overlapping of 
their responsibilities.
To enable this semi-collegial Presidency to function smoothly, it will be necessary 
to give a central place to the President of the European Council, who should logi-
cally be its driving force and act as arbiter since he is ultimately accountable to the 
highest body.  Choosing to ignore this political reality by making the President 
of the European Council a simple “chairman” with an ill-deﬁ  ned supporting role 
would not be in keeping with the spirit of the Treaty and would inevitably lead to 
serious disillusionment and, ultimately, to disorder and powerlessness.
Conversely, if the future President of the European Council were to show any 
signs of autocratic behaviour by ignoring or acting against the advice of those with 
whom he has to work in the exercise of his responsibilities or by avoiding the basic 
obligation to consult, he would quickly be criticised and sooner rather than later 
be confronted with a refusal to cooperate, which would also lead to confusion and 
paralysis.
Between these two temptations — which permeate the text of the new Treaty as a 
result of strong ulterior motives at play during the negotiations — the path ahead 
is narrow and, as is often the case, the choice of the ﬁ  rst men or women to perform 
these new tasks will be decisive for the immediate and longer-term future of func-
tion of the Presidency.The Presidency of the Council: The Paradox of the New Presidency
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Annex 1  Th   e European Council and its President
  (as envisaged by CIG 1/1/07 October 2007: pp. 12-13)
Article 9b
1.   Th   e European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for 
its development and shall deﬁ  ne the general political directions and priorities 
thereof. It shall not exercise legislative functions.
2.   Th   e European Council shall consist of the Heads of State or Government 
of the Member States, together with its President and the President of the 
Commission. Th   e High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and 
Security Policy shall take part in its work. 
3.   Th   e European Council shall meet twice every six months, convened by its Presi-
dent. When the agenda so requires, the members of the European Council 
may decide each to be assisted by a minister and, in the case of the President 
of the Commission, by a member of the Commission. When the situation 
so requires, the President shall convene a special meeting of the European 
Council. 
4.   Except where the Treaties provide otherwise, decisions of the European Coun-
cil shall be taken by consensus.
5.   Th   e European Council shall elect its President, by a qualiﬁ  ed majority, for a 
term of two and a half years, renewable once. In the event of an impediment 
or serious misconduct, the European Council can end his or her term of oﬃ   ce 
in accordance with the same procedure.
6.   Th   e President of the European Council: (a) shall chair it and drive forward 
its work; (b) shall ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the 
European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission, and 
on the basis of the work of the General Aﬀ  airs Council; (c) shall endeavour 
to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council; (d) shall 
present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the 
European Council. Th   e President of the European Council shall, at his or her 
level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on 
issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice 
to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs 
and Security Policy. Th   e President of the European Council shall not hold a 
national oﬃ   ce.54
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Article 9c
6.   Th   e Council shall meet in diﬀ  erent conﬁ  gurations, the list of which shall be 
adopted in accordance with Article 201b(a), of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. 
  Th   e General Aﬀ  airs Council shall ensure consistency in the work of the dif-
ferent Council conﬁ  gurations. It shall prepare and ensure the follow-up to 
meetings of the European Council, in liaison with the President of the Euro-
pean Council and the Commission. 
  Th   e Foreign Aﬀ  airs Council shall elaborate the Union’s external action on the 
basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensure 
that the Union’s action is consistent. 
7.   A Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Mem-
ber States shall be responsible for preparing the work of the Council. 
8.   Th   e Council shall meet in public when it deliberates and votes on a draft 
legislative act. To this end, each Council meeting shall be divided into two 
parts, dealing respectively with deliberations on Union legislative acts and 
non-legislative activities. 
9.   Th   e Presidency of Council conﬁ  gurations, other than that of Foreign Aﬀ  airs, 
shall be held by Member State representatives in the Council on the basis of 
equal rotation, in accordance with the conditions established in accordance 
with Article 201b(b), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union.”
Annex 2  Th   e European Council
  (as envisaged by CIG 1/1/07 October 2007: p. 114)
Article 201a
1.   Where a vote is taken, any member of the European Council may also act on 
behalf of not more than one other member. 
  Paragraph 4 of Article 9c of the Treaty on European Union and paragraph 2 
of Article 205 of this Treaty shall apply to the European Council when it is 
acting by a qualiﬁ  ed majority. Where the European Council decides by vote, 
its President and the President of the Commission shall not take part in the 
vote. 
  Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent 
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2.   Th   e President of the European Parliament may be invited to be heard by the 
European Council. 
3.   Th   e European Council shall act by a simple majority for procedural questions 
and for the adoption of its Rules of Procedure. 
4.   Th   e European Council shall be assisted by the General Secretariat of the 
Council. 
Article 201b 
Th   e European Council shall adopt by a qualiﬁ  ed majority: 
(a)   a decision establishing the list of Council conﬁ  gurations other than those 
referred to in second and third subparagraphs of Article 9c(6) of the Treaty 
on European Union; 
(b)   a decision on the Presidency of Council conﬁ  gurations, other than that of 
Foreign Aﬀ  airs, in accordance with Article 9c(9) of the Treaty on European 
Union.”. 
Annex 3    Declaration on Article 9c(9) of the Treaty on European 
Union concerning the European Council decision on the 
exercise of the Presidency of the Council
(as envisaged by CIG 3/1/07 REV 1 October 2007: pp. 3-4)
Th   e Conference declares that the Council should begin preparing the decision 
establishing the procedures for implementing the decision on the exercise of the 
Presidency of the Council as soon as the Treaty amending the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community is signed, and should 
give its political approval within six months. A draft decision of the European 
Council, which will be adopted on the date of entry into force of the said Treaty, 
is set out below: 
Draft decision of the European Council on the exercise of the Presidency of 
the Council 
Article 1
1.   Th   e Presidency of the Council, with the exception of the Foreign Aﬀ  airs 
conﬁ  guration, shall be held by pre-established groups of three Member States 
for a period of 18 months. Th   e groups shall be made up on a basis of equal 56
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rotation among the Member States, taking into account their diversity and 
geographical balance within the Union.
2.   Each member of the group shall in turn chair for a six-month period all 
conﬁ  gurations of the Council, with the exception of the Foreign Aﬀ  airs con-
ﬁ  guration. Th   e other members of the group shall assist the Chair in all its 
responsibilities on the basis of a common programme. Members of the team 
may decide alternative arrangements among themselves. 
Article 2
Th   e Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States shall be chaired by a representative of the Member State chairing the General 
Aﬀ  airs Council. 
Th   e Chair of the Political and Security Committee shall be held by a representative 
of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy. 
Th   e chair of the preparatory bodies of the various Council conﬁ  gurations, with 
the exception of the Foreign Aﬀ  airs conﬁ  guration, shall fall to the member of the 
group chairing the relevant conﬁ  guration, unless decided otherwise in accordance 
with Article 4. 
Article 3
Th   e General Aﬀ  airs Council shall ensure consistency and continuity in the work of 
the diﬀ  erent Council conﬁ  gurations in the framework of multiannual programmes 
in cooperation with the Commission. Th   e Member States holding the Presidency 
shall take all necessary measures for the organisation and smooth operation of the 
Council’s work, with the assistance of the General Secretariat of the Council. 
Article 4
Th   e Council shall adopt a decision establishing the measures for the implementa-
tion of this decision.57
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QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING IN THE COUNCIL:
EXPLAINING AND ASSESSING THE NEW RULE(S)
Th  e  qualiﬁ  ed majority voting (QMV) rules in the Council of the European Union
[1] 
have been subject to constant debate and negotiations throughout the history of 
the Union. Th   e various versions of the rules reﬂ  ect the fundamental question of 
how best to balance the representation of small and large countries, as well as how 
to reﬂ  ect the Union’s dual identity as both a “Union of States” and a “Union of 
People”. As a result, decisions by QMV have ever since the establishment of the 
European Economic Community in 1957 been characterised by a system of “degres-
sive proportionality” where medium- and small members are given more weights 
proportionally to their population shares. In this way, the principle of degressivity 
is widely argued to give more legitimacy to the system due to the considerations of 
both governments and populations, and so far there has been no real questioning of 
this argument. However, the inclusion of a large number of members — particularly 
a large number of small and medium-sized members — in 2004 and again in 2007 
once more opened up the issue of how to balance representation in the Council. 
Th   e QMV rules in the Reform Treaty are a bold departure from the Nice Treaty 
rules, which constitutes the current legal base for decision-making. Th  e  three 
criteria in the Nice rules are 1) that 255 of the 345 votes distributed between the 
members must be cast in favour of the proposal, 2) that 62% of the population must 
be represented, and 3) that a majority of countries must be supportive. Extensive 
analyses of these rules have been provided by a number of scholars and practitioners, 
with the dominant conclusions being that the Nice rules are rather complicated 
and ineﬃ   cient; these characteristics are further emphasised as the membership of 
the Union has grown. 
Th   e rules included in the Nice Treaty were never considered an optimal solution 
that would last for many years. It had only been possible to agree to smaller changes 
during the Nice Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) in 2000 and the general 
request to increase the eﬃ   ciency of the system was left unfulﬁ  lled. It was on this 
basis, and in the context of the initiative taken in Laeken in 2001 to re-shape the 
entire treaty base of the Union, that the Convention on the Future of Europe in 
2003 presented a proposal for a new simpliﬁ  ed “double majority” system. Th  is 
proposal was subsequently modiﬁ  ed and adopted at an IGC in 2004 as part of 
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (commonly referred to as “the 
[1]   Hereafter referred to as “the Council”.60
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Constitutional Treaty”). Th   e rules included in the Constitutional Treaty abolished 
the weighted voting system that has been included in all previous treaty texts, 
and instead stated that 55% of the Member States and 65% of the population 
must be represented in order for a proposal to pass.
[2] Th   e rules in the new Reform 
Treaty stem from the outcome of this 2004 decision, which was later suspended 
due to the failed ratiﬁ  cation of the Constitutional Treaty. Th   ough, the new rules 
stipulated in the Reform Treaty include a few signiﬁ  cant amendments to the rules 
formulated in 2004. 
1. THE NEW QMV RULES
Th  e  qualiﬁ  ed majority rule stipulated in the Reform Treaty (Article 9c) states 
that:
“As from 1 November 2014, a qualiﬁ  ed majority shall be deﬁ  ned as at least 
55 % of the members of the Council, comprising at least ﬁ  fteen of them 
and representing Member States comprising at least 65 % of the population 
of the Union. 
A blocking minority must include at least four Council members, failing 
which the qualiﬁ  ed majority shall be deemed attained.”
In Article 205(2) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union this rule 
is further speciﬁ  ed with the following:
“[…] as from 1 November 2014 and subject to the provisions laid down in 
the Protocol on transitional provisions, where the Council does not act on 
a proposal from the Commission or from the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy, the qualiﬁ  ed majority shall be 
deﬁ  ned as at least 72% of the members of the Council, representing Member 
States comprising at least 65% of the population of the Union. 
[…] in cases where not all the members of the Council participate in voting, 
a qualiﬁ  ed majority shall be deﬁ  ned as follows: 
(a)  A qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55% of the mem-
bers of the Council representing the participating Member 
States, comprising at least 65% of the population of these States. 
[2]   The requirements were a majority of Member States and 60% of the populations in the proposal from the 
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A blocking minority must include at least the minimum number of Coun-
cil members representing more than 35% of the population of the par-
ticipating Member States, plus one member, failing which the qualiﬁ  ed 
majority shall be deemed attained;
(b)  By way of derogation from point (a), where the Council does not act on 
a proposal from the Commission or from the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy, the qualiﬁ  ed majority shall 
be deﬁ  ned as at least 72% of the members of the Council representing the 
participating Member States, comprising at least 65% of the population 
of these States.”
Furthermore, the text includes — in Protocol No 10 on Transitional Provisions, 
Article 3 — the speciﬁ  cation that from 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2017 a tran-
sitional rule is in place that allows a Council member to request for the application of 
the current Nice rules if the proposal on the table is of particular political sensitivity 
to that Member State.
[3] Lastly, in the Declarations attached to the Reform Treaty, 
an article sets out the legal basis for the so-called modiﬁ  ed Ioannina compromise 
(Article 4). Th   is article has caused great headaches for the negotiators, not least for 
the previous German presidency and the current Portuguese, as some governments 
have had very strong — and diverging — preferences over both the wording, the 
legal status and the implementation of the compromise. As a last development 
before the article was unanimously adopted, a reference to how the article can be 
amended was after the October Council summit included in a Protocol. Th  e  full 
text of the article in the Declaration as well as the article in the Protocol is provided 
in Annex 1, while the content and background should be explained here.
The Modifi  ed Ioannina Compromise
A deadlock during the June 2007 summit negotiations led the European Council 
to agree to the inclusion of an article which stipulates the possibility for a minority 
of countries to request a deferral and re-examination of a decision in cases where 
[3]   The application would be in a slightly modifi  ed version, but with the same implications as under the Nice rules: 
“Acts shall be adopted if there at least 255 votes in favour representing a majority of the members where, under the Treaties, 
they must be adopted on a proposal from the Commission. In other cases decisions shall be adopted if there at least 255 votes 
in favour representing at least two thirds of the members. 
A member of the European Council or the Council may request that, where an act is adopted by the European Council or the 
Council by a qualifi  ed majority, a check is made to ensure that the Member States comprising the qualifi  ed majority represent 
at least 62% of the total population of the Union. If that proves not to be the case, the act shall not be adopted.
Until 31 October 2014, the qualifi  ed majority shall, in cases where not all the members of the Council participate in voting, […] 
, be defi  ned as the same proportion of the weighted votes and the same proportion of the number of the Council members 
and, if appropriate, the same percentage of the population of the Member States concerned as laid down in [the] paragraph 
[above].”62
The Treaty of Lisbon : Implementing the Institutional Innovations
these countries would oppose the decision, but are not quite enough to form a 
blocking group. According to the then German presidency, this deferral was not 
included to allow for any veto-like situation, but is rather intended to serve as a 
mechanism that would allow the Council members more time to build broader 
support for a given decision. Th   e paragraph is in this way a modiﬁ  cation of the 
so-called “Ioannina compromise” invented in 1994 prior to the enlargement of 
the EU to 15 Member States. Th   e new version of this compromise, as included in 
the Reform Treaty, states that it is possible for Member States which represent 1) 
three quarters of the population share necessary to constitute a blocking minor-
ity, or 2) three quarters of the number of Member States necessary to constitute a 
blocking minority to request the Council to continue its work to ﬁ  nd an agreement 
with broader support, if a minority is strongly opposed to a proposal. A second 
threshold applies for the period following 2017 with the requirement then being 
“[…] at least 55% of the population or at least 55% of the Member States necessary to 
constitute a blocking minority”.
Th   e deferral of a decision has the limitation that it should be done “within a rea-
sonable time without prejudicing obligatory time limits laid down by Union law” 
(please refer to Annex 1). EU decision rules generally have a three month limit for 
the Council to reach a decision on a Commission proposal or Parliament opinion, 
which could suggest that also decisions under the Ioannina compromise cannot be 
delayed by more than three months. However, the revival of the Ioannina com-
promise was due to a demand made by the Polish government, which after the 
presentation of the text for a short while threatened to not support the agreement 
as they argued that they had been promised a deferral period of up to two years 
would be included in the text. At the end, the Poles gave in on the issue after tense 
discussions with the presidency, and the Reform Treaty now has no explicit men-
tioning of the possible duration of the deferral period under the modiﬁ  ed Ioannina 
compromise. Still, it is on this basis that the article is now placed in the Treaty’s 
Declarations rather then in a Protocol or the Treaty text itself. As mentioned, a 
reference stipulating that the article can only be amended by “consensus” is included 
in Protocol No. 9, but the placement of the article itself in a declaration provides 
the article with less legal status and eﬀ  ectively signals it to be an exception clause 
rather than the norm.
2. IMPLICATIONS 
Th   e naming of the Reform Treaty rules as a “double majority rule” may seem 
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does not appear as a simple decision rule with only two criteria to be met. Even 
the “basic” voting rules that will be applied to the vast majority of decisions (i.e. 
the ﬁ  rst article explained above under Article 9c) actually consist of three criteria, 
namely the population criteria of 65%, the Member State criteria of 55% and the 
blocking criteria of 4 Member States. Still, the rules are consistently referred to 
by this name mainly as a “left-over” from the convention and the rules included 
in the suspended Constitutional Treaty. Th   ere, the emphasis was on ﬁ  nding an 
“adequate” percentage level for both the population and the Member State criteria 
during the negotiations. 
As in any democratic, political system, the decision rules stipulated in the Reform 
Treaty must be carefully evaluated not just on the basis of whether or not it was 
the best political deal that could be achieved at the eve of the negotiations. Rather, 
they must be addressed in the light of their direct implications for the transparency, 
eﬃ   ciency and democratic legitimacy of the system.
Th   is analysis y seeks to address the topic from the point of how the new rules are 
likely to change the power balance and decision-making, compared to the current 
Nice rules. With this aim in mind, the remaining part of the paper is structured 
according to 4 topics: 1) General observations made regarding the deﬁ  nitions of 
the Reform Treaty rules, 2) expected changes in the eﬃ   ciency of the system when 
compared to the current rules, 3) changes in the power balance between Member 
States, and 4) the sustainability and implementation of the rules.
3. THE PRIMACY OF THE POPULATION CRITERION
Turning from the explanation and deﬁ  nition of the new QMV rules to an analysis 
of the implications, the ﬁ  rst point to raise is related to the actual deﬁ  nition of the 
three criteria for passing legislation.
[4] Why has the threshold ended with a 65% 
level for the representation of the populations, why are 55% of the Member States 
needed in support of a proposal, and why does it require at least 4 governments to 
form a blocking minority? Th   e answer is perhaps rather disappointing: Although 
the initial logic was to have a simple system with only two criteria that could 
increase the eﬃ   ciency and transparency of decision-making, the process obscured 
the simplicity and the political negotiations have now resulted in a rule which 
seeks to re-order the balance between small, medium and large Member States, 
but which is essentially a rather complicated system where no one government can 
[4]   The population criterion, the Member State criterion and the blocking criterion.64
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easily predict their exact relative or absolute weights in the negotiations, let a lone 
the weight of others. Th   ough, one ﬁ  rst conclusion to draw in this paper may go 
some way in easing these complexities: Th   e dominant component of the three vot-
ing criteria is the 65% population quota, as there is a rather small probability that 
legislation would be diﬀ  erent when passed based on the population criterion on its 
own compared to all three components of the rule.
[5] Especially the clause excluding 
blocking majorities with less than 4 members rules out just 10 possible coalitions.
[6] 
Th   erefore, as a basic rule, the population shares can serve as a good indicator for 
the distribution of inﬂ  uence, quite similarly as the weighted votes have been in all 
previous treaties. Still, since each of the criteria have to be met — and can be used 
as a blocking element if they are not — there may be situations where either of the 
criteria will play a role and they should as such therefore all be addressed. 
A second conclusion to draw from the speciﬁ  cations of the Reform Treaty QMV 
rules is that, considering the fact that the population criterion is a dominant factor, 
it is rather concerning that no formal legislative speciﬁ  cations are provided from 
the EU level with regard to how the Member States should report their population 
ﬁ  gures. It is common for democratic political systems that rely on a population 
criterion for decision-making to have legal speciﬁ  cations for how to count and report 
on the number of people that can be categorised as part of the “population”. Th  e 
US is but one example where such regulation is in place. In order to authoritatively 
establish what the absolute number associated with the 65% threshold is in the 
Reform Treaty, EU-wide censuses either have to be carried out on a regular basis, or 
a common legal base must be established to ensure a harmonised and accountable 
reporting by the governments to Eurostat, which currently provides the national 
statistical data for the EU. At present, the latter appears somewhat questionable as 
an authoritative basis for the purpose of determining the vote quota in the Council: 
With no legal framework from the EU level for the reporting of population sizes, 
there appears to be some diﬀ  erences between how the Member States report the 
numbers of “residents” and “citizens”, and to which extent “migrants” are uniformly 
counted and reported in the national ﬁ  gures. A legally founded deﬁ  nition of the 
population threshold should therefore be considered in order to avoid suspicions 
of statistical inaccuracy or even political manipulation. Th   e recent row between 
Germany and Poland during the June EU summit over who should be counted in 
[5]   Please recall from above that although the Reform Treaty rules are popularly referred to as the “double majority 
rule”, they do in fact consist of three components, namely the population criterion of 65%, the Member State criterion 
of 55% and the “blocking criterion” of at least 4 Member States.
[6]   These are: Germany and France and one of either UK, Italy, Spain or Poland; Germany and UK and one of Italy, Spain 
or Poland; Germany and Italy and one of Spain or Poland; France and UK and Italy. An 11th coalition would, based on the 
predicted demographic changes presented in Table 1, from 2025 be France, UK and Spain. Qualifi  ed Majority Voting in the Council: Explaining and Assessing the New Rule(s)
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their respective countries, and the basis for how their respective votes in the Council 
should be determined, signiﬁ  es the importance of having the legal rules in place. 
Somewhat related hereto, another observation is that Europe’s demographic changes 
over the next 20 years do not appear to have been considered during the negotiations 
over the decision threshold, and they may aﬀ  ect the voting system (if it remains in 
place) at some point after they have come fully into eﬀ  ect in 2014-2017. Table 1 
below summarises how the population sizes will develop up until 2050.
Table 1: Population forecasts of current EU Member States (millions)
Country 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Germany 82,6 82,8 82,9 82,7 82,1 81,1 79,9 78,4 76,7 74,6
France 60,2 61,5 62,6 63,6 64,4 65,1 65,7 66 65,9 65,7
UK 59,9 60,9 61,9 62,9 63,8 64,4 64,7 64,7 64,6 64,3
Italy 58,2 58,6 58,6 58,3 57,8 57,1 56,3 55,3 54,2 52,7
Spain 42,9 44,6 45,3 45,6 45,6 45,4 45,1 44,6 43,9 42,8
Poland 38,1 37,8 37,4 37,1 36,8 36,5 36,1 35,4 34,5 33,7
Romania 21,7 21,3 20,9 20,3 19,7 19,2 18,8 18,3 17,8 17,1
Netherlands 16,3 16,7 17 17,2 17,4 17,6 17,7 17,6 17,5 17,4
Greece 11,1 11,3 11,4 11,4 11,4 11,3 11,2 11,1 10,9 10,6
Portugal 10,5 10,7 10,8 10,8 10,7 10,7 10,6 10,4 10,2 10
Belgium 10,4 10,6 10,7 10,8 10,9 11 11 11 11 10,9
Czech Rep. 10,2 10,1 10 9,9 9,8 9,7 9,5 9,3 9,1 8,9
Hungary 10,1 10 9,8 9,7 9,6 9,5 9,4 9,2 9,1 8,9
Sweden 9 9,2 9,4 9,6 9,8 9,9 10 10,1 10,1 10,2
Austria 8,1 8,3 8,4 8,4 8,5 8,5 8,5 8,4 8,3 8,2
Bulgaria 7,7 7,4 7,1 6,8 6,5 6,2 5,9 5,6 5,4 5,1
Denmark 5,4 5,5 5,5 5,5 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,5 5,5 5,4
Slovakia 5,4 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,2 5,2 5,1 5 4,9 4,7
Finland 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,4 5,4 5,4 5,4 5,4 5,3 5,2
Ireland 4,1 4,3 4,6 4,8 4,9 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,5
Lithuania 3,4 3,3 3,3 3,2 3,1 3,1 3 3 2,9 2,9
Latvia 2,3 2,2 2,2 2,1 2,1 2 2 1,9 1,9 1,9
Slovenia 22222222 1 , 9 1 , 9
Estonia 1,3 1,3 1,3 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,1 1,1
Cyprus 0 , 7 0 , 8 0 , 8 0 , 9 0 , 9 0 , 9 0 , 9111
Luxembourg 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6
Malta 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5
Total 487,7 492,7 495,5 496,5 496,2 494,8 491,9 486,8 480,2 471,866
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4. EFFICIENCY
Th   e lowering in the decision threshold by the new rules improves the eﬃ   ciency 
of the EU in that it increases the probability of governments’ approval of an act 
rather than their blockage. Also, the Reform Treaty text further extends the QMV 
rule to a number of new areas where the EU will gain new competences, as well 
as a number of existing areas currently under the unanimity requirement. Annex 
2 lists all of these areas. 
Th   e decision to transfer areas already existing within the EU framework to the 
QMV decision rule from the unanimity rule is made on the basis that decision-mak-
ing within these areas has essentially proved too ineﬃ   cient amongst the Member 
States. Th   e perhaps most debated area which in this way will experience substan-
tial institutional revision is the area of freedom, security and justice that has been 
notorious for its inability to respond to its challenges under the existing institu-
tional framework.
[7] Still, as pointed out in chapter “Enhanced Cooperation”, a 
number of technocratic terms like “emergency brakes”, “ﬂ  exibility”, “enhanced 
cooperation” and “opt-outs” (and even “opt-ins”) mar the language around these 
otherwise well-intended transfers to the QMV rule, particularly within the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice. Hence, the Reform Treaty rules will in principle 
create an improved decision-making procedure for each of these areas, but it may 
be that the increased emphasis on ﬂ  exibility mechanisms related to the QMV rules 
results in a system of “exceptionalism” rather than a de-intergovernmentalisation 
of these new policy areas. 
Hence, the Reform Treaty rules will in principle create an improved decision-
making procedure for each of these areas that will lead to a higher degree of eﬃ   -
ciency, legal certainty, accountability and democratic control by the European 
Parliament.
Another point to take into account is the fact that in the case of the Council it 
is necessary to consider not merely the mathematical probabilities for approving 
legislation but also the eﬀ  ect on how everyday preparatory negotiations are carried 
out. In this regard, there is little doubt that the lowering of the decision threshold 
will alter also the informal negotiations, putting a pressure on the governments to 
“comply” more easily with the expected majority position as they can otherwise 
risk to be isolated in a losing minority without inﬂ  uence. 
[7]   C ARRERA S. and GEYER Fl., The Reform Treaty and Justice and Home Aff  airs (Bruxelles, CEPS — Policy Brief, August 2007); 
see also chapter “Enhanced Cooperation” in this issue.Qualifi  ed Majority Voting in the Council: Explaining and Assessing the New Rule(s)
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Still, it would be naïve to assert that the new rules will fully solve the current chal-
lenges the EU face in terms of eﬃ   ciency. Th   e new system will not enter into force 
until 2014/2017 and the eﬀ  ects of implementing the Ioannina compromise remain 
unknown. In eﬀ  ect, the risk is that the clause can be activated rather easily with the 
threshold being only 1/4 of the Member States and 1/5 of the population before it 
can be formally introduced. And even if the Ioannina clause does not lead to explicit 
blocking of legislation, there is a real chance that the threat of applying it may lead 
to a slower decision-making process in the Council due to a need for more bargain-
ing between the Member States. It is on this basis that the new QMV rules can be 
concluded to generally increase the eﬃ   ciency of decision-making in the Council 
granted that there is a certain “etiquette” from the governments’ side to refrain from 
invoking the Ioannina compromise. But, again, we will have to wait until 2014 and 
2017 to see if such etiquette will indeed be possible in a Union of 27+.
5. EQUITY
Th   e double majority rule (with the additional modifying clause) in the Reform 
Treaty does not allocate ﬁ  xed votes to each country, but the dominance of the 
population criterion means that the number of votes for each government is, in 
eﬀ  ect, equal to the population of the given Member State. Now, as shown above, 
these ﬁ  gures change over time and are in fact not uniformly or precisely deﬁ  ned. 
Nevertheless, based on the latest available Eurostat population ﬁ  gures, Table 2 
compares the Nice Treaty and Reform Treaty rules by listing the population sizes, 
the absolute number of votes allocated under the Nice Treaty, the distribution of 
relative voting power under each rule as well as the ﬁ  gures for how well this relative 
voting power corresponds with the governments’ population shares 
According to a school of thought, this can generate problems of over/under-
representation. Th   ough this analysis is not shared by all of us, it deserves being 
mentioned.
Before concluding on the results in the table, a short explanation should be given 
on the method for estimating both the distribution of voting power and the over/
under-representation: Th   e “Voting power” columns in Table 2 are constructed 
on the basis of a commonly adopted — but much debated — assumption used 
in power analyses of the governments in the Council. Rather than comparing the 
number of votes that each government has in absolute terms, and which can lead 
to very misleading conclusions regarding how much power that provides a gov-
ernment with in real terms, the literature on voting power has developed various 68
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ways of estimating how much inﬂ  uence the governments hold in terms of their 
probabilities for inﬂ  uencing a decision outcome. Much criticism has been voiced 
regarding this form of power analysis that is based on voting power indices, mainly 
due to its lack of consideration of empirical aspects such as the skills of negotia-
tors, coalition blocks, years of membership and/or the preferences of the respective 
governments. 
Deciding Powers
Th   ere are no doubts that certain countries have more inﬂ  uence than others based 
on such Assets.
[8] Nevertheless the implications of the voting rules should be con-
sidered both in their empirical, political context as well as on a basis independently 
of any other factors which may aﬀ  ect the negotiation process. Th   e latter is what 
the columns in Table 2 provide the results for, whereas the political context will 
be considered in the text below.
Table 2:   Changes in the QMV rules from the Nice Treaty 
to the Reform Treaty
Country Popula-
tion 
(mio.)*
Popula-
tion 
(%)*
Nice 
Treaty: 
Votes
Nice 
Treaty: 
Voting 
power**
Nice 
Treaty: 
Over/
under 
represen-
tation 
(%) ***
Reform 
Treaty: 
Voting 
power**
Reform 
Treaty: 
Over/
under 
represen-
tation 
(%) ***
Germany 82.4 16.72 29 7.78 -17.8 11.65 23.1
France 63.0 12.78 29 7.78 -5.9 9.03 9.2
UK 60.4 12.25 29 7.78 -3.9 8.69 7.3
Italy 58.8 11.93 29 7.78 -2.6 8.49 6.2
Spain 43.8 8.89 27 7.42 7.5 6.55 -5.1
Poland 38.1 7.73 27 7.42 15.2 5.71 -11.4
Romania 21.6 4.38 14 4.26 -12.2 4.15 -14.3
Netherlands 16.3 3.31 13 3.97 -5.6 3.50 -17
Greece 11.1 2.25 12 3.68 5.8 2.88 -17.3
Portugal 10.6 2.15 12 3.68 8.7 2.80 -17.3
Belgium 10.5 2.13 12 3.68 9 2.80 -17.2
Czech Rep. 10.3 2.09 12 3.68 10.3 2.77 -17.1
Hungary 10.1 2.05 12 3.68 11.3 2.75 -17.0
Sweden 9.0 1.83 10 3.09 -1.5 2.63 -16.2
[8]   see e.g. MOBERG A., Is the double majority really double? The second round in the debate of the voting rules in the EU 
Constitutional Treaty (Madrid, Real Instituto Elcano, WP 23/2007) for a discussion.Qualifi  ed Majority Voting in the Council: Explaining and Assessing the New Rule(s)
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Austria 8.3 1.68 10 3.09 3.1 2.53 -15.5
Bulgaria 7.7 1.56 10 3.09 6.7 2.47 -14.8
Denmark 5.4 1.10 7 2.18 -10.2 2.19 -9.9
Slovakia 5.4 1.10 7 2.18 -9.9 2.18 -9.8
Finland 5.3 1.08 7 2.18 -8.7 2.17 -9.1
Ireland 4.2 0.85 7 2.18 1.9 2.04 -4.6
Lithuania 3.4 0.69 7 2.18 13.6 1.95 1.2
Latvia 2.3 0.47 4 1.25 -20.9 1.81 14.9
Slovenia 2.0 0.41 4 1.25 -15.5 1.78 20.6
Estonia 1.3 0.26 4 1.25 3.3 1.70 40.3
Cyprus 0.7 0.14 4 1.25 37.4 1.63 78.6
Luxembourg 0.5 0.10 4 1.25 76.1 1.59 124.7
Malta 0.4 0.08 3 0.94 42.9 1.58 138.6
Total**** 492.9 100.00 345 99.95 - 100.02 -
QMV thresholds Pop (%) Votes Members
Nice Treaty 62% 255 (74%) 14 (50+%)
Reform Treaty 65%-  55%
* Source: Latest Eurostat fi  gures (2006) available from www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat.
** “Voting power” refers to the relative voting power distribution, meaning each government’s ability to infl  uence a 
decision and be pivotal for the forming of a majority. The relative voting power calculations have the advantage that, 
contrary to the absolute vote distribution, they allow for a direct comparison of the respective governments’ power 
“shares”. Relative voting power indices are a common tool for addressing questions related to the distribution of votes 
and is here calculated on the basis of the Banzhaf voting power index as reported in FELSENTHAL D. S., MACHOVER M., The 
QM rule in the Nice and EU reform treaties: future projections, Project Report (London, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 2007). Please refer to BANZHAF J. F., Weighted voting doesn’t work: A mathematical analysis, Rutgers 
Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1965, pp. 317-343, FELSENTHAL D. S., MACHOVER M., The Measurement of Voting Power: Theory and 
Practise, Problems and Paradoxes (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1998) and MOBERG A., Is the double majority really double? 
The second round in the debate of the voting rules in the EU Constitutional Treaty (Madrid, Real Instituto Elcano, WP 23/2007) 
for explanations and discussions.
*** The over/under representation is estimated on the basis of the governments’ share of voting power relative to their 
population sizes (i.e. by dividing the voting power for each government with the square root percentage of the popula-
tion fi  gures). The values are given in %s such that, for example, Germany is shown to have 17.8% less voting power under 
the Nice Treaty than what its population share would otherwise have indicated, whereas it gets 23.1% more under the 
Reform Treaty rules than the population share would have prescribed.
**** The totals in the “Voting Power” columns do not come to 100 due to rounding of the fi  gures in the columns.
Th   e distribution of votes and the thresholds deﬁ  ned under the Nice Treaty rules has 
on many occasions been criticised for favouring a number of medium- and small 
members, whereas the largest members have been found to be under-represented. 
Th   is is conﬁ  rmed by the ﬁ  gures in Table 2, although not in an entirely consistent 
pattern: Although the vote distribution under the Nice rules is decreasing from 
the largest to the smallest members in the column “Votes/Nice Treaty” as well as 
in the column listing the governments’ relative voting power (the “Voting Power/
Nice Treaty” column), the column showing the over- and under-representation 
of the Member States indicates that the four largest members are currently under-70
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represented compared to their population shares (particularly Germany), as are 
also Romania, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Slovakia, Finland, Latvia 
and Slovenia. Conversely, Spain, Poland, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, Ireland, Lithuania are all over-represented 
to varying degrees, with the four smallest members, Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg 
and Malta, being the most over-represented of all. 
Under the Reform Treaty rules this changes and brings more power to the four 
largest and the seven smallest members, while the medium-sized countries lose out. 
All the countries ranging from Spain to Ireland are underrepresented by at least 
4.6% (Ireland) up until more than 17% (Greece, Portugal, Belgium and the Czech 
Republic), whereas, for example, Malta stand out by having 138.6% more than 
what would have been allocated to it if the baseline measure had been the size of its 
population alone. Other studies
[9] have addressed this issue in more detail, and the 
conclusion is that overall, the new voting rule is rather unequal in the distribution 
of power when considered from the basis of the members’ population sizes. 
Of course, the proportional representation of the populations is not the only criteria 
to consider as a determinant of “equity” or “legitimacy” of the system. Nevertheless, 
decision-making in the Council has been characterised as a process taking place in 
“the shadow of the vote”, meaning that the voting rules are considered during the 
negotiation process, but that explicit voting rarely takes place. Before an act is put 
forward for a formal decision in the Council, it has been through a preparatory 
process of bargaining until an agreement is reached that is likely to be acceptable to 
at least the minimum number of members required to meet the decision threshold. 
A number of insiders have pointed out, partly as a criticism against voting power 
studies, that in this way the votes are “only potential weapons”.
[10] Instead, what 
the governments focus on is the blocking potential of any countries opposed to a 
decision. Th   e “blocking power” rather than the “voting power” of governments 
is therefore often highlighted to be a much more powerful bargaining asset in the 
negotiations, mainly as politicians and oﬃ   cials see it as politically more important 
to be able to block unwanted decisions than to support desirable ones.
Each of these observations is highly relevant for analyses of power dynamics in 
the Council. However, two points should be clariﬁ  ed here: First, since the voting 
rules are indeed considered even in the preparatory processes of the policy process 
(by way of “backward induction”), they should also be at the core of any analysis 
[9]   F ELSENTHAL D. S., MACHOVER M., The QM rule in the Nice and EU reform treaties: future projections, Project Report (London, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, 2007).
[10]   M OBERG, op. cit.Qualifi  ed Majority Voting in the Council: Explaining and Assessing the New Rule(s)
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of decision-making in the Council; subsequently, they must then of course also 
be addressed also in their political context, as is attempted in this paper. Secondly, 
together with the latest enlargements and the resulting formalisation of Council 
meetings
[11] the considerable lowering of the decision threshold in the Reform 
Treaty rules means that the dynamics in the Council are likely to turn away from 
the potential of blocking decisions to the possibilities for constructing majorities. 
In that scenario, the voting power rather than the governments’ blocking power 
becomes even more important as a bargaining instrument to reach agreement. 
Blocking Power
Although the blocking power is therefore likely to play much less of a dominant 
role in the political negotiators’ estimations of when an agreement is likely to pass 
under the Reform Treaty rules, the ﬁ  gures for how much the governments’ blocking 
potential changes from the current rules should naturally also be presented here. 
Diﬀ  erent methods have been presented for how to measure this kind of power. 
Here, a blocking power measure is used where no a priori assumptions are made 
about how likely certain blocking coalitions are compared to others.
[12] Th  erefore, 
the ﬁ  gures in Table 3 and 4 should not be interpreted too literally as such coalitions 
clearly do not form at random in the Council.
[13] On the other hand, the ﬁ  gures 
do show the average ease or diﬃ   culty that this process will encounter based on 
the decision rule, but without regard to either the members’ preferences, coalition 
history or the proposal to be adopted.
Table 3 shows that all countries except for Malta lose in their blocking power due to 
the lowering of the decision threshold. Th   e reason is that it is simply more diﬃ   cult 
to successfully oppose a proposal since it takes fewer countries to form a winning 
majority. But at the same time, Table 4 indicates that the balance between the 
countries has also shifted: Relative to the distribution between all Member States, 
the larger countries are by far dominant in their possession of blocking power, which 
is also why the additional clause of having at least 4 countries in a blocking coalition 
was inserted in the Reform Treaty. Th   e medium- and smaller Member States are 
in a diﬀ  erent situation: there is a considerable diﬀ  erence between the distribution 
amongst the four to ﬁ  ve biggest members and the rest of the countries (the power 
[11]   cf.  HAGEMANN S. and DE CLERCK-SACHSSE J., Decision-making in the Enlarged Council of Ministers: Evaluating the Facts 
(Bruxelles, CEPS — Policy Brief, January 2007).
[12]   The measure is the popular Coleman’s measure for blocking power. Please see FELSENTHAL and MACHOVER (1998), 
op. cit.
[13]   cf.  MOBERG, op. cit; FELSENTHAL and MACHOVER (2007), op. cit.72
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distribution drops from Poland and onwards), meaning that, again, the medium 
sized countries are granted considerable less power proportionally to their popula-
tion shares and compared to the power allocated to the smallest countries. 
Table 3:   Gain or loss in blocking power from the Nice Treaty to the Reform 
Treaty
Table 4:   Blocking power under the Reform Treaty rules
6. SUSTAINABILITY
One real advantage of having a decision rule deﬁ  ned by a certain percentage level 
of the Member State representation and the population share is that it — in prin-
ciple — would allow the inclusion of new members without having to embark on 
diﬃ   cult negotiations to re-weight the governments’ votes. However, particularly 
two issues may prove to obscure this positive element of the new voting rules: ﬁ  rst, 
as the system will not enter into force in the next 7 to 9 years Croatia, and perhaps 
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a number of other smaller candidate countries, will simply have to be allocated a 
politically “adequate” number of votes under the Nice Treaty rules, depending on 
their possible accession dates. Second, having the population criterion as a deter-
minant for inﬂ  uence, it seems very unlikely — even with a considerable political 
“squeezing” of the system — that Turkey could be included under the Reform 
Treaty system. Again, demographic changes should also be mentioned here since 
the fact that Turkey’s population is increasing while, for example, Germany’s 
is decreasing further undermines such possibilities: Turkey would soon after its 
accession become the EU’s largest Member State and would under the Reform 
Treaty rules by deﬁ  nition receive a large amount of voting power. Th   is result is 
quite obviously an easy point to make by those existing members who are sceptical 
of a full Turkish membership.
CONCLUSION
Th   e implications of the new rules are already a matter of dispute amongst internal 
as well as external analysts of the system. Some argue that very little changes will in 
eﬀ  ect be observed in the Council when the new rules enter into force, mainly due to 
the great emphasis on consensus building and the extensive preparatory processes 
in the Council. Others argue that, consensus building or not, the rules will have 
a direct eﬀ  ect for the negotiators as a lowering of the decision threshold simply 
indicates that governments have to “give in” earlier in the negotiation process in 
order to be part of the majority and able to inﬂ  uence the ﬁ  nal decision outcome. 
Th   e present study aims to address the question of whether the new voting rules are 
likely to change the power balance and decision-making in the Council from the 
current Nice rules. Th   e following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis:
Effi   ciency
Th   e extension of the QMV rule to 21 new legal areas and to 23 existing areas cur-
rently under unanimity is likely to ease the ability of the EU to pass legislation within 
those areas. Th   e double majority rule included in the Reform Treaty will enhance 
the ability of the Council to decide. However, the intended eﬀ  ect of applying the 
QMV rules rather than the unanimity requirement will be constrained by the fact 
that it is the QMV rules as laid out in the Nice Treaty that will govern those areas 
for the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve to eight years: Th   e extension of areas falling under QMV will take 
eﬀ  ect from 2009, whereas the reforms of the QMV rules will not follow through 
even for these new areas until 2014, and possibly 2017. Also the implementation of 
the extremely complex emergency brakes mechanisms (the Ioannina compromise) 74
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may pose a challenge to the internal work processes in the Council and can indeed 
prove to have perverse eﬀ  ects for the decision-making capacity of the Union. 
Power
Th   e formal power balance between the governments in the Council shifts consider-
ably when the Reform Treaty rules enter into force, both in terms of the distribu-
tion of the governments’ relative voting power and in their blocking potential. 
Th   is shift may have only a limited immediate eﬀ  ect for how majorities or blocking 
minorities are constructed due to the culture of consensus in the Council. But as 
consensus becomes increasingly diﬃ   cult in the club of 27+, the governments’ focus 
may shift from consensus building to the construction of only suﬃ   cient majority 
coalitions. 
Sustainability
Th  e  deﬁ  nition of a decision threshold in the Council in terms of percentages rather 
than absolute voting weights allocated to each government is an important advan-
tage of the new Reform Treaty rules. It should — at least in principle — make the 
system quite adaptable. Nonetheless, some questions remain unanswered: With the 
arguably most important criterion in the new double majority rule being deﬁ  ned 
by the countries’ population sizes, the EU’s lack of a common legal basis for how 
governments aggregate and report their population ﬁ  gures is an issue for concern. 
Related hereto, it is with interest that this paper observes that the projected demo-
graphic changes in Europe do not appear to have been explicitly addressed in the 
negotiations of the new QMV rules. Further enlargements have not been mentioned 
either in the Reform Treaty in relation to the QMV system, and hence suggests 
that any enlargement beyond the accession of Croatia — and possibly one or two 
other smaller candidate countries — would mean a re-opening of the allocation 
of the voting weights. 
Th   e conclusions drawn in this paper are therefore, in short, that the Reform Treaty 
takes an important step towards improving the ease with which decisions can be 
made in the Council, but leaves several important issues related to the QMV sys-
tem unresolved. Politically, however, it seems that there will be quite some time 
before any issues related to radical changes of the decision rules will be put onto 
the Council negotiation table again.Qualifi  ed Majority Voting in the Council: Explaining and Assessing the New Rule(s)
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Annex 1  Qualiﬁ  ed Majority Voting in the Council
  (as envisaged by CIG 1/1/07 REV 1 October 2007)
Declaration on Article 9c(4) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 
205(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
Th   e Conference declares that the decision relating to the implementation of Article 
9c(4) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 205(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union will be adopted by the Council within six 
months from the date of the signature of the Treaty amending the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community and will 
enter into force on the day that Treaty enters into force. Th   e draft decision is set 
out below:
Draft decision of the Council relating to the implementation of Article 9c(4) of the 
Treaty on European Union and Article 205(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union between 1 November 2014 and 31 March 2017 on the 
one hand, and as from 1 April 2017 on the other
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Whereas: 
1.   Provisions should be adopted allowing for a smooth transition from the sys-
tem for decision-making in the Council by a qualiﬁ  ed majority as deﬁ  ned in 
Article 3(3) of the Protocol on the transitional provisions, which will continue 
to apply until 31 October 2014, to the voting system provided for in Article 
9c(4) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 205(2) of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, which will apply with eﬀ  ect from 
1 November 2014, including, during a transitional period until 31 March 
2017, speciﬁ  c provisions laid down in Article 3(2) of that Protocol. 
2.   It is recalled that it is the practice of the Council to devote every eﬀ  ort to 
strengthening the democratic legitimacy of decisions taken by a qualiﬁ  ed 
majority. 
3.   It is judged appropriate to maintain this decision as long as is necessary to ensure 
smooth transition to the new voting system provided for in the Treaties, 76
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HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS: 
Section 1 Provisions to be applied from 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2017 
Article 1 
From 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2017, if members of the Council, 
representing: 
(a)   at least three quarters of the population, or 
(b)   at least three quarters of the number of Member States necessary to constitute 
a blocking minority resulting from the application of Article 9c(4), ﬁ  rst sub-
paragraph, of the Treaty on European Union or Article 205(2) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union, indicate their opposition to the 
Council adopting an act by a qualiﬁ  ed majority, the Council shall discuss the 
issue. 
Article 2 
Th   e Council shall, in the course of these discussions, do all in its power to reach, 
within a reasonable time and without prejudicing obligatory time limits laid down 
by Union law, a satisfactory solution to address concerns raised by the members of 
the Council referred to in Article 1. 
Article 3 
To this end, the President of the Council, with the assistance of the Commission 
and in compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council, shall undertake 
any initiative necessary to facilitate a wider basis of agreement in the Council. Th  e 
members of the Council shall lend him or her their assistance. 
Section 2 Provisions to be applied as from 1 April 2017 
Article 4 
As from 1 April 2017, if members of the Council, representing: 
(a)   at least 55 % of the population, or 
(b)   at least 55 % of the number of Member States necessary to constitute a blocking 
minority resulting from the application of Article 9c(4), ﬁ  rst subparagraph, 
of the Treaty on European Union or Article 205(2) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, indicate their opposition to the Council 
adopting an act by a qualiﬁ  ed majority, the Council shall discuss the issue. Qualifi  ed Majority Voting in the Council: Explaining and Assessing the New Rule(s)
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Article 5 
Th   e Council shall, in the course of these discussions, do all in its power to reach, 
within a reasonable time and without prejudicing obligatory time limits laid down 
by Union law, a satisfactory solution to address concerns raised by the members of 
the Council referred to in Article 4. 
Article 6
To this end, the President of the Council, with the assistance of the Commission 
and in compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the Council, shall undertake 
any initiative necessary to facilitate a wider basis of agreement in the Council. Th  e 
members of the Council shall lend him or her their assistance.
Protocol (no 9bis) on the decision of the council relating to the implementa-
tion of article 9c(4) of the treaty on European Union and article 205(2) of the 
treaty on the functioning of the European Union between 1 November 2014 
and 31 march 2017 on the one hand, and as from 1 April 2017 on the other 
THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT the fundamental importance that agreeing on the 
Decision of the Council relating to the implementation of Article 9c(4) of the 
Treaty on European Union and Article 205(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union between 1 November 2014 and 31 March 2017 on the 
one hand, and as from 1 April 2017 on the other (hereinafter “the Decision”), 
had when approving the Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty establishing the European Community; 
HAVE AGREED UPON the following provisions, which shall be annexed to the 
Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union: 
Single Article 
Before the examination by the Council of any draft which would aim either at 
amending or abrogating the Decision or any of its provisions, or at modifying 
indirectly its scope or its meaning through the modiﬁ  cation of another legal act 
of the Union, the European Council shall hold a preliminary deliberation on the 
said draft, acting by consensus in accordance with Article 9b(4) of the Treaty on 
European Union.78
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Annex 2  Nouveaux cas de vote à la majorité qualiﬁ  ée
Sous réserve de certaines dispositions qui ne seraient pas in ﬁ  ne reprises dans le 
traité modiﬁ  catif, les cas d’extension du vote à la majorité qualiﬁ  ée prévus par 
l’accord de juin 2004 et listés ci-dessous devraient être intégralement repris [man-
dat point 18]. 
I — Liste des bases juridiques existantes qui passent à la majorité qualiﬁ  ée
Présidences du Conseil — article 203 CE [traité 2004 I-24.7]
(1)  Modalités de contrôle de l’exercice des compétences exécutives de la Com-
mission — article 202 CE [traité 2004 I-37.3]
(2)  Liberté d’établissement, accès aux activités non-salariées qui comporte une 
modiﬁ  cation des principes législatifs dans un État membre — article 47.2 
CE [traité 2004 III-141] 
(3)  Violation GOPE ou atteinte à l’UEM
[14] — article 99.2 CE [traité 2004 
III-179.4]
(4) Constat  d’un  déﬁ  cit excessif — article 104.6 CE [traité 2004 III-184.6]
(5)  Mesures pour contrer un déﬁ  cit excessif
[15] — article 104.9 .10 et .12 CE 
[traité 2004 III-184.9 .10 et .11] 
(6) Modiﬁ  cations de certaines dispositions des statuts du SEBC — article 107.5 
CE [traité 2004 III-187.3]
(7) Déﬁ  nition des missions et objectifs des fonds structurels et du Fonds de 
Cohésion, après la première réforme du régime applicable au moment de la 
signature du traité modiﬁ  catif (qui reste à l’unanimité) — article 161 CE 
[traité 2004 — III-223.1]
(8)  Dérogations dans le domaine des transports — article 71.2 CE [traité 2004 
III-236.2] 
(9)  Coopération administrative dans l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de jus-
tice — articles 66 CE et 34.1 UE [traité 2004 III-263] 
(10)  Contrôle aux frontières — article 67 CE [traité 2004 III-265]
(11)  Asile — article 67 CE [traité 2004 III-266] 
(12)  Immigration — article 67 CE [traité 2004 III-267] 
[14]   Il s’agit de la majorité qualifi  ée « ordinaire », à savoir celle applicable aux actes sur proposition de la Commission 
(bien qu’ici l’acte soit adopté sur recommandation de la Commission).
[15]   Il s’agit de la majorité qualifi  ée « ordinaire », à savoir celle applicable aux actes sur proposition de la Commission 
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(13)  Eurojust — article 31.2 UE [traité 2004 III-273] 
(14)  Coopération policière non opérationnelle — article 30.1 UE [traité 2004 
III-275.2] 
(15)  Europol — article 30.2 UE [traité 2004 III-276] 
(16)  Mesures dans le domaine de la culture — article151.5 CE [traité 2004 
III-280.5]
(17)  Initiatives du Ministre des aﬀ  aires étrangères en PESC à la demande du 
Conseil européen [traité 2004 III-300.2]
(18)  PESD, statut et siège de l’agence d’armements [traité 2004 III-311.2]
(19)  Nomination des membres du directoire de la BCE — article 112 CE [traité 
2004 III-382.2].
MQ accompagnée par des mécanismes complémentaires (Emergency brake)
(20)  Libre circulation des travailleurs, prestations sociales — article 42 CE [traité 
2004 III-136] 
(21)  Coopération judiciaire en matière pénale — article 31.1, points a), b), c), 
d), UE [traité 2004 III-270.2 à 4]
(22)  Rapprochement des normes pénales, infractions et sanctions — article 31.1 
point e) UE [traité 2004 III-271.2 à 4]
II — Liste des nouvelles bases juridiques à la majorité qualiﬁ  ée
(23)  Liste des formations du Conseil [traité 2004 I-24.4]
(24)  Révision des règles relatives à la nature et composition du CdR et du CES 
[traité 2004 I-32.5]
(25)  Initiative populaire en vue de la proposition d’une loi européenne [traité 
2004 I-47.4]
(26)  Mesures d’exécution du système des ressources propres [traité 2004 
I-54.4]
(27)  Accord de retrait d’un EM [traité 2004 I-60.2]
(28)  Principes et conditions pour le fonctionnement des services d’intérêt 
économique général [traité 2004 III-122]
(29)  Mesures pour faciliter la protection diplomatique et consulaire [traité 2004 
III-127]
(30)  Propriété intellectuelle et régimes centralisés [traité 2004 III-176.1]
(31)  EM dont la monnaie est l’euro, position commune et représentation uniﬁ  ée 
sur la scène internationale [traité 2004 III-196.1 et .2]80
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(32) Politique  spatiale  [traité 2004 III-254]
(33) Énergie
[16] [traité 2004 III-256.2]
(34)  Mesures d’encouragement dans le domaine de la prévention du crime [traité 
2004 III-272]
(35) Tourisme  [traité 2004 III-281] 
(36) Sport  [traité 2004 III-282]
(37) Protection  civile
[17] [traité 2004 III-284]
(38) Coopération  administrative  [traité 2004 III-285]
(39)  Établissement d’une coopération structurée permanente dans le domaine 
de la défense [traité 2004 III-312.2]
(40)  Admission d’un EM à la coopération structurée permanente dans le domaine 
de la défense [traité 2004 III-312.3] 
(41)  Suspension d’un EM de la coopération structurée permanente dans le 
domaine de la défense [traité 2004 III-312.4]
(42) Aide  humanitaire
[18] [traité 2004 III-321.3 et 5]
(43)  Administration de l’Union européenne
[19] [traité 2004 III-398]
[16]   À noter que la plupart des mesures dans le domaine de l’énergie sont à présent adoptées sur base de dispositions 
qui prévoient déjà le QMV (art. 95 CE, art. 175 CE).
[17]   À noter que des mesures dans le domaine de la protection civile sont à présent adoptées sur base de dispositions 
qui prévoient déjà le QMV (art. 175 CE).
[18]   À noter que les mesures dans le domaine de l’aide humanitaire sont à présent adoptées sur base de dispositions 
qui prévoient déjà le QMV (art. 179 CE).
[19]   À noter que les mesures dans le domaine de l’administration communautaire sont à présent adoptées sur base de 
dispositions qui prévoient déjà le QMV (art. 283 CE).81
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NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS: 
NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS AND THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE
Th   e draft Constitution introduced a major innovation by proposing that national 
Parliaments should be directly involved in the work of the EU in monitoring the 
proper application of the subsidiarity principle.
Th   e role of national Parliaments is further enhanced in the Reform Treaty:
A new article 8c reﬂ  ecting the role of the national Parliaments in the Union 
is to be inserted in Title II of the EU Treaty (See Annex 1). It concerns the 
proper application of the subsidiarity principle, policy evaluation in the area 
of freedom security and justice, revision procedure, accession procedure and 
inter-parliamentary cooperation.
Th  e  simpliﬁ  ed revision procedure (article 33 of the Reform Treaty) enables 
the European Council to decide unanimously to move from unanimity to 
Qualiﬁ  ed Majority Voting or from the special legislative procedure to the 
normal one. However any national Parliament can block this passerelle by 
making known its opposition within six months of the proposal. Th  e  same 
procedure applies to legislation concerning family law with cross border 
implications where it is the Council which can activate the passerelle (See 
Annex 5).
Th   e two protocols introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty on the role of 
national Parliaments in the decision-making process and on the applica-
tion of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are repealed and 
replaced by two new protocols increasing the role of national Parliaments 
(See Annex 3 & 4). 
Th  e  eﬀ  ectiveness, practical consequences and merits of giving a role to national 
Parliaments in the Union’s decision making process are addressed hereafter. It 
should be noted however that the new procedures also impacts on the internal con-
stitutional order of Member States, including the sharing of powers. Belgian draft 
declaration 49
[1] reﬂ  ects that fact. Some Member States (France, for instance) may 
have to modify their constitution because their parliament would receive powers 
which they do not possess under their national constitution. 
[1]   CIG 3/1/07 REV I, page 24.
•
•
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1. DOES THE NEW “EARLY WARNING” PROCEDURE EFFECTIVELY ENSURE A PROPER 
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY?
Th   e procedure concerns “draft legislative acts” deﬁ  ned as proposals from the Com-
mission, initiatives from a group of Member States, initiatives from the Euro-
pean Parliament, requests from the Court of Justice, recommendations from the 
European Central Bank and requests from the European Investment Bank for the 
adoption of a legislative act. 
Draft legislative acts must be justiﬁ  ed with regard to the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality. National Parliaments must be informed of such drafts and 
have a period of eight weeks to give a reasoned opinion stating why it considers 
that the draft in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Th  e 
relevant institution must then review its proposal. Th   ere are some variations in 
procedure but basically the initiator may decide to withdraw, amend or maintain 
its draft and should explain its reasoning for ﬁ  nal decision by the European Parlia-
ment and the Council of Ministers.
Th   e underlying implication seems to be that violations of subsidiarity result fre-
quently from legislative acts and can therefore be corrected by amendments to 
legislative procedure. 
Many observers would question that implication and argue that the proposed 
texts are addressing the wrong target. It may occur that European legislation can 
be considered to violate subsidiarity, although appreciation on that point may 
well vary from state to state. But such violations will result much more frequently 
not from legislation, but from the implementation of legislation, either from the 
comitology procedures or from the exercise of executive powers by the Commis-
sion (in competition policy for instance) or from autonomous regulation of the 
Council (quasi-legislative acts).
Th   ere are each year approximately sixty or seventy new legislative texts, but between 
two and three thousand comitology decisions
[2]. In view of the numbers, it is obvi-
ously impossible to involve national Parliaments in the control of comitology 
decisions, though nothing prevents them from questioning their government on 
positions taken by national experts in such procedures.
[2]   Daniel  GUEGUEN and Vicky MARISSEN, The Comitology Reform: 70 legal texts adopted in co-decision annually, over 2500 
regulations in comitology (Brussels, Europolitics, September 2007).National Parliaments: National Parliaments and the Subsidiarity Principle
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It may therefore be the case that the new procedures will not have a major impact 
on perceived violations of the subsidiarity principle. Th   is could well be a source of 
disappointment, especially for the Netherlands who were, in the last instance, the 
main advocates of this reinforced procedure.
2. IS THE NEW PROCEDURE LIKELY TO MAKE THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS MORE 
CUMBERSOME?
In theory the addition of a new tier in the decision making process could be a source 
of complication and delay.
In practice this is unlikely to be the case. Firstly because the delay of eight weeks 
for introducing a reasoned opinion is not signiﬁ  cant in view of the normal dura-
tion of the legislative process in the Union. Secondly because the formulation 
is vague and loosely drafted
[3]. It leaves plenty of space for interpretations: when 
confronted with a “reasoned opinion”, the Commission could for instance, make 
only cosmetic changes to its initial proposals and present them again to Council 
and Parliament with another “reasoned opinion”. Lastly, and more importantly, 
because on past experience, it is very doubtful whether national Parliaments, who 
do not, in general, show much interest for European aﬀ  airs, will frequently want, as 
a matter of urgency, to draft a reasoned opinion on a European legislative proposal. 
Th   at level of implication by national Parliaments would indeed be a revolution. 
Th   e procedure will presumably be exercised only in a very limited number of cases, 
and that should not have a signiﬁ  cant impact on the legislative process.
However article 8 of the protocol on subsidiarity should be considered with some 
attention (See Annex 4). It gives to the Court of Justice the position of ﬁ  nal arbiter 
in matters of subsidiarity. Actions can be brought by Member States “or notiﬁ  ed 
by them in accordance with their legal order on behalf of their national Parliament or 
a chamber of it”. In practice it might well be diﬃ   cult for a Member State not to 
“notify” an action when his national Parliament, or a chamber of it, has decided 
that it wants to call on the Court. Some national Parliaments, frustrated perhaps 
by the relative ineﬀ  ectiveness of the early warning procedure, might decide to 
systematically call on the court. Constant litigation would be a serious handicap 
for the legislative process. Even if article 8 does not imply that the initiation of a 
[3]   For instance, Article 7.3.b of the protocol on subsidiarity says that if, by a majority of 55 % of the members of the 
Council or a majority of the votes cast in the European Parliament, the legislator is of the opinion that the proposal 
is not compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, the legislative proposal shall not be given further consideration. 
Does one really have to put in the treaty the fact that a proposal opposed by a majority vote in Council or Parliament is 
doomed?86
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Court action suspends that process, it might well inhibit Council and Parliament 
from moving forward on the disputed legislation. 
Much will depend on the jurisprudence of the Court. It may consider that subsid-
iarity is frequently a question of opportunity or political appreciation, and refrain 
from passing judgment. In similar circumstances the German constitutional court 
has been very cautious. Th   e subsidiarity principle has been part of European law 
since 1993
[4] but the Court has, to this day, never made use of it. Reluctance to 
pass judgment on subsidiarity would obviously discourage national Parliaments 
from systematically initiating judicial procedures.
3. HOW ABOUT THE PASSERELLES CLAUSES?
Th   e articles proposed by the new treaty on the activation of passerelles for the simpli-
ﬁ  ed revision procedure or for legislation concerning family law with cross border 
implications give in eﬀ  ect a right of veto to any national Parliament. Th   is is likely 
to be an even greater obstacle than unanimity in Council which is also required. 
In Council, unanimity can at times be attained by a negotiation on a quid pro 
quo basis, but a national Parliament is not a negotiating partner in Council, and 
the position it has taken will at times be used by the Member State concerned to 
make its position even more uncompromising. In those circumstances, it would 
need a very clear cut and overwhelmingly convincing case for a passerelle clause 
to be activated by an unanimous vote in Council and without a single national 
Parliament dissenting. 
In practice such cases are not likely to occur and therefore those clauses will presum-
ably remain lettre morte. Th   is should not come as a surprise: passerelle clauses of 
this type have existed since the treaty of Amsterdam and have never been activated. 
Th   is situation is likely to continue. 
4. IS THERE AN IMPACT ON THE TREATY REVISION PROCEDURE?
National Parliaments have always played a fundamental role in treaty revision 
procedures in the sense that they have always had to ratify treaty changes. 
A new draft article 33, replacing article 48 (See Annex 5), conﬁ  rms that the ordi-
nary revision procedure implies the convening of a Convention in which national 
[4]   Maastricht Treaty (second paragraph of Article B of the Treaty on European Union, Article 3b of the EC Treaty).National Parliaments: National Parliaments and the Subsidiarity Principle
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Parliaments will have a major role. Th   is certainly implies a signiﬁ  cant increase in 
the capacity of national Parliaments to inﬂ  uence the negotiating process. It is a 
conﬁ  rmation of the practice followed in negotiating the Constitutional treaty, and 
should cause no more problems (but no less) than the 2002-2003 Convention. 
It is to be noted however that national Parliaments are not involved in the decision 
not to convene a Convention “should this not be justiﬁ  ed by the extent of the pro-
posed amendments”. Th   at decision is taken by a simple majority in the European 
Council with the consent, of the European Parliament. Nor are national Parliaments 
involved in the simpliﬁ  ed ratiﬁ  cation procedure applicable to Part Th   ree of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union relating to the internal policies 
and action of the Union. National Parliaments will of course be involved in the 
national ratiﬁ  cations of the treaty changes resulting from those procedures.
It remains to be seen if the “ordinary” procedure, implying the calling of a Conven-
tion, will become the rule or the exception in future treaty changes.
5. WHAT IS THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS PROCESS?
Th   e current constitutional reform process was launched by a European Council 
held at Laeken in 2001
[5]. Th   e declaration adopted on that occasion identiﬁ  es “the 
democratic challenge facing Europe” and says that “citizens are calling for a clear, 
open, eﬀ  ective, democratically controlled Community approach” because “they feel that 
deals are all too often cut out of their sight and they want better democratic scrutiny”. 
European institutions should be closer to the citizen, more transparent, more 
democratic. Th   e fact is that those ambitions are not being fulﬁ  lled in the present 
negotiating process.
However the implication of national Parliaments in the European legislating pro-
cess does go some way in the direction indicated at Laeken by promoting greater 
transparency and more eﬀ  ective document dissemination at the national level. 
Interaction between the European institutions and national Parliaments could 
spread to national political parties and the representative actors of civil society 
thereby creating a new political process. At least it creates an opportunity which 
should be seized. Th   e ambition should be to create a network including MEPs, 
national parliamentarians, party leaders and experts so that national political actors 
[5]   Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, see http://www.euconvention.be/static/LaekenDeclara-
tion.asp.88
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become more structurally involved, and thus more aware of the EU integration 
process and its political life. 
Th   e inter-parliamentary cooperation established by the protocol on national Parlia-
ments, if actively pursued and developed, could also have a signiﬁ  cant impact in 
connecting the national political debate with the European one.
CONCLUSION
Th   e implication of national Parliaments in the European legislative process is 
unappealing to the constitutional lawyer and may not have a major eﬀ  ect on the 
implementation of the principle of subsidiarity. It should not however have a nega-
tive impact on the functioning of the European institutions, except if one or more 
national Parliaments were to pursue a course of systematic litigation, and in that 
case the Court is unlikely to oblige. Its main advantage lies not in the results, but 
in the process itself, which brings the national political debate and the European 
political debate in closer contact. Th   e gradual development of a political network, 
associating in various ways the European level and the national level, would be at 
least a partial answer to the democratic challenge identiﬁ  ed six years ago by the 
Laeken European Council.National Parliaments: National Parliaments and the Subsidiarity Principle
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Annex 1  Th   e Role of National Parliaments
  (as envisaged by CIG 1/1/07 REV 1 October 2007: pp. 9-10)
Article 8c Th   e role of national Parliaments
National Parliaments shall contribute actively to the good functioning of the 
Union:
(a)   through being informed by the institutions of the Union and having draft 
European legislative acts forwarded to them in accordance with the Protocol 
on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union; 
(b)   by seeing to it that the principle of subsidiarity is respected in accordance 
with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; 
(c)   by taking part, within the framework of the area of freedom, security and 
justice, in the evaluation mechanisms for the implementation of the Union 
policies in that area, in accordance with Article 64 of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union, and through being involved in the political 
monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust’s activities in accordance 
with Articles 69k and 69h of that Treaty; 
(d)  by taking part in the revision procedures of the Treaties, in accordance with 
Article 33 of this Treaty; 
(e)   by being notiﬁ  ed of applications for accession to the Union, in accordance 
with Article 34 of this Treaty; 
(f)   by taking part in the inter-parliamentary cooperation between national Parlia-
ments and with the European Parliament, in accordance with the Protocol 
on the role of national Parliaments in the European Union.
Annex 2  Judicial cooperation in civil matters
  (as envisaged by CIG 1/1/07 REV 1 October 2007: pp. 65)
Article 65 shall be replaced by the following chapter and article: Chapter 3 - Judicial 
cooperation in civil matters:90
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Article 69d
3.   Notwithstanding paragraph 2, measures concerning family law with cross-
border implications shall be established by the Council, acting in accordance 
with a special legislative procedure. Th   e Council shall act unanimously after 
consulting the European Parliament. 
  Th   e Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt a decision 
determining those aspects of family law with cross-border implications which 
may be the subject of acts adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure. Th  e 
Council shall act unanimously after consulting the European Parliament. 
  Th   e proposal referred to in the second subparagraph shall be notiﬁ  ed to the 
national Parliaments. If a national Parliament makes known its opposition 
within six months of the date of such notiﬁ  cation, the decision shall not be 
adopted. In the absence of opposition, the Council may adopt the decision.
Annex 3    Protocol (no 1) on the role of national Parliaments in the 
European Union
(as envisaged by CIG 2/1/07 REV 1 October 2007: pp. 3-6)
Title I - Information for National Parliaments
Article 1
Commission consultation documents (green and white papers and communica-
tions) shall be forwarded directly by the Commission to national Parliaments upon 
publication. Th   e Commission shall also forward the annual legislative programme 
as well as any other instrument of legislative planning or policy to national Parlia-
ments, at the same time as to the European Parliament and the Council.
Article 2
Draft legislative acts sent to the European Parliament and to the Council shall be 
forwarded to national Parliaments. For the purposes of this Protocol, “draft legisla-
tive acts” shall mean proposals from the Commission, initiatives from a group of 
Member States, initiatives from the European Parliament, requests from the Court 
of Justice, recommendations from the European Central Bank and requests from 
the European Investment Bank for the adoption of a legislative act. Draft legislative 
acts originating from the Commission shall be forwarded to national Parliaments 
directly by the Commission, at the same time as to the European Parliament and 
the Council. Draft legislative acts originating from the European Parliament shall 
be forwarded to national Parliaments directly by the European Parliament. Draft National Parliaments: National Parliaments and the Subsidiarity Principle
91
legislative acts originating from a group of Member States, the Court of Justice, 
the European Central Bank or the European Investment Bank shall be forwarded 
to national Parliaments by the Council.
Article 3
National Parliaments may send to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission a reasoned opinion on whether a draft legislative 
act complies with the principle of subsidiarity, in accordance with the procedure 
laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. 
If the draft legislative act originates from a group of Member States, the President 
of the Council shall forward the reasoned opinion or opinions to the governments 
of those Member States. If the draft legislative act originates from the Court of 
Justice, the European Central Bank or the European Investment Bank, the President 
of the Council shall forward the reasoned opinion or opinions to the institution 
or body concerned.
Article 4
An eight-week period shall elapse between a draft legislative act being made available 
to national Parliaments in the oﬃ   cial languages of the Union and the date when it 
is placed on a provisional agenda for the Council for its adoption or for adoption 
of a position under a legislative procedure. Exceptions shall be possible in cases of 
urgency, the reasons for which shall be stated in the act or position of the Council. 
Save in urgent cases for which due reasons have been given, no agreement may 
be reached on a draft legislative act during those eight weeks. Save in urgent cases 
for which due reasons have been given, a ten-day period shall elapse between the 
placing of a draft legislative act on the provisional agenda for the Council and the 
adoption of a position.
[…]
Article 6
When the European Council intends to make use of Article 33(1) or (2) of the 
Treaty on European Union, national Parliaments shall be informed of the initiative 
of the European Council at least six months before any decision is adopted. 
[…]92
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Article 8
Where the national Parliamentary system is not unicameral, Articles 1 to 7 shall 
apply to the component chambers. 
Title II - Interparliamentary Cooperation
Article 9
Th   e European Parliament and national Parliaments shall together determine the 
organisation and promotion of eﬀ  ective and regular interparliamentary coopera-
tion within the Union. 
Article 10
A conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Aﬀ  airs may submit any 
contribution it deems appropriate for the attention of the European Parliament, 
the Council and the Commission. Th   at conference shall in addition promote the 
exchange of information and best practice between national Parliaments and the 
European Parliament, including their special committees. […]Contributions from 
the conference shall not bind national Parliaments and shall not prejudge their 
positions. 
Annex 4    Protocol (no 2) - on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality 
(as envisaged by CIG 2/1/07 REV 1 October 2007: pp. 7-10)
Article 1
Each institution shall ensure constant respect for the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, as laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. 
Article 2
Before proposing legislative acts, the Commission shall consult widely. Such consul-
tations shall, where appropriate, take into account the regional and local dimension 
of the action envisaged. In cases of exceptional urgency, the Commission shall not 
conduct such consultations. It shall give reasons for its decision in its proposal. 
[…]National Parliaments: National Parliaments and the Subsidiarity Principle
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Article 5
Draft legislative acts shall be justiﬁ  ed with regard to the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality. Any draft legislative act should contain a detailed statement 
making it possible to appraise compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. Th   is statement should contain some assessment of the proposal’s 
ﬁ  nancial impact and, in the case of a directive, of its implications for the rules to 
be put in place by Member States, including, where necessary, the regional legisla-
tion. Th   e reasons for concluding that a Union objective can be better achieved at 
Union level shall be substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, quantita-
tive indicators. Draft legislative acts shall take account of the need for any burden, 
whether ﬁ  nancial or administrative, falling upon the Union, national governments, 
regional or local authorities, economic operators and citizens, to be minimised and 
commensurate with the objective to be achieved.
Article 6
Any national Parliament or any chamber of a national Parliament may, within eight 
weeks from the date of transmission of a draft legislative act, send to the Presidents 
of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission a reasoned opin-
ion stating why it considers that the draft in question does not comply with the 
principle of subsidiarity. It will be for each national Parliament or each chamber 
of a national Parliament to consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments with 
legislative powers. If the draft legislative act originates from a group of Member 
States, the President of the Council shall forward the opinion to the governments 
of those Member States. 
If the draft legislative act originates from the Court of Justice, the European Central 
Bank or the European Investment Bank, the President of the Council shall forward 
the opinion to the institution or body concerned.
Article 7
1.   Th   e European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, and, where 
appropriate, the group of Member States, the Court of Justice, the European 
Central Bank or the European Investment Bank, if the draft legislative act 
originates from them, shall take account of the reasoned opinions issued by 
national Parliaments or by a chamber of a national Parliament. Each national 
Parliament shall have two votes, shared out on the basis of the national Par-
liamentary system. In the case of a bicameral Parliamentary system, each of 
the two chambers shall have one vote. 94
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2.   Where reasoned opinions on a draft legislative act’s non-compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity represent at least one third of all the votes allocated 
to the national Parliaments in accordance with the second subparagraph of 
paragraph 1, the draft must be reviewed. Th   is threshold shall be a quarter in 
the case of a draft legislative act submitted on the basis of Article 68 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union on the area of freedom, 
security and justice. After such review, the Commission or, where appropri-
ate, the group of Member States, the European Parliament, the Court of 
Justice, the European Central Bank or the European Investment Bank, if the 
draft legislative act originates from them, may decide to maintain, amend or 
withdraw the draft. Reasons must be given for this decision. 
3.   Furthermore, under the ordinary legislative procedure, where reasoned opin-
ions on the non-compliance of a proposal for a legislative act with the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity represent at least a simple majority of the votes allocated 
to the national Parliaments in accordance with the second subparagraph of 
paragraph 1, the proposal must be reviewed. After such review, the Commis-
sion may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the proposal. If it chooses 
to maintain the proposal, the Commission will have, in a reasoned opinion, 
to justify why it considers that the proposal complies with the principle of 
subsidiarity. Th   is reasoned opinion, as well as the reasoned opinions of the 
national Parliaments, will have to be submitted to the Union legislator, for 
consideration in the procedure:
(a)   before concluding the ﬁ  rst reading, the legislator (Council and European 
Parliament) shall consider whether the legislative proposal is compatible with 
the principle of subsidiarity, taking particular account of the reasons expressed 
and shared by the majority of national Parliaments as well as the reasoned 
opinion of the Commission;
(b)  if, by a majority of 55 % of the members of the Council or a majority of the 
votes cast in the European Parliament, the legislator is of the opinion that the 
proposal is not compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, the legislative 
proposal shall not be given further consideration. 
Article 8
Th   e Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in actions on 
grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a legislative act, brought 
in accordance with the rules laid down in Article 230 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union by Member States, or notiﬁ  ed by them in accordance National Parliaments: National Parliaments and the Subsidiarity Principle
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with their legal order on behalf of their national Parliament or a chamber of it. 
In accordance with the rules laid down in the said Article, the Committee of the 
Regions may also bring such actions against legislative acts for the adoption of 
which the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that it be 
consulted. 
[…]
Annex 5  Article 33 Treaty revision procedures 
  (as envisaged by CIG 1/1/07 REV 1 October 2007: pp. 35-37)
An Article 33 shall be inserted to replace Article 48: 
Article 33
1.   Th   e Treaties may be amended in accordance with an ordinary revision pro-
cedure. Th   ey may also be amended in accordance with simpliﬁ  ed revision 
procedures.
Ordinary revision procedure
2.   Th   e government of any Member State, the European Parliament or the Com-
mission may submit to the Council proposals for the amendment of the 
Treaties. Th   ese proposals may, inter alia, serve either to increase or to reduce 
the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties. Th  ese  proposals 
shall be submitted to the European Council by the Council and the national 
Parliaments shall be notiﬁ  ed.
3.   If the European Council, after consulting the European Parliament and the 
Commission, adopts by a simple majority a decision in favour of examining 
the proposed amendments, the President of the European Council shall con-
vene a Convention composed of representatives of the national Parliaments, 
of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, of the European 
Parliament and of the Commission. […]
  Th   e European Council may decide by a simple majority, after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, not to convene a Convention should 
this not be justiﬁ  ed by the extent of the proposed amendments. In the latter 
case, the European Council shall deﬁ  ne the terms of reference for a conference 
of representatives of the governments of the Member States. […]96
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4.   A conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States shall 
be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of determining 
by common accord the amendments to be made to the Treaties.
  Th   e amendments shall enter into force after being ratiﬁ  ed by all the Member 
States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. […]
Simpliﬁ  ed revision procedures 
6.   Th   e Government of any Member State, the European Parliament or the Com-
mission may submit to the European Council proposals for revising all or 
part of the provisions of Part Th   ree of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union relating to the internal policies and action of the Union. 
  Th   e European Council may adopt a decision amending all or part of the 
provisions of Part Th   ree of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. Th   e European Council shall act by unanimity after consulting the 
European Parliament and the Commission, and […].Th   at decision shall not 
enter into force until it is approved by the Member States in accordance with 
their respective constitutional requirements. 
  Th   e decision referred to in the second subparagraph shall not increase the 
competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties.
7.   Where the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or Title V of 
this Treaty provides for the Council to act by unanimity in a given area or 
case, the European Council may adopt a decision authorising the Council 
to act by a qualiﬁ  ed majority in that area or in that case. Th  is  subparagraph 
shall not apply to decisions with military implications or those in the area of 
defence. 
  Where the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for 
legislative acts to be adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legis-
lative procedure, the European Council may adopt a decision allowing for the 
adoption of such acts in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure.
  Any initiative taken by the European Council on the basis of the ﬁ  rst or 
the second subparagraph shall be notiﬁ  ed to the national Parliaments. If a 
national Parliament makes known its opposition within six months of 
the date of such notiﬁ  cation, the decision referred to in the ﬁ  rst or the 
second subparagraph shall not be adopted. In the absence of opposition, 
the European Council may adopt the decision. 
  For the adoption of the decisions referred to in the ﬁ  rst and second sub-
paragraphs, the European Council shall act by unanimity after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, which shall be given by a majority of 
its component members.97
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ENHANCED COOPERATION: 
FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
Brieﬂ  y described, “enhanced cooperation” is a last resort mechanism created by 
the Amsterdam Treaty which can be triggered in cases “when (the Council) has 
established that the objectives of such cooperation cannot be attained within a 
reasonable period by the Union as a whole”. A certain number of Members States 
can then be authorised by the Council to move ahead, between themselves, while 
staying within the constitutional framework of the Union. Th   e only institutional 
adjustment concerns the Council: non participating Member States are not involved 
in the adoption of decisions implementing enhanced cooperation, they are not 
bound by such decisions, nor do they support relevant costs (other than adminis-
trative). According to the principle of openness, each Member State is entitled to 
join enhanced cooperation from the outset or at a latter stage.
Much time and eﬀ  ort was spent in devising the enhanced cooperation mechanism in 
the Amsterdam Treaty, then in reforming it in the Nice Treaty. It has however so far 
never been triggered as such. Th   is does not imply that it has never been considered, 
let alone brandished as a threat, in the negotiation of a regulation. Neither does this 
imply, as is often heard, that enhanced cooperation does not formally exist in EU 
law. A form of enhanced cooperation comes into being each time a new measure 
is built upon the Schengen acquis, without the participation (which is optional) of 
the United-Kingdom, Ireland or even Denmark, in accordance with the Protocol 
integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union.
[1]
What was the alleged purpose of enhanced cooperation?
[2] In view of the enlarge-
ment of the Union, it was conceived as a tool, to manage the growing heterogeneity 
of Member States. Th   e Franco-German axis, supported at times by the Benelux 
countries and the European Commission, played a major role in promoting the 
concept which was supposed to reconcile the deepening and the widening of the 
Union. Th   e main argument was that enlargement would increase the pressure 
for diﬀ  erentiation amongst Member States, which could lead to the creation of 
sub-groups like the Eurozone and the Schengen area. It was considered preferable 
that such sub-groups should develop within the institutional framework of the 
[1]   More precisely, the initial authorisation for enhanced cooperation is deemed to have been granted, and the legal 
framework of enhanced cooperation is of residual application for issues which are not directly addressed by the said 
protocol.
[2]   On this question, see also Ph. DE SCHOUTHEETE, Closer cooperation: Political background and issues in the negotia-
tion, in J. MONAR & W. WESSELS (eds.), The European Union after Amsterdam (London and New York, Continuum, 2001), in 
particular pp. 154-158.100
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Union, rather than outside it, as had often been the case. Th   at argument was of 
course convincing for supranational institutions, because the community method 
and judicial control were preserved. But it also provided some safeguards for those 
Member States who are not taking part in enhanced cooperation. 
Why has the enhanced cooperation mechanism not been 
implemented?
Lengthy considerations can be devoted to the reasons why the enhanced coopera-
tion mechanism within the Union has never been triggered, in spite of high initial 
expectations.
[3]
Part of the answer lies in the fact that intergovernmental cooperation outside the 
Union has developed, for instance in the Prüm Treaty, sometimes known as “Schen-
gen III”. Concluded by seven Member States, that treaty, addresses issues which are 
connected to the area of freedom, security and justice
[4], and which could have been 
an ideal topic for enhanced cooperation. It seems that the incentives for Member 
States to embark upon enhanced cooperation are not suﬃ   cient. In practice as long 
as enhanced cooperation and intergovernmental cooperation outside the Union are 
alternatives and as long as priority is not given to trying out enhanced cooperation 
ﬁ  rst, the new mechanism is likely to remain a dead letter.
Part of the answer also lies in the fact that the treaties already provide numerous form 
of predeﬁ  ned ﬂ  exibility, as described further on, which in many cases seem more 
appropriate or eﬃ   cient than the general mechanism of enhanced cooperation. 
Th   e Reform Treaty has preserved a certain number of innovations coming from the 
Constitutional Treaty concerning the triggering and the functioning of enhanced 
cooperation within the constitutional framework of the Union, including rela-
tions with non-participating Member States. Th   ey are meant to make the mecha-
nism easier to trigger, more useful, and more attractive. Th   ese now need to be 
considered.
[3]   For a comprehensive analysis, see H. BRIBOSIA, Les coopérations renforcées: quel modèle d’intégration pour l’Union 
européenne?, Thèse de doctorat (Florence, Institut universitaire européen, 2007).
[4]   Convention of 29 Augustus 2005 on the stepping up of cross border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, 
cross border crime and illegal migration.Enhanced Cooperation:  From Theory to Practice
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1. IMPLEMENTING ENHANCED COOPERATION: INNOVATIONS AND ISSUES
1.1. The Formation and the Scope of Enhanced Cooperation
Th   ree innovations are meant to facilitate the triggering of enhanced cooperation. 
Firstly, the last resort condition has been clariﬁ  ed and downgraded: a deadlock 
in the decision-making process can now be established by the Council in the 
initial decision authorizing enhanced cooperation.
Secondly, the initial authorizing decision shall be enacted by qualiﬁ  ed major-
ity without further qualiﬁ  cations (except in CFSP). 
Th   irdly, the authorizing decision may lay down conditions for participation, 
to test the capacity, or the good will, of the initial participating Member 
States. Th   is aims at preventing the participation of unwilling Member States, 
only interested in keeping some inﬂ  uence on the development of enhanced 
cooperation, or even impeding it.
Th   e fact that the minimum participation which had been set at eight Member 
States in Nice, a third of the Member States in the draft Constitution, is now set 
at nine in the Reform treaty is not very signiﬁ  cant. Given that enhanced coopera-
tion makes use of the common institutions, it might have been more reasonable 
to request the participation of a majority of Member States, as originally provided 
by the Amsterdam Treaty.
Th   e treaty speciﬁ  es that candidates Member States “shall address a request to the 
Commission, specifying the scope and objectives of the enhanced cooperation pro-
posed”. Th   is implies that enhanced cooperation is not necessarily limited to the 
adoption by some Member States of one single act blocked in the Council. Th  e 
enhanced cooperation mechanism could thus create a structured and more or less 
“exclusive” sub-system like the Schengen area or the Euro zone, without having to 
predeﬁ  ne them through an IGC negotiation. 
Th   e Reform Treaty also clariﬁ  es to a certain extent the respective role of the Euro-
pean Commission and the candidate Member States in the initial stage of the pro-
cedure. Th   us the Commission has the power of initiative but only after a request 
in that respect by the Member States concerned, and without challenging the 
composition of the initial group of participants. It also seems that the candidate 
Member States can deﬁ  ne the scope of action of enhanced cooperation, but with-
out necessarily depriving the Commission from any review. It is however less clear 
•
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who shall propose the conditions for participation (if any) which are to be set in 
the authorizing decision. 
1.2. The Functioning of Enhanced Cooperation within the 
Constitutional Framework of the Union
Enhanced cooperation is implemented within the constitutional framework of 
the Union. One implication of that principle is sometimes overlooked: it means 
that nothing can be done in enhanced cooperation that the Union would not be 
entitled to do itself. Nor can anything be done in a diﬀ  erent way from that which 
the Union could itself do. In other words, enhanced cooperation is governed by 
the same legal bases as those governing the Union, i.e. the same powers, the same 
instruments of action, and the same procedures. Th   e fact that enhanced coopera-
tion is a means of last resort conﬁ  rms that principle.
As a result, enhanced cooperation can potentially be initiated in all areas covered 
by the treaties, but only in those areas. It can be argued that the issues which can be 
dealt with in enhanced cooperation are further limited by substantive conditions 
like those regarding non discrimination, the integrity of the internal market, and 
the acquis communautaire. On the other hand, nothing rules out that legal bases 
which tend to extend the competences of the Union be also used in enhanced 
cooperation. Th   is is for example the case for the general ﬂ  exibility clause
[5] and for 
a similar clause addressing the European citizens rights to move and reside freely 
in the Union.
[6] Th   is is also the case for deﬁ  ning new aspects of criminal procedure 
or other areas or crime that could be addressed by “minimum rules” of the Union, 
and thus by enhanced cooperation.
[7]
Another implication is that enhanced cooperation is carried out in the same insti-
tutional setting as that of the Union. Th   e composition of the institutions remains 
unchanged, except for the Council of ministers: non-participants are excluded from 
voting and the measures adopted by the Council are not applicable to them. Th  ey  are 
however present in the room and can take part in the deliberations. Th   is may lead 
participants to gather informally amongst themselves beforehand for the shaping 
of their decision, as the Euro Members States already do in the Eurogroup. 
[5]   Article 308 TFU.
[6]   Including measures related to social security and social protection (article 18, § 3 TFU). The European Constitution 
was also referring to measures concerning passports, identity cards, residence permits or any other such document 
(comp. article III — 125, § 2).
[7]   Article 69 E, § 1 d) TFU (III — 270) and article 69 F, § 1, sub. 3 TFU (III — 271).Enhanced Cooperation:  From Theory to Practice
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A point which may have been overlooked by negotiators concerns the application of 
QMV in the enhanced cooperation mechanism. Th   e double majority system, in this 
case 55% (or 65%) of the Members States participating in enhanced cooperation 
and 65% (or 72%) of their population, would be applicable and it could lead to 
some odd consequences depending on the actual number of participating Member 
States and their respective population. In particular, the adaptation of the blocking 
minority condition may be problematic.
[8] Th   e power balance between participating 
Member States, especially if their number is limited, may well be very diﬀ  erent in 
enhanced cooperation from what it is in the Union as a whole.
Th   e composition of both the Commission and the European Court of Justice 
is unaﬀ  ected when they are called upon to intervene in an enhanced coopera-
tion mechanism. Th   is is quite appropriate, given their neutrality and their strong 
supranational features. 
Th   e question is more delicate as regards the European Parliament.
[9] No variable 
geometry is foreseen for the Parliament in enhanced cooperation, nor in the areas 
of predeﬁ  ned ﬂ  exibility like EMU and the area of freedom, security and justice 
(AFSJ). Up to now that has not seemed very problematic because either just a few 
Member States were concerned by non-participation
[10], or the areas concerned did 
not fully involve the European Parliament. Th   is may change, for example as regards 
the area of freedom, security and justice. Here the ordinary legislative procedure 
(co-decision) becomes the rule, whereas countries like the UK, Denmark, let alone 
Ireland, are largely exempted, and thus will not be bound by most legislation. Th  e 
question arises as to the legitimacy of the participation of MEP’s elected in those 
countries in the decision-making process. As for enhanced cooperation, the ques-
tion would become even more sensitive if only nine or ten Members States were 
involved in enacting legislation. Th   e European Parliament has always rejected the 
idea of a variable geometry in its composition, but this position may become a real 
obstacle to the development of enhanced cooperation. 
As a rule the procedures applying to the decision-making process within enhanced 
cooperation are those provided for by the legal bases for the Union as a whole. 
However the Reform Treaty takes on board one of the most original proposals of 
the Constitution, namely a so-called passerelle system. Participating Member States 
[8]   Article 205, § 3 TFU.
[9]   See also the section on the European Parliament above in this issue.
[10]   As far the single currency is concerned, a majority of the Member States have not adopted the euro, but apart from 
the UK and Denmark, this situation is supposed to be transitional so that their full involvement in the European Parlia-
ment is justifi  ed.104
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may amend amongst themselves, and just for themselves, the procedures which 
will govern the implementation of enhanced cooperation: either to switch from 
unanimity to qualiﬁ  ed majority, or from a special legislative procedure to the ordi-
nary legislative procedure.
[11] Such a prospect may be an incentive for integrationist 
Member States to embark upon enhanced cooperation. It may also be noted that 
the implementation of such a passerelle amounts to a simpliﬁ  ed treaty amendment 
procedure, with such procedural changes eventually becoming part of the acquis of 
enhanced cooperation, potentially binding upon all future participants.
1.3. Relations with Non-Participating Member States and Later 
Participation
According to the principle of openness, all Member States are entitled to join 
enhanced cooperation at a latter stage: they then have to accept the acquis of 
enhanced cooperation. Th   e new procedure for later participation has been stream-
lined by the European Constitution and the Reform Treaty. Th  e  Commission  is 
supposed to conﬁ  rm the participation of any new candidate. In case of refusal 
the candidate can refer the matter to the Council (which decides by QMV of the 
participants). A temporary refusal can only be justiﬁ  ed by non-compliance with 
predetermined conditions for participation. Th   is should avoid arbitrary decisions. 
In the case of CFSP, it is directly up to the Council to conﬁ  rm later participation. 
Given that the intention was to render enhanced cooperation more inclusive with 
respect to later participation of the willing, the reference to unanimity voting in 
this case seems rather strange.
Th   e procedure for later participation of Member States to enhanced cooperation 
raises delicate questions. Is it the only way for them to be involved in the matter 
dealt with in enhanced cooperation? To what extent does enhanced cooperation 
de facto pre-empt any concurrent action at Union level once it has been autho-
rized? Legally speaking, the Commission could always try to make a proposal for 
the Union as a whole, notwithstanding previous failures. But it is very unlikely 
that the Member States taking part in enhanced cooperation will be motivated to 
reopen the negotiations, especially if they have already started adopting measures 
for themselves.
[12] Th   ey may indeed argue that the procedure for latter participation 
is always open to them.
[11]   Article 280h TFU.
[12]   If however a latter concurrent action was to be undertaken at EU level, there might be a confl  ict between the Union 
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In practice, however, there are several precedents where alternatives to full par-
ticipation have been devised. In EMU for example, the application of a rule has 
been extended to non participants in the single currency by referring to article 
308 TEC.
[13] Before that, the four directives adopted under the Maastricht social 
protocol had been similarly extended to the UK when it decided to join in, on the 
basis of article 94 TEC.
[14] More recently, in the framework of Title IV TEC, the 
application of several regulations has been extended to Denmark by concluding 
a “parallel” (and incongruous) international agreement between the Community 
and Denmark.
[15] 
Be it as it may, the acquis of enhanced cooperation may de facto predetermine future 
Union law, without all Member States having been involved in its elaboration. Th  is 
consideration may weigh heavily on the initial authorizing procedure.
It is clear from the analysis so far that a serious eﬀ  ort has been made in the Con-
stitution and the Reform Treaty to render the enhanced cooperation mechanism 
more attractive and eﬀ  ective, both at the initial stage (triggering mechanisms), at 
the functioning stage (passerelle) and in relations to non participants. However a 
number of uncertainties, ambiguities and potential problems remain. Some of these 
uncertainties are legal in nature. How will enhanced cooperation aﬀ  ect the judiciary 
system of the Union, e.g. in assessing the applicability of the decisions enacted in 
enhanced cooperation to situations involving in one way or another non partici-
pating Members States or their nationals? What will be the impact of enhanced 
cooperation on the external action of the Union and on further enlargements? What 
is eventually the legal nature of enhanced cooperation and its acquis? 
[13]   See for example Council Regulation n° 1339/2001 of 28 June 2001 extending the eff  ects of Regulation n° 1338/2001 
laying down measures necessary for the protection of the euro against counterfeiting to those Member States which 
have not adopted the euro as their single currency, OJ L 181, 2001, p. 11. 
[14]   Former article 100 TEC. See for example the Council Directive 97/74/EC of 15 December 1997 extending, to the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Directive 94/45/EC on the establishment of a European Works 
Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes 
of informing and consulting employees, OJ L 10, 16 January 1998, p. 22.
[15]   See for example the “Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on the criteria 
and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in Denmark or any 
other Member State of the European Union and “Eurodac” for the comparison of fi  ngerprints for the eff  ective application 
of the Dublin Convention”, OJ L 66, 8 March 2006, p. 38.106
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2. POTENTIAL AREAS FOR ENHANCED COOPERATION
Th  e  ﬁ  rst case where enhanced cooperation was seriously considered concerned 
the minimum taxation of energy products.
[16] It has also been envisaged to enact 
the Statute for a European company,
[17] and later the European arrest warrant.
[18] 
Th   e European Commission, prompted by former Commissioner F. Bolkenstein, 
contemplated the use of enhanced cooperation to establish a common consolidated 
basis for taxation on company proﬁ  ts.
[19] In all those cases, unanimity was the vot-
ing procedure in Council and it is probably in such cases that opportunities for 
enhanced cooperation can still be found. 
Th   ree areas need to be considered separately
[20]: the area of freedom, security and 
justice, common foreign and security policy, and economic and monetary union. 
In those three areas, forms of ﬂ  exibility other than enhanced cooperation stricto 
sensu are operational so that we have to consider how they could be supplemented 
or complemented.
[21]
2.1. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
A form of enhanced cooperation already exists with regard to the Schengen acquis 
and measures building upon it, as a result of the non-participation of the United-
Kingdom, Ireland, and/or Denmark.
[22] A similar mechanism, concerning the same 
Member States, has been set up for implementing Title IV of the TEC on asylum, 
immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons. 
[16]   See eventually the Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for 
the taxation of energy products and electricity, OJ L 283/51, 31 October 2003. 
[17]   See eventually Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company, 
OJ L 294, 10 November 2001, p. 22.
[18]   See eventually Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the 
surrender procedures between Member States, OJ L 190, 18 July 2002, p. 1.
[19]   Report from the Commission to the spring European Council — Delivering Lisbon — Reforms for the enlarged 
Union COM (2004), 20 February 2004, pp. 23-24.
[20]   Energy and environment related taxation might also become eligible for enhanced cooperation in the future, let 
alone further harmonisation of VAT.
[21]   On the potentialities of enhanced cooperation and other forms of fl  exibility in various policy areas, see also F. 
DEHOUSSE, W. COUSSENS and G. GREVI, Integrating Europe. Multiple Speed — One direction?, EPC Working Paper No. 9, April 
2004, pp. 18-30.
[22]   See in the Reform Treaty the Protocol on the Schengen acquis integrated into the European Union.Enhanced Cooperation:  From Theory to Practice
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In the European Constitution, and thus in the Reform Treaty, Denmark’s exemp-
tion has been extended to all questions building upon the acquis falling under the 
area of freedom, security and justice, Schengen related or not.
[23]
As for the UK and Ireland, the scope of their special status is extended by the Con-
stitution, notably to the collection storage, processing, analysis and exchange of 
relevant information.
[24] Th   e Reform Treaty will extend further the UK status to all 
matters related to judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation. 
Th   e scope of the exemption will thus cover the whole area of freedom, security and 
justice
[25], as is the case for Denmark (but the legal regime remains diﬀ  erent). Th  e 
status of Ireland will presumably be aligned on that of Britain.
Th   e complexity and the many incoherencies resulting from those protocols are 
aggravated by the Reform Treaty. Th   e United Kingdom has submitted to the 
Court of justice two cases linked to those protocols where it considers that its opt-
in rights were not respected.
[26] Th   e Court will have, for the ﬁ  rst time, to dig into 
the interpretation and articulations of those protocols, and thereby may give some 
guidance for their implementation in the future.
Judicial cooperation in criminal matters, including minimum harmonisation of 
national criminal law, has also been considered as a potential area for enhanced 
cooperation. In the Constitutional treaty a so-called “emergency brake” to the 
legislative procedure has been devised, but in case of continuing deadlock, the 
authorisation to pursue enhanced cooperation “shall be deemed to be granted” to 
the willing Member States.
[27] Th   e Reform Treaty has somewhat simpliﬁ  ed that 
procedure
[28] and extended it to police cooperation as well as to the establishment 
of European Public Prosecutor’s oﬃ   ce.
[29] It is therefore the whole former third 
pillar (title VI of the TEU) which will be covered by that special procedure aimed 
[23]   Thus, Denmark’s exemption now covers all measures building upon the Schengen acquis, not only those that are 
based on Title IV TEC, but also those based on Title VI TEU (due to its “communautarization”). The exemption is thus equally 
extended to non Schengen related developments of Title VI TEU. The legal regime of Denmark’s status is governed by 
the Protocol on the position of Denmark (including for most Schengen related issues).
[24]   Article 69 J, § 2, a) TFEU (article III — 275, § 2, a) of the Constitution, article 30, § 1, b of the TEU).
[25]   Protocol on the position of the United-Kingdom and Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and 
justice.
[26]   See already the elaborate opinions of Advocate General TRSTENJAK delivered on 10 July 2007, on Cases C-77/05 and 
C-137/05. The fi  rst one addresses the Council Regulation n° 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European 
agency for the management of operational cooperation at the external borders of the Member States of the European 
Union. The second case addresses the Council Regulation (EC) No. 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for 
security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States.
[27]   See article III — 270 and 271 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
[28]   Comp. articles 69 E and 69 F TFEU.
[29]   See articles 69 I and 69 J TFEU (article III — 274 and 275 of the Constitution).108
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at easing the creation of enhanced cooperation.
[30] Th   e articulation of that special 
triggering procedure with the special status of the UK, Ireland, and Denmark will 
give some work to legal experts.
Do all those forms of ﬂ  exibility preclude Member States from triggering the normal 
enhanced cooperation mechanism in this area? In our opinion, legally speaking 
they do not, although they may entail more procedural constraints.
Triggering enhanced cooperation in the area of freedom, security and justice could 
make sense if a given policy is opposed by more than just the three Member States 
with a special status. It might also make sense if participating Member States wanted 
to deﬁ  ne a wide scope for their cooperation, or set conditions for participation, 
points which the “special” triggering mechanism (always linked to a speciﬁ  c draft 
directive or regulation) does not allow.
Finally, the extension of European citizenship rights could appear to be an interest-
ing candidate for enhanced cooperation. Th   e Nice treaty removed the exclusion 
of citizenship from enhanced cooperation. Enhanced cooperation could then be 
envisaged to enlarge the concept of freedom of movement and residence inside the 
Union to the beneﬁ  t of European citizens, or even to recognize new rights, like, for 
instance, voting rights at national (and not only local) level.
[31]
2.2. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
Another innovation of the Constitution taken up by the Reform Treaty concerns 
the extension of the scope of enhanced cooperation to CFSP, without conﬁ  ning it 
to mere implementation of common actions or positions in the name of the Union 
However, given that an unanimous vote is required to trigger enhanced cooperation 
in CFSP
[32], it is unlikely ever to be implemented. 
It is moreover debatable whether it would be politically feasible and desirable to 
apply enhanced cooperation to foreign policy, as this would contradict the necessary 
unity of action and external representation. Th   e “constructive abstention” technique 
was specially devised by the Amsterdam Treaty for CFSP but it has never been 
[30]   Except where measures concerning police cooperation are building upon the Schengen acquis (in which case the 
Schengen protocol or the UK/Irish protocol mentioned above should be applicable), see Article 69 J, last sentence.
[31]   Article 22, § 2 TFU (although the necessary approval by the Member States in accordance to their constitutional 
requirement may be an obstacle to the setting up of enhanced cooperation).
[32]   Which is a regression in relation not only to the Convention draft (which had provided QMV), but also to the current 
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used either, although it is much lighter than enhanced cooperation, and purports 
not to aﬀ  ect the unity of the Union.
As formally part of CFSP, defence policy has also become a potential area for 
enhanced cooperation. However, given various existing forms of ﬂ  exibility provided 
for in that area, both outside and inside the Union framework
[33], the enhanced 
cooperation mechanism, as such, is unlikely ever to be triggered in this ﬁ  eld. Th  e 
case of the most reluctant Member State, Denmark, had already been dealt with 
in the Danish protocol annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty: Denmark is considered 
as a non participant to “closer cooperation” in that area.
[34] 
In the drafting of the European Constitution, enhanced cooperation was foreseen 
in order to establish the European Defence Agency. Th   is agency, which has been set 
up in the meantime
[35] does indeed diﬀ  erentiate among Member States by “taking 
account of the level of eﬀ  ective participation in the Agency’s activities”
[36]. Enhanced 
cooperation was also kept in mind as a fall back position in case the concept of 
“permanent structured cooperation” were to fail by the end of the process. But 
the Reform Treaty has not made any changes on that issue. Permanent structured 
cooperation is still planned to be set up in order to increase and further integrate 
the forces of the participating Member States and to engage in the most demand-
ing Petersberg missions
Permanent structured cooperation resembles enhanced cooperation in that it will be 
set up by a Council decision which will identify the participating Member States. It 
will be reserved to the willing Member States that fulﬁ  l the criteria and have made 
the commitments on military capabilities predeﬁ  ned in a protocol in that regard. 
Th   e non-participants will be precluded from voting in the Council (whereas their 
right to take part in the deliberations is not expressly provided). And they can 
submit at a later stage to the Council their intention to participate.
Th   e main diﬀ  erence lies in the fact that the scope of the “structured cooperation” 
is predeﬁ  ned and relatively wide, which makes it indeed more “permanent” than 
enhanced cooperation. Its creation, by a qualiﬁ  ed majority vote, is likely to occur as 
soon as the Reform Treaty enters into force. It is not subject to a condition of last 
resort nor to any minimum threshold participation, nor to any substantive condi-
[33]   See also A. MISSIROLI, CFSP, Defence and Flexibility, EU-ISS Chaillot Paper No. 38, February 2000.
[34]   Article 6 of the protocol on the position of Denmark.
[35]   Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, OJ L 
245/17, 17 July 2004.
[36]   Article III — 311, § 2 (new article 30, § 2 TEU). 110
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tion. Th   e participation of a Member State can be suspended if the commitments 
on military capabilities are not complied with; conversely any participant has the 
right to withdraw from the structured cooperation.
In other words, permanent structured cooperation is another kind of predeﬁ  ned 
institutional ﬂ  exibility, similar to the Euro zone or the Schengen area. Its creation 
conﬁ  rms in a way the enduring shortcomings of the enhanced cooperation mecha-
nism. Th   e latter is perceived as more constraining, less exclusive, and thus not as 
attractive and useful.
Th   e Reform Treaty has taken up from the Constitution another form of ﬂ  exibility 
which formalizes a long standing practice.
[37] It consists of entrusting the imple-
mentation of a Petersberg’s mission to a group of States “which are willing and have 
the necessary capability for such a task”, presumably in the name of the Union.
[38] 
Such missions are supposed be carried out “within the framework of the Union”. 
Th   e Council shall be kept informed and may amend the mandate of the mission. 
However the management of the mission remains in the hand of the group of States, 
“in association with the High Representative”. Th   e involvement of the Political 
and security committee is but ensured at that level.
2.3. Enhanced Cooperation in the Economic and Monetary Union 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is a comprehensive predeﬁ  ned system of 
diﬀ  erentiation within the Union. Denmark and the UK have been exempted from 
adopting the single currency, whereas the participation of other Member States 
“with a derogation” is postponed until they meet the convergence criteria. Th  is  is 
still the case for Sweden as well as for the twelve new Member States, except for 
Slovenia which joined the Euro zone in January 2007.
[39] Apart from the UK, all 
the non-participating Member States basically enjoy the same status. Within the 
Union framework, their voting right is suspended for a number of questions that 
concern mainly the participants to the single currency, like for example the legal 
status of the Euro. For many other issues, they keep their voting right in the Council 
but decisions are shaped in the Eurogroup from which they are excluded. Within 
the European System of Central Banks, the national banks of the non-participants 
are not part of the Eurosystem; they are not involved in the Governing Council 
[37]   And which recalls the main characteristic of enhanced cooperation in CFSP as it was devised in the Nice Treaty.
[38]   New article 29 TUE (articles I-41, § 5 and III — 310).
[39]   Cyprus and Malta will join in January 2008.Enhanced Cooperation:  From Theory to Practice
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nor in the Executive Board. Th   ey are only consulted through the meetings of the 
General Council. 
Enhanced cooperation could be envisaged in policies directly connected to EMU, 
like social policy, employment and taxation. Within the EMU chapter itself, there 
is presumably no room for enhanced cooperation in monetary and exchange rate 
policies, due the exclusiveness of EU powers in that area.
[40] But the coordination 
of national economic policies could be considered for enhanced cooperation, even 
though its implementation could not go beyond the powers attributed to the 
Union: enhanced cooperation is indeed conﬁ  ned to the constitutional framework 
of the Union.
Th   e Reform Treaty, just like the European Constitution, develops the possibility 
of deepening further economic coordination amongst the Euro Member States. It 
does so by increasing the number of cases in which the Council suspends the voting 
right of non-participants and dispenses them from applying the resulting measures. 
Th   is will be the case in the framework of multilateral surveillance, for the “adoption 
of the parts of the broad economic policy guidelines which concern the euro area 
generally”
[41], and for the “recommendations made to those Member States whose 
currency is the euro (…), including on stability programmes and warnings”
[42]. Th  is 
will also be the case in the framework of the public deﬁ  cit procedure, ﬁ  rstly in order 
to declare the existence of such a deﬁ  cit, and secondly where the Council establishes 
“that there has been no eﬀ  ective action in response to its recommendations (…), 
including the decision to make those recommendations public”
[43]. And this will 
be the case for “measures to ensure uniﬁ  ed representation within the international 
ﬁ  nancial institutions and conferences”
[44].
In all those cases, it would have been possible to consider applying enhanced coop-
eration. But preference has been given to an extension of the predeﬁ  ned EURO 
system. Th   at choice is signiﬁ  cant.
What about the Stability and Growth Pact? Would it be conceivable for the Mem-
bers States belonging to the Euro zone to engage into enhanced cooperation in 
order to strengthen their stability programmes?
[45] Or in order the regulate the 
[40]   At least with respect to the States part of the Euro zone.
[41]   Article 116, § 2, a) TFEU (article III — 197, § 2, a), corresponding to article 99, § 2 TEC.
[42]   Article 116 § 4, a) TFEU (article III — 197, § 4, a), corresponding to article 99, § 4 TEC.
[43]   Article 116, § 4, b) TFEU (article III — 197, § 4, b), corresponding to article 104, §§ 6 and 7 TEC.
[44]   Article 116, § 2, j) TFEU (article III — 197, § 2, j), compare article 111, § 4 TEC.
[45]   In accordance to Council Regulation No. 1466/97, 7 July 1997.112
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sanctions related to the public deﬁ  cit procedures, given that such sanctions do 
not concern Member States who do not participate in the Euro?
[46] In fact another 
choice was made for the reform of the Stability Pact in June 2005. Th  e  idea  was 
not to strengthen cooperation, but to relax and make the Pact more ﬂ  exible in 
order to take into account the particularities of each Member States. It is however 
interesting to observe that the Eurogroup played an important role in shaping the 
reform of the Stability Pact. 
A more general question concerns the possibility of “formalizing” the Eurogroup and 
“repatriating” it in the EU institutional framework trough enhanced cooperation. 
Given that the Eurogroup is able to shape the decisions without the interference of 
non participants, whereas enhanced cooperation would only suspend their voting 
rights in the decision-taking, the question could be formulated as follows: could 
the Eurogroup use enhanced cooperation in order to enact formally its decisions? 
Th   e answer is yes: enhanced cooperation can always be used as long as it does so 
within the legal framework of the Union. However given that the Eurogroup deals 
at times with issues which go beyond the competences of the Union, these could 
therefore not be dealt with in the Ecoﬁ  n Council nor in enhanced cooperation.
Two more issues are worth considering: prudential supervision and complementary 
legislation to the ESCB.
Th   e Council, acting unanimously, may confer speciﬁ  c tasks concerning prudential 
supervision of ﬁ  nancial institutions to the ECB.
[47] No such regulation has ever 
been adopted. If diﬃ   culties are forthcoming from some Member States, it might 
make sense to apply the enhanced cooperation mechanism. Participants might, or 
might not, be the same as Member States sharing the Euro. 
Complementary legislation to the Statute of the ESCB operates in a complex 
legal system. In some cases, for instance the consultation of the ECB by national 
authorities
[48], or the collection of statistical information by the European Central 
Bank
[49], the Council, in its full composition, provides for two distinctive legal 
regimes depending on the participation or not to the single currency. For other 
regulations, the Council acts in its full composition, although acts adopted do 
not apply to the non-participants. Such is the case for the regulations concerning 
[46]   In accordance to Council Regulation No. 1467/97, 7 July 1997.
[47]   Article 105, § 6 TEC.
[48]   Council Decision 98/415/CE of 29 June 1998, OJ L 189, 3 July 1998
[49]   Council Regulation No. 2533/98 of 23 November 1998, OJ L 318, 27 November 1998.Enhanced Cooperation:  From Theory to Practice
113
the application of minimum reserves by the ECB
[50], the powers of the European 
Central Bank to impose sanctions
[51], and further calls of foreign reserve assets by 
the ECB
[52]. At one moment in time, Euro States might seek an agreement amongst 
themselves to use the enhanced cooperation mechanism rather than the full Council, 
for adopting those regulations or legal regimes that apply only to themselves. Th  is 
could be particularly the case in relation to Member States which are not actually 
committed to joining the single currency. 
CONCLUSION
Since its creation in the Amsterdam Treaty, the enhanced cooperation mechanism 
has been driven by two logics.
[53] Th   e initial aim was to circumvent blockages due 
to unanimity voting in the Council in order to pass single acts. A second motiva-
tion was to acquire the capacity to create new sub-groups like the Eurozone, the 
Schengen area, or the former social agreement. Of course both logics are not incom-
patible, but enhanced cooperation seems to be much too elaborate a mechanism 
to be used solely to render decision-making procedures more ﬂ  exible in speciﬁ  c 
cases: simpler techniques exist in that respect, like “constructive abstention” and 
opt-outs. Using enhanced cooperation for single speciﬁ  c acts also raises the risk 
of fragmentation.
As indicated above the innovations of the European Constitution, fully taken up 
by the Reform Treaty, were meant to make enhanced cooperation more useful and 
more attractive. Th   ey increase the autonomy of the potential groupings of Member 
States at the moment of their creation, in their functioning, in the deﬁ  nition of their 
scope of action, and in setting conditions for participation. Th   e fact remains that 
implementing enhanced cooperation may raise unexpected new legal questions.
Potential areas of application can be identiﬁ  ed. In spite of the existing forms of 
ﬂ  exibility, enhanced cooperation is not ruled out in the area of freedom, security 
and justice, nor in the EMU, notably to strengthen economic coordination between 
the Euro States. Other areas include Community policies governed by unanimity 
like taxation, social policy, but also European citizenship. Conversely, enhanced 
cooperation would seem to be of little use in the ﬁ  eld of CFSP and Defence.
[50]   Council Regulation No. 2531/98 of 23 November 1998, OJ L 318, 27 November 1998.
[51]   Council Regulation No. 2532/98 of 23 November 1998, OJ L 318, 27 November 1998.
[52]   Council Regulation No. 1010/2000 of 8 May 2000, OJ L 155, 16 May 2000.
[53]   About this argument, see H. BRIBOSIA, cited above, 2007, pp. 496-513.114
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Compared to intergovernmental cooperation outside the Union, the enhanced 
cooperation mechanism is advantageous: it maintains the community method, 
parliamentary and judicial control, and guarantees for the non-participants. Com-
pared to predeﬁ  ned systems of ﬂ  exibility (Euro, Schengen): it can create functioning 
subsystem without needing an IGC, it is more general and coherent a system, and 
through the “passerelle” clause it can modify its internal decision making system.
Nevertheless intergovernmental cooperation outside the Union remains a strong 
rival to enhanced cooperation within the framework of the Union. Perhaps coop-
eration outside the Union should be better regulated or articulated with enhanced 
cooperation in order to make sense of the new mechanism. Perhaps the former 
should be considered as a second best, to be used in “last resort” only, when 
it is established that enhanced cooperation within the Union framework is not 
possible? 
It is also the case that there is some reluctance in the European establishment, 
notably in the European Commission and the new Member States, towards imple-
menting enhanced cooperation. Embarking upon enhanced cooperation is still 
perceived by some as a divisive “threat” rather than an “opportunity”
[54] for the 
dynamics of European integration.
It may well be that the combination of these elements will continue to inhibit in 
practice, as has been the case so far, any attempt at triggering the enhanced coop-
eration mechanism. Much eﬀ  ort would then have been spent in vain.
[54]   See already S. KURBAS, J. DE CLERCK-SACHSSE, J.I. TORREBLANCA, G. RICARD-NIHOUL, From Threat to Opportunity: Making Flexible 
Integration Work, EPIN Working Paper, No. 15/September 2006.Enhanced Cooperation:  From Theory to Practice
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Annex Th   e New Provisions on Enhanced cooperation
  (as envisaged by CIG 1/1/07 REV 1 October 2007: pp. 143-147)
Title IV shall take over the heading of Title VII “PROVISIONS ON ENHANCED 
COOPERATION” and Articles 27a to 27e, Articles 40 to 40b and Articles 43 to 
45 shall be replaced by the following Article 10: 
Article 10 
1.   Member States which wish to establish enhanced cooperation between them-
selves within the framework of the Union’s non-exclusive competences may 
make use of its institutions and exercise those competences by applying the 
relevant provisions of the Treaties, subject to the limits and in accordance 
with the procedures laid down in this Article and in Articles 280a to 280i of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Enhanced coopera-
tion shall aim to further the objectives of the Union, protect its interests and 
reinforce its integration process. Such cooperation shall be open at any time 
to all Member States, in accordance with Article 280c of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.
2.   Th   e decision authorising enhanced cooperation shall be adopted by the Coun-
cil as a last resort, when it has established that the objectives of such coopera-
tion cannot be attained within a reasonable period by the Union as a whole, 
and provided that at least nine Member States participate in it. Th  e  Council 
shall act in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 280d of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
3.   All members of the Council may participate in its deliberations, but only 
members of the Council representing the Member States participating in 
enhanced cooperation shall take part in the vote. Th   e voting rules are set out 
in Article 280e of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
4.   Acts adopted in the framework of enhanced cooperation shall bind only 
participating Member States. Th   ey shall not be regarded as part of the acquis 
which has to be accepted by candidate States for accession to the Union.
A Title III “ENHANCED COOPERATION” shall be inserted after Article 280. 
Th   e following new Articles 280a to 280i shall be inserted: 116
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Article 280a 
Any enhanced cooperation shall comply with the Treaties and the law of the 
Union. 
Such cooperation shall not undermine the internal market or economic, social and 
territorial cohesion. It shall not constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade 
between Member States, nor shall it distort competition between them. 
Article 280b 
Any enhanced cooperation shall respect the competences, rights and obligations 
of those Member States which do not participate in it. Th   ose Member States shall 
not impede its implementation by the participating Member States. 
Article 280c 
1.   When enhanced cooperation is being established, it shall be open to all Mem-
ber States, subject to compliance with any conditions of participation laid 
down by the authorising decision. It shall also be open to them at any other 
time, subject to compliance with the acts already adopted within that frame-
work, in addition to those conditions. 
  Th   e Commission and the Member States participating in enhanced coopera-
tion shall ensure that they promote participation by as many Member States 
as possible. 
2.   Th   e Commission and, where appropriate, the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy shall keep the European Parlia-
ment and the Council regularly informed regarding developments in enhanced 
cooperation. 
Article 280d 
1.   Member States which wish to establish enhanced cooperation between them-
selves in one of the areas covered by the Treaties, with the exception of ﬁ  elds 
of exclusive competence and the common foreign and security policy, shall 
address a request to the Commission, specifying the scope and objectives of 
the enhanced cooperation proposed. Th   e Commission may submit a proposal 
to the Council to that eﬀ  ect. In the event of the Commission not submitting 
a proposal, it shall inform the Member States concerned of the reasons for 
not doing so. Enhanced Cooperation:  From Theory to Practice
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  Authorisation to proceed with the enhanced cooperation referred to in the 
ﬁ  rst subparagraph shall be granted by the Council, on a proposal from the 
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
2.   Th   e request of the Member States which wish to establish enhanced coopera-
tion between themselves within the framework of the common foreign and 
security policy shall be addressed to the Council. It shall be forwarded to the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy, 
who shall give an opinion on whether the enhanced cooperation proposed 
is consistent with the Union’s common foreign and security policy, and to 
the Commission, which shall give its opinion in particular on whether the 
enhanced cooperation proposed is consistent with other Union policies. It 
shall also be forwarded to the European Parliament for information. 
  Authorisation to proceed with enhanced cooperation shall be granted by a 
decision of the Council acting unanimously. 
Article 280e 
All members of the Council may participate in its deliberations, but only members 
of the Council representing the Member States participating in enhanced coopera-
tion shall take part in the vote. 
Unanimity shall be constituted by the votes of the representatives of the participat-
ing Member States only. 
A qualiﬁ  ed majority shall be deﬁ  ned in accordance with Article 205(3). 
Article 280f 
1.   Any Member State which wishes to participate in enhanced cooperation in 
progress in one of the areas referred to in Article 280d(1) shall notify its inten-
tion to the Council and the Commission. Th   e Commission shall, within four 
months of the date of receipt of the notiﬁ  cation, conﬁ  rm the participation of 
the Member State concerned. It shall note where necessary that the conditions 
of participation have been fulﬁ  lled and shall adopt any transitional measures 
necessary with regard to the application of the acts already adopted within 
the framework of enhanced cooperation. 
  However, if the Commission considers that the conditions of participation 
have not been fulﬁ  lled, it shall indicate the arrangements to be adopted to fulﬁ  l 
those conditions and shall set a deadline for re-examining the request. On the 
expiry of that deadline, it shall re-examine the request, in accordance with the 118
The Treaty of Lisbon : Implementing the Institutional Innovations
procedure set out in the second subparagraph. If the Commission considers 
that the conditions of participation have still not been met, the Member State 
concerned may refer the matter to the Council, which shall decide on the 
request. Th   e Council shall act in accordance with Article 280e. It may also 
adopt the transitional measures referred to in the second subparagraph on a 
proposal from the Commission.
2.   Any Member State which wishes to participate in enhanced cooperation in 
progress in the framework of the common foreign and security policy shall 
notify its intention to the Council, the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy and the Commission. Th  e  Council  shall 
conﬁ  rm the participation of the Member State concerned, after consulting 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy 
and after noting, where necessary, that the conditions of participation have 
been fulﬁ  lled. Th   e Council, on a proposal from the High Representative, may 
also adopt any transitional measures necessary with regard to the application 
of the acts already adopted within the framework of enhanced cooperation. 
However, if the Council considers that the conditions of participation have not 
been fulﬁ  lled, it shall indicate the arrangements to be adopted to fulﬁ  l those 
conditions and shall set a deadline for re-examining the request for participa-
tion. For the purposes of this paragraph, the Council shall act unanimously 
and in accordance with Article 280e. Article 280g Expenditure resulting from 
implementation of enhanced cooperation, other than administrative costs 
entailed for the institutions, shall be borne by the participating Member States, 
unless all members of the Council, acting unanimously after consulting the 
European Parliament, decide otherwise.
Article 280h 
1.   Where a provision of the Treaties which may be applied in the context of 
enhanced cooperation stipulates that the Council shall act unanimously, the 
Council, acting unanimously in accordance with the arrangements laid down 
in Article 280e, may adopt a decision stipulating that it will act by a qualiﬁ  ed 
majority. 
2.   Where a provision of the Treaties which may be applied in the context of 
enhanced cooperation stipulates that the Council shall adopt acts under a 
special legislative procedure, the Council, acting unanimously in accordance 
with the arrangements laid down in Article 280e, may adopt a decision stipu-
lating that it will act under the ordinary legislative procedure. Th  e  Council 
shall act after consulting the European Parliament. Enhanced Cooperation:  From Theory to Practice
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3.   Paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply to decisions having military or defence 
implications.
Article 280i 
Th   e Council and the Commission shall ensure the consistency of activities under-
taken in the context of enhanced cooperation and the consistency of such activities 
with the policies of the Union, and shall cooperate to that end.121
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FOREIGN POLICY: 
MANY OPPORTUNITIES AND A FEW UNKNOWS
Whatever the reasons that the citizens of France and the Netherlands gave for their 
“Noes” to the Constitutional Treaty in the spring of 2005, the new architecture 
of EU “foreign policy” it contained was not a signiﬁ  cant factor. Moreover, public 
opinion in the EU consistently favours better cooperation among member states 
for common action in international aﬀ  airs and for the defence of European values 
and interests in the wider world. 
Th   is is why the Reform Treaty includes practically the same provisions as the ill-
fated EU “Constitution”. And the new Treaty oﬀ  ers many good opportunities — in 
terms of greater policy coherence, eﬀ  ectiveness and visibility — coupled with some 
unknowns related to its implementation. 
1. WHAT IS THE BACKGROUND, AND WHAT THE ACQUIS SO FAR? 
Since the very beginning, the European Community/Union’s external relations 
“system” has developed along two distinct paths and patterns. 
On the one hand, the European Commission has gradually built a network of ser-
vices to support and implement its development aid programmes in third countries, 
often in connection with privileged trade agreements. Th   is translated i.a. into the 
creation of a growing number of EC Delegations covering all continents and also 
some international organisations. 
On the other hand, ﬁ  rst with the institutionalisation of the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) in 1986, then with the establishment of the Common For-
eign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 1991, the Council General Secretariat has 
progressively put in place a dedicated Directorate-General to deal with external 
relations. 
Th   ese have come to be known and labelled as the two “pillars” of European “for-
eign policy”. 
On the Commission side, the signature of the Maastricht Treaty prompted a spe-
ciﬁ  c reorganisation, intended also to “match” the parallel development of Council 
structures in the CFSP domain: a reorganisation that was centred upon the creation 
of DG I A (for external political aﬀ  airs) as distinct from DG I proper (for external 
economic aﬀ  airs) and under the authority of a dedicated Commissioner (Hans van 124
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den Broek), and with the ensuing creation of a Uniﬁ  ed External Service (1994) for 
the growing number of EC Delegations in third countries.
Th   e Santer Commission (1995-99) reunited political and economic aﬀ  airs and 
established four separate DGs with mainly geographical responsibilities: Central 
Europe/Russia/CIS (under Commissioner Hans van den Broek), industrialised 
world (Leon Brittan), Latin America/Mediterranean/Middle East/developing Asia 
(Manuel Marin), ACP countries/Lome’ (Joao de Deus Pinheiro). A college-internal 
committee presided by Jacques Santer himself was due to coordinate external poli-
cies. Still, the new set-up entailed many grey areas, overlapping zones of competence 
(e.g. trade) and, more generally, unnecessary fragmentation: a further Commis-
sioner (Emma Bonino), for instance, was in charge i.a. of humanitarian aﬀ  airs. 
Th   e Prodi Commission (1999-2004) carried out a further internal reorganisation 
with the creation of DG RELEX proper (with a new Director-General) and the 
appointment of Chris Patten as a “primus inter pares” among the Commissioners in 
charge of external relations: Poul Nielson for development aid, Guenther Verheu-
gen for enlargement, and Pascal Lamy for trade. Th   is arrangement did not always 
work smoothly, but it certainly represented an improvement over the previous set 
up. Moreover, the Commission could count on more than 120 EC Delegations in 
approximately 150 countries, amounting to a total of 7,000 oﬃ   cials. 
On the Council side, a new DG for External Relations was created in 1994 under 
Brian Crowe: one of his deputies led the new CFSP Unit, while another was in 
charge of external economic relations. When the European Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP) was launched in 1999, this was expanded into DG E, devoted to 
External and Politico-Military Aﬀ  airs, under Robert Cooper.
Before and alongside these new structures, a number of more informal fora, func-
tions, preparatory bodies and groups took shape over the years: the regular meetings 
of the Political Committee (PoCo) in the framework of the EPC/CFSP, prepared 
by the European Correspondents based in the national Foreign Ministries; or the 
various Working groups/Parties and Task Forces convened periodically in Brus-
sels, mostly prepared by the RELEX (since 1999 CFSP) Counsellors based in the 
Permanent Representations.
A signiﬁ  cant boost to the size and scope of Council structures occurred in 1999 
with the appointment of the High Representative for CFSP and Secretary-Gen-
eral of the Council (HR/SG), Javier Solana, and the dedicated Policy Planning 
and Early Warning Unit — both foreseen by the Amsterdam Treaty. Th  e  boost 
continued with the setting up, from 2001, of the new ESDP bodies foreseen by Foreign Policy:  Many Opportunities and a Few Unknows
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the Nice Treaty — such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC), de facto 
replacing the PoCo but permanently based in Brussels, to deal with international 
crisis management — and also those, like most military bodies and the new Council 
agencies, that derived from the transfer of most functions of the Western European 
Union (WEU) to the EU. 
With the exception of the PSC (and the Council “Special Representatives”, created 
already with the Maastricht Treaty), virtually all these new structures were set up 
through simple Joint Actions or Council decisions. Th   ey have come to include 
up to 500 individuals (including the politico-military bodies), plus the personnel 
engaged on the ground in the various ESDP operations around the world.
Th   is new Brussels-based set-up worked reasonably well. Chris Patten’s pragmatic 
approach and attitude, in particular, helped smooth relations with the new player 
on the other side of Rue de la Loi, Javier Solana. Th   e interaction between them and 
the modus vivendi established between their staﬀ  s prevented the in-built “dualism” 
of European foreign policy from negatively aﬀ  ecting its overall conduct at a diﬃ   cult 
time. Th   ey even prompted many analysts to advocating the appointment of a sort 
of “Pattana” — as it was half-jokingly labelled — for the Union. Th   is, in turn, fed 
more or less directly the discussions on institutional reform inside the Convention 
on the Future of Europe (2002-03).
Th   at eventually led to the proposal — later incorporated in the Constitutional 
Treaty — to appoint a “Union Minister for Foreign Aﬀ  airs” combining the “hats” 
of both Solana and Patten. S/he would be in the Commission as one of its Vice-
Presidents (which Patten was not); would chair a newly established Foreign Aﬀ  airs 
Council (resulting from the splitting of the current General Aﬀ  airs and External 
Relations Council); and would be supported by a dedicated “European External 
Action Service” (EEAS). Preparation for the latter would start immediately after 
the signature of the new treaty.
In fact, far from “merging” the two roles and functions, the new ﬁ  gure was (and 
still is), basically, a personal union. Th   e intrinsic dualism of EU’s foreign policy, in 
other words, was not suppressed, as separate procedures were (and are) maintained 
for CFSP proper, on the one hand, and the rest of Union’s external relations, on 
the other: it was only contained and “subsumed” in one individual.
Th   e outcome of the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), with the 
oﬃ   cial signature of the Constitutional Treaty in Rome on 29 October 2004, had 
a direct impact on the make-up of the Barroso Commission (2004–). Th  e  existing 
DGs were maintained but the President took back the role of chairing the group 126
The Treaty of Lisbon : Implementing the Institutional Innovations
of Commissioners dealing with external policies, namely Olli Rehn (enlargement), 
Peter Mandelson (trade), Louis Michel (development aid), and Benita Ferrero 
Waldner, in charge of External Relations and also the recently established European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
Th   is partial reorganisation was based on the assumption that the Constitutional 
Treaty would enter into force, as planned, on 1 November 2006: at that point in 
time — such at least was the reasoning, but no formal decision was ever made in 
this respect — the new “Union Minister for Foreign Aﬀ  airs” would take over the 
RELEX services proper, while Benita Ferrero Waldner would remain Commis-
sioner for the ENP, and possibly sit on the Foreign Aﬀ  airs Council on behalf of 
the Commission (although no formal decision was taken in this respect).
For his part, Solana was “nominated” by the Council as the future “Union Minister 
for Foreign Aﬀ  airs” as from 1 November 2006, while the role of Secretary-General 
of the Council — now separated from that of High Representative for CFSP — 
would be taken over by Pierre de Boissieu, Solana’s deputy in that function, thus 
re-establishing the bureaucratic tradition previously impersonated by Niels Ersboll 
and Juergen Trumpf. 
While personally pleased by the nomination, Solana did not conceal his worries 
about the fact that, in the new capacity, he would have been unable to do what 
he had been doing best during the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve years of his tenure, namely acting as a 
“roving” ambassador and trouble-shooter for the EU, cultivating personal contacts 
throughout the world, and limiting red tape.
At any rate, the crisis triggered by the French “non” and the Dutch “nee” to the 
Constitutional Treaty, in the spring of 2005, put everything on hold for a while. 
It also prompted the “hibernation” of the talks that had been hitherto conducted 
between oﬃ   cials from DG RELEX and the Council Secretariat — ﬂ  anked by the 
Antici Group of the COREPER — over the possible scope and structure of the 
EEAS. A joint Progress Report was indeed presented in May 2005
[1], identifying a 
few agreed principles and general points of convergence, but it was soon set aside 
and almost forgotten. Ever since, little or no reﬂ  ection has been conducted on the 
EU foreign policy set up — with the possible exception of the Commission’s June 
[1]   European External Action Service: Joint progress report to the European Council by the Secretary-General/High Repre-
sentative and the Commission, Brussels, 9 June 2005, 9956/05, CAB 24 RELEX 304, DQPG.Foreign Policy:  Many Opportunities and a Few Unknows
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2006 Communication on “Europe in the World”
[2] — and the overall climate 
between the two sides of Rue de la Loi has hardly improved. 
2. WHAT DOES THE REFORM TREATY SAY?
As already mentioned, the new Reform Treaty retains virtually all the CFSP/ESDP-
relevant provisions of the Constitutional Treaty, with only two minor changes: 
the “Union Minister for Foreign Aﬀ  airs” is renamed “High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy”; and not one but two new Decla-
rations attached to the Treaty (30 and 31) underline i.a. that the new provisions 
(including the EEAS) “do not aﬀ  ect the responsibilities of the member states, as they 
currently exist, for the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy nor of their 
national representation in third countries and international organisations”; neither do 
they “prejudice the speciﬁ  c character of the security and defence policy of the member 
states” or “the primary responsibility of the Security Council and of its members for 
the maintenance of international peace and security” [emphasis added]. 
Th   e second Declaration, in particular, not only ring-fences “the existing legal basis, 
responsibilities, and powers of each member state in relation to the formulation and 
conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries 
and participation in international organisations, including a member state’s membership 
of the Security Council of the UN”. It also reiterates that no new powers in this domain 
are therewith given to either the Commission or the European Parliament.
Th   e change in the title of the former “Minister” is purely cosmetic or, more precisely, 
symbolic, in that it aims to dispel the fears that the term could trigger. Th  e  second 
change is even less signiﬁ  cant, in legal terms, as it states the obvious and reiterates 
existing norms. Still, taken together, the two changes in the text seem to herald a 
slight change in the context: inserted mainly at the request of the UK, they may 
in fact contribute to containing the possible spill-over eﬀ  ects of the “double-hat-
ting” of the new High Representative and maintaining the traditional separation 
between the old EU “pillars”.
As for the rest, the new text reiterates the main changes already enshrined in the 
Constitutional Treaty: 
[2]   Europe in the World — Some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Eff  ectiveness and Visibility, Communication 
from the Commission to the European Council of June 2006, Brussels, 08.06.2006, COM(2006) 278 fi  nal.128
The Treaty of Lisbon : Implementing the Institutional Innovations
the end of the rotational presidency in foreign relations, with some role for 
the President of the European Council (appointed for two and half years, 
renewable once) not only in protocol matters but also in crisis situations 
(new art.13); 
the creation of the double-hatted High Representative, also appointed by 
the European Council (with the agreement of the President of the Commis-
sion) acting, if necessary, by qualiﬁ  ed majority, and also subject to a vote of 
consent by the European Parliament; 
the separation of such role and function from that of Secretary-General of 
the Council; 
the establishment the new Foreign Aﬀ  airs Council, separate from the General 
Aﬀ  airs Council; 
the establishment of the EEAS, set “to work in cooperation with the diplo-
matic services of the member states”, and comprising “oﬃ   cials from relevant 
departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission 
as well as staﬀ   seconded from national diplomatic services of the member 
states” (Declaration 22, attached to the Treaty, reiterates also that “prepara-
tory work” to this end should begin as soon as the new Treaty is “signed”);
the adoption of a single “legislative” procedure, the Council’s “European 
decision” (thus overcoming the distinction between common positions, 
joint actions, and common strategies), but with virtually no change to the 
existing consensual rule;
the expansion of the scope of ESDP, now called Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP), and of its missions (new artt. 27 and 28), including: 
a “solidarity clause” and a “mutual defence” commitment, both with sub-
stantial qualiﬁ  cations and provisos; the possibility for the Council “to entrust 
the implementation of a task to a group of member states which willing and 
have the necessary capability” (new art.29); and the possible establishment of 
“permanent structured cooperation” in the ﬁ  eld of defence (new art. 31);
last but certainly not least, the establishment of a single legal personality for 
the Union.
3. WHAT CAN BE THE TREATY’S IMMEDIATE IMPACT?
A ﬁ  rst question to be addressed concerns the likely new institutional “environ-
ment” in which the High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission 
(the acronym HR/VP seems both more appropriate and deﬁ  nitely more workable 
than HRUFASP) will operate. In fact, with the end of the rotational presidency in 
external aﬀ  airs and with the double “hat”, most of the problems of fragmentation 
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and “dualism” associated with the current system seem solved, at least in principle: 
there will no longer be two or even three distinct EU representatives at international 
meetings — from the Middle East “Quartet” (thus often turned into a “Sextet”) 
to other diplomatic occasions — and there will no longer be a new personality 
representing the EU on the world stage every six months either.
Like the Constitutional Treaty beforehand, however, the Reform Treaty introduces 
another new institutional ﬁ  gure, namely the President of the European Council
[3]. 
She will take over some of the responsibilities — and arguably staﬀ   — of the 
Council Secretariat, and will also ensure some form of external coordination and 
representation as related to EU summits. As a result, the HR/VP will have to liaise 
very intensely and closely with the new institutional ﬁ  gure for all matters linked to 
the preparation of European Council decisions and events. At best, this will require 
a degree of duplication between their respective staﬀ  .
Moreover, it seems unlikely that the President of the Commission will entirely 
abstain from intervening in the sphere of foreign relations. Th   ere are so many policy 
areas the Commission is involved in which have an “external” dimension that it will 
be diﬃ   cult to draw a line and keep its President out of this game, considering also 
the possible need for some coordination and arbitrage among Commissioners.
Finally, despite the suppression of the rotational presidency in external relations, 
the head of state and government and the foreign minister of the country in the 
Council presidency — to date mostly in charge of all EU aﬀ  airs during the semes-
ter — may still keep some role in this domain. After all, the rotational presidency 
is likely to remain in place for both the General Aﬀ  airs Council (which also deals 
with enlargement issues) and the COREPER, unquestionably a major player in 
foreign policy matters. And there are ever more Council formations that have a 
speciﬁ  c “external” policy dimension.
As a result, along with the two “hats”, the HR/VP may also have to carry a raincoat 
and umbrella. It will be very crowded indeed at the EU top, and the old formal 
troika may well be succeeded by a new informal one (the President of the European 
Council, the HR/VP, and the President of the Commission), while the new trio of 
successive Council presidencies will linger on the sidelines.
At the end of the day, the precise division of labour and even the chemistry inside 
this sort of new EU troika will depend also on the proﬁ  les and personalities of the 
incumbents. In fact, Solana’s case has already shown that the way in which an oﬃ   cial 
[3]   See also the chapter on the Presidency of the Council in this issue.130
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interprets and plays a role that is very much a blank sheet matters more than the 
actual competences and even the treaty language.
In this particular case, the modalities for the appointment of the three top EU oﬃ   -
cials will also matter, especially if it comes down to a “package deal” to be struck, 
probably, in the summer of 2009, in the wake of the elections for the European 
Parliament, or earlier. In fact, although the Reform Treaty is set to enter into force 
already on 1 January 2009, it is equally  plausible that such personnel decisions be 
taken not one by one but in a comprehensive bundle, either in June 2009 or even 
earlier. While a special procedure has been agreed on the possible appointment of 
a temporary HR/VP already in December 2008, in fact, the choice of the President 
of Commission may have to follow the June 2009 elections, unless of course the 
incumbent is preliminarily conﬁ  rmed for a second consecutive term. For its part, 
the appointment of the ﬁ  rst President of the European Council is inevitably related 
to the willingness of the Czech Republic and Sweden to relinquish — at least in 
part — their role as the last “full” rotational EU presidencies in 2009.
But if a comprehensive “package” of nominations is to be delivered, there will be a 
need for some political balance and personal trade-oﬀ  s between: a) party “families”, 
b) big and small countries, c) North and South, as well as East and West. And 
this could produce unpredictable results: the hope is that policy competence does 
not lose out to political expediency, and that legitimate personal (and national) 
ambitions do not hijack the overarching European interests. At any rate, there 
will inevitably be a trial period for all, in which adjustments and arrangements 
will have to be made.
4. HOW CAN THE NEW HR/VP OPERATE?
For his/her part, the HR/VP may also have to juggle the two “hats” — or even 
three, if one considers the implications of chairing the Foreign Aﬀ  airs Coun-
cil — more frequently than previously assumed. Th   e new Declaration mentioned 
above, in fact, insists on the separation between the CFSP/ESDP pillar proper and 
the community one, and will therefore make it more diﬃ   cult — politically rather 
than legally — to “mingle” the two with a view to achieving a more coherent and 
eﬀ  ective EU external policy. 
Th   is is a pity, also because precisely the experience of the past few years in such 
places as Afghanistan and Iraq has shown that international crisis management 
requires a varied and complex set of instruments and a high degree of synergy and 
coordination, rather than separate boxes, approaches, and staﬀ  s. Also, insofar as Foreign Policy:  Many Opportunities and a Few Unknows
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they have not competed with each other, the two “pillars” of European foreign 
policy have proved quite complementary: what they still lack is a political synthesis 
and a joined-up framework.
In order also better to manage such a near-impossible brief, for instance, the HR/VP 
may have to have a single cabinet rather than two — to ensure coherence — and 
also to appoint deputies.
But how many — and what for?
One deputy could for instance cover ESDP (now CSDP) and crisis management 
proper — whose speciﬁ  cally military component, in turn, will remain more “com-
partmentalised” than any other aspect of foreign policy — and could also act as 
chairperson of the PSC. 
Th   e Reform Treaty already foresees that the latter be chaired by a “representative” of 
the HR/VP. Th   is chairperson could either be appointed through a speciﬁ  c Council 
decision, as is the case with the EU Special Representatives, or be elected by (and 
arguably from within) the PSC itself. An interesting precedent in this respect was 
set in 2001 with the election of the Chairman of the EU Military Committee (MC). 
In the case of the PSC, however, the duration of the mandate — which is three 
years for the MC — should preferably be in line with that of the other relevant 
bodies: two and a half years, for instance, renewable once.
It is evident that such an option for the PSC risks separating the speciﬁ  cally ESDP/
CSDP (operational) dimension of foreign policy from the CFSP (diplomatic) one. 
A dedicated deputy for CFSP, however, could also assist the HR/VP when s/he 
wears the third hat, i.e. chairing the Foreign Aﬀ  airs Council, and in liaising with 
the Presidency of the European Council.
Further deputies could deal with those other policies — such as the ENP and, 
possibly, also development aid (much as the 2005 Progress Report did not include 
the latter, along with trade, in the likely sphere of competence of the then “Foreign 
Minister”) — that lie in the grey area across pillars, with shared and overlapping 
competences, and where some “contamination” may be not only inevitable but 
also necessary. Yet this will depend primarily on the way in which the next Com-
mission (2009-14) shares out portfolios and responsibilities.
Last but not least, it remains to be seen where exactly to place: a) the coordina-
tion of the ﬁ  ght against terrorism, which cuts across competences and pillars; and, 
now, b) also “the protection of [EU] citizens” abroad, that the Reform Treaty has 132
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inserted — at the request of France — among the objectives of the Union’s com-
mon external action.
5. HOW CAN THE EEAS BE ORGANISED?
How will all this reﬂ  ect on the possible make-up of the EEAS? In this case, the 
wording in the treaty has not changed: its three structural components — “oﬃ   -
cials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the 
Commission as well as staﬀ   seconded from national diplomatic services of the member 
states” — remain the same, as does their task (to “assist” the HR/VP in fulﬁ  lling 
his/her mandate). 
For the future European “foreign policy chief”, arguably, the EEAS is expected to 
become at the same time a walking stick and a satellite navigator: it will be to the 
HR/VP what the Policy Unit has been to the HR/SG. Yet its precise composition, 
size and internal set-up are not spelt out in the treaty, and even the joint Progress 
Report from May 2005 says very little in this respect: it is reasonably clear about 
what the EEAS will probably not be, but quite unclear about what it could or 
should turn out to be.
Paradoxically, one unintended consequence of the UK demands in the treaty 
negotiations — resulting in the two new Declarations mentioned above — may 
be that the EEAS, in the end, cling much more onto the Commission’s side than 
initially imagined. If part of the Council Secretariat moves to the new Presidency 
of the European Council, in fact, and if another part (the politico-military struc-
tures) remains neatly separate from the rest of the external action machinery, it 
seems obvious that the bulk of the EEAS would come from (and/or rely upon) DG 
RELEX, and more indirectly also other Commission services that are increasingly 
relevant to the Union’s external action. If so, the “Vice-Presidential” hat will gain 
in importance and inﬂ  uence.
To this end, however, the Commission should ﬁ  rst get its own act together. On 
the one hand, it should identify the “core” policy areas it is ready to integrate with 
the EEAS, starting of course with those in DG RELEX. While trade is likely to 
remain separate, development could well be, if not fully incorporated, certainly 
closely associated, as it is crucial for any comprehensive and coherent policy towards 
Africa.
On the other hand, the Commission should establish, if not a rigid and hierarchical 
internal “chain of command”, at least an identiﬁ  able line of accountability — e.g. Foreign Policy:  Many Opportunities and a Few Unknows
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on budgetary and administrative matters — that confers the VP a tangible coor-
dinating and supervisory role in this domain inside the college.
To achieve that, it would suﬃ   ce to reform some internal rules whereby, for instance, 
certain decisions by individual Commissioners could be taken only “in agreement 
with the Vice-President”: easier said than done, in the light also of Chris Patten’s 
experience, but certainly not impossible. By doing so, the HR/VP would turn the 
Commission’s RELEX service into the organisational “hub” for all those common 
policies that have external ramiﬁ  cations.
And what could then be the functional and institutional whereabouts of the 
EEAS? 
Generally speaking, it could become a sort of functional interface between all the 
main institutional actors of European foreign policy. For both political and func-
tional reasons, it should not be placed in the Commission or the Council: as also 
the Progress Report of 2005 underlined, it should be sui generis, due also to the 
diﬃ   culty of making the legal and professional backgrounds of its three (or rather 
2 + 27) components fully compatible and interoperable with one another. Like the 
European Defence Agency (EDA) established in 2004, for instance, it could have 
no tenured staﬀ   of its own, at least in its starting phase: but it could easily evolve, 
if proven eﬀ  ective, into a more stable structure. Unlike the EDA (that essentially 
hires people from national defence ministries), however, it should oﬀ  er a common 
“home” — albeit temporarily — to oﬃ   cials from very diﬀ  erent backgrounds.
It could initially include all the main geographical desks of both the Commission 
and the Council. Th   is is a domain where a lot of duplication has been in place (or 
even created from scratch) over the past few years, and where some streamlining is 
in order and coordination necessary. Following the “interface” model, this should 
also include liaising with the Presidency of the European Council and assisting the 
relevant oﬃ   cials in the preparation of the General Aﬀ  airs Council to ensure, once 
again, the necessary coherence.
And what legal status could the EEAS have? 
Personnel issues are among the most intractable, although they do not normally grab 
the headlines, and there is deﬁ  nitely a risk that, over the next months, the entire EU 
foreign policy machinery be trapped into bureaucratic turf wars instead of remaining 
focused on delivery. Considering the transitional nature of the arrangements that 
will probably govern the EEAS at the start, however, a possible solution preserving 
its sui generis nature without opening the Pandora’s box of inventing a new status 134
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for its staﬀ   could be based on seconded oﬃ   cials only: from the Commission, the 
Council General Secretariat, and the member states.
Accordingly, all EU fonctionnaires would preserve their status, career path and 
salaries: they would simply be placed with the EEAS for a few years. Oﬃ   cials from 
the member states could be either seconded as temporary agents or, possibly, be 
taken in as Seconded National Experts: this in fact would amount to an indirect 
form of co-ﬁ  nancing that would signiﬁ  cantly alleviate the initial costs of setting 
up the service without changing much (in the light of the experience made so far) 
the degree of EU “loyalty” of those oﬃ   cials. 
Th   e duration of the secondment, however, should be the same for all, whichever 
“component” they come from. And, presumably, some system of national quotas 
would be tacitly used, to guarantee the common “ownership” of the new service, 
but matched with a homogenous process of selection of candidates based on their 
professionalism.
Finally, the speciﬁ  c nature of the EEAS could be that of an EU agency: neither 
an EC agency, however, nor a Council one like the EDA, but rather a hybrid new 
agency, indeed sui generis. It could be established through a Council decision 
(though not through a CFSP instrument) and have its administrative costs covered 
primarily by the EU budget, thus involving also the European Parliament. Th  is 
arrangement could well last until 2013, when the current Financial Perspectives 
expire, before being substantially reviewed in light of the experience.
By 2013, in fact, the whole set-up may have to be checked again: not only will 
a new EU budget have to be adopted, but the one-third reduction in the size of 
the Commission foreseen by the new Treaty for 2014 will impact also on the 
position of the HR/VP. Th   is means that the EEAS agency would constitute only 
a ﬁ  rst step towards the establishment of a European “foreign service” worth this 
name — which, in turn, may end up being not too dissimilar from other already 
existing “common services”, available to both Council and Commission, like for 
instance the EU interpretation service. 
6. WHAT ABOUT THE RAMIFICATIONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES?
Most of the considerations made above refer primarily to the Brussels “headquar-
ters” of the EEAS, so to speak. Th   ere is, however, also a very important external 
dimension to that, namely its possible articulation in the EU Delegations. In fact, 
the Reform Treaty maintains i.a. that the Union acquires full legal personality: this Foreign Policy:  Many Opportunities and a Few Unknows
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is likely to have a strong impact on the role of the Delegations, although probably 
only over time. 
Th   e Delegations cannot be considered mere instruments of foreign policy, as they 
also deal with trade, development and now also other issues; nor can their Heads 
be seen — at least for the time being — simply as instruments of DG RELEX. 
Once again, the Reform Treaty (like the Constitutional Treaty beforehand) states 
that they will be placed under the authority of the HR/VP, but does not explicitly 
mention them in connection with the EEAS.
As a consequence, a degree of “double-hatting” may well have to be introduced 
also there: its articulation and implementation may vary according to the relative 
importance of economic or political aﬀ  airs in the country in question. In some cases, 
for instance, there could be good reasons for continuing along more traditional 
lines (predominance of the old community “pillar” and project management: in 
some ACP countries, for instance), while in others the Head of Delegation could 
have a much stronger politico-diplomatic proﬁ  le and background (e.g. in most 
Asian countries).
While no single rigid “template” needs to be designed in advance, in other words, 
some “pilot” formats could be put in place, tested, and subsequently reviewed. Th  e 
objective would be to come to some sort of general reassessment and rationalisation 
in a few years time, in light of the experience made until then. 
Needless to say, the uniﬁ  ed regional desks in the Brussels HQs will have to be well 
connected with the local missions, and vice-versa. Good communication lines will 
have to be established with all the relevant Commission DGs, too, as well as with 
the services of the European Council’s President.
It will also be interesting to see whether the future Union Delegations are given con-
sular representation, elaborating on both art.20 of the current Community Treaty 
and the new commitment to the “protection” of EU citizens abroad. Some propos-
als to this end were put forward in May 2006 — in a Report to the Council and 
the Commission by former European Commissioner Michel Barnier
[4], prompted 
by the Asian tsunami of December 2005 — in the context of the possible creation 
of a European civil protection force. Th   ey were not given much consideration, as 
they raised sensitive issues that nobody wanted to address at that time. But moving 
towards the creation of at least a few experimental “European consulates” would 
certainly bring the debate on the EEAS to a completely diﬀ  erent level.
[4]   For a European civil protection force: Europe Aid, Report by Michel BARNIER, May 2006.136
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Last but not least, the provisions of the Reform Treaty may also have “cascading” 
eﬀ  ects on other aspects of the external machinery of the Union. Just to name one: 
who is going to chair the coordinating meetings of EU member states ambassadors 
in third countries (or international organisations)? 
In the current system, such task falls to the rotating presidency, with additional 
arrangements for those capitals and regions where the country chairing the EU is 
not represented (for the time being, there are only three “third” countries in the 
world where all 27 member states have an embassy or consulate: the United States, 
Russia and China). In the new system enshrined in the Reform Treaty, could it 
fall to the local Head of the EU Delegation? After all, s/he would be accountable 
to the HR/VP, who in turn chairs the Foreign Aﬀ  airs Council. Th   is is unlikely 
to happen, however, in such places as Washington, Moscow or New York (at the 
UN), where the member states will be quite reluctant to be “coordinated” — and 
even less represented — by the EU s such.
7. WHAT FLEXIBILITY IN FOREIGN POLICY?
Finally, the Reform Treaty — following on the Constitutional Treaty — makes 
it easier to implement both CFSP and ESDP/CSDP ﬂ  exibly. 
With respect to the possibility of entrusting “a group of member states” with a certain 
operational task, it mainly certiﬁ  es what has already happened in EU-led interna-
tional crisis management missions, namely that participation is limited to a (bigger 
or smaller) number of interested member states, acting with the consensus and in the 
name of all. Th   e terms of such “entrustment” are normally laid out and negotiated 
in advance, and therefore do not aﬀ  ect the equal rights of the Union members nor 
represent a blank check. Still, having such an eventuality mentioned in the new 
treaty confers more transparency and legitimacy to the existing practice. 
As for enhanced cooperation, it remains to be seen
[5] whether it is likely to be 
“triggered” at all, especially in the domain of foreign policy (where no internal 
legislation is produced, and consensus is not only the rule but also the preferred 
option of national diplomacies); or whether it is in the Treaty only as a sort of 
institutional “deterrent of last resort” against political blockage. In fact, it is hard 
to imagine what speciﬁ  c functional or geographical area could become the object 
of such an initiative.
[5]   As illustrated in the chapter on Enhanced Cooperation in this issue.Foreign Policy:  Many Opportunities and a Few Unknows
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“Permanent structured cooperation”, however, is a completely diﬀ  erent story, as it 
looks inherently diﬀ  erent from both enhanced cooperation proper — it is prede-
termined in scope rather than generally enabling, and has speciﬁ  c procedures (e.g. 
no minimum threshold of participants) — and other forms of ﬂ  exibility based on 
voluntary contributions and peer pressure. In fact, the commitment is permanent, 
its nature is structured, and the eligibility assessment is based on performance. 
Interestingly, also, the traditional political taboo over the unanimity rule on all 
matters “having military or defence implications” is broken here, mainly in order 
to meet functional goals and overcome potential vetoes — although it resurfaces 
inside the scheme. 
What still looks a bit fuzzy is the extent to which participation is (and will be) 
determined by political will and/or functional ability. As compared with the con-
vergence criteria for joining EMU enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, for instance, 
those listed in Protocol 4 to the Reform Treaty are less speciﬁ  c: they include the 
achievement of high military operational readiness through national or multina-
tional force packages, and through pooling and/or specialisation of means and 
capabilities; participation in “major joint or European equipment programmes” and in 
the activities of the EDA; and increased cooperation with a view to meeting agreed 
objectives concerning “the level of investment expenditure on defence equipment”. As 
such, they leave much room for interpretation, which may well be precisely the 
point of keeping them a bit vague. Th   ere is no clear hierarchy among them either, 
although much emphasis is put on high military readiness.
What is “permanent structured cooperation” then for?
Its essential goal seems to be a general and uniform improvement of European mili-
tary capabilities to be pursued through: a) explicit (but not “quantiﬁ  ed”) functional 
benchmarks, and b) implicit political incentives (being “in” or “out”) that have all 
been set in common and in advance. Th   is is indeed something the EU has proved to 
be good at in the past, although the challenge in this domain is particularly tough. 
Much will depend on the way in which the speciﬁ  c criteria for participation will 
be eventually set and implemented, as their degree of inclusiveness will determine 
also the ultimate shape and scope of the whole scheme.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there is now both a great potential for a joined-up common European 
foreign policy and a stronger demand for it, inside and outside the Union. Th  e 
Reform Treaty provides a good legal basis for achieving that and giving the Union 138
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the “politics of scale” that would permit it to play a more active international role, 
and one commensurate to its stated ambitions. 
However, a few issues still remain unsettled, and the new treaty per se does not oﬀ  er 
clear solutions: they concern the precise scope of the HR/VP’s mandate, especially 
with respect to that of the President of the European Council; the possible shape 
and status of the EEAS, both in the Brussels “headquarters” and in the EU Delega-
tions; and, more generally, the coordination mechanisms and procedures between 
all these new bodies and functions in the EU foreign policy “system”. 
While there will inevitably be a trial and testing period for all (at least until 2013/14), 
it would be useful to try and address at least some of these issues already in 2008, 
in parallel with the treaty ratiﬁ  cation process, in order to prevent Brussels from 
being too busy with bureaucratic and personal turf wars in the years to come, and 
to allow these new actors to hit the ground running in 2009.Foreign Policy:  Many Opportunities and a Few Unknows
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Annex Th   e New Provisions on External Relations of the EU
  (as envisaged by CIG 1/1/07 REV 1 October 2007)
Article 9e TEU
1.   Th   e European Council, acting by a qualiﬁ  ed majority, with the agreement 
of the President of the Commission, shall appoint the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy. Th  e  European  Council 
may end his or her term of oﬃ   ce by the same procedure. 
2.   Th   e High Representative shall conduct the Union’s common foreign and 
security policy. He or she shall contribute by his or her proposals to the devel-
opment of that policy, which he or she shall carry out as mandated by the 
Council. Th   e same shall apply to the common security and defence policy. 
3.   Th   e High Representative shall preside over the Foreign Aﬀ  airs Council. 
4.   Th   e High Representative shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commis-
sion. He or she shall ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action. 
He or she shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities 
incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the 
Union’s external action. In exercising these responsibilities within the Com-
mission, and only for these responsibilities, the High Representative shall be 
bound by Commission procedures to the extent that this is consistent with 
paragraphs 2 and 3.
Article 13a TEU
1.   Th   e High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy, 
who shall chair the Foreign Aﬀ  airs Council, shall contribute through his or her 
proposals towards the preparation of the common foreign and security policy 
and shall ensure implementation of the decisions adopted by the European 
Council and the Council. 
2.   Th   e High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the 
common foreign and security policy. He or she shall conduct political dialogue 
with third parties on the Union’s behalf and shall express the Union’s position 
in international organisations and at international conferences. 140
The Treaty of Lisbon : Implementing the Institutional Innovations
Role of Commission in external representation
Article 9d TEU
1.  (…) With the exception of the common foreign and security policy, and 
other cases provided for in the Treaties, it shall ensure the Union’s external 
representation.
European External Action Service
Article 13a TEU
3.   In fulﬁ  lling his or her mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by 
a European External Action Service. Th   is service shall work in cooperation 
with the diplomatic services of the Member States and shall comprise oﬃ   cials 
from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the 
Commission as well as staﬀ   seconded from national diplomatic services of the 
Member States. Th   e organisation and functioning of the European External 
Action Service shall be established by a decision of the Council. Th  e  Council 
shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the 
European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission.
Union Delegations
Article 188q ECT
1.   Union delegations in third countries and at international organisations shall 
represent the Union. 
2.   Union delegations shall be placed under the authority of the High Represen-
tative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy. Th   ey shall act in 
close cooperation with Member States’ diplomatic and consular missions.
Consistency of external action
Article 10a TEU
3.   (…) Th   e Union shall ensure consistency between the diﬀ  erent areas of its 
external action and between these and its other policies. Th   e Council and the 
Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate 
to that eﬀ  ect.Foreign Policy:  Many Opportunities and a Few Unknows
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Joint proposals in the ﬁ  eld of external aﬀ  airs
Article 10 b TEU
2.   Th   e High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy, 
for the area of common foreign and security policy, and the Commission, for 
other areas of external action, may submit joint proposals to the Council.
Common Foreign and Security Policy
Article 11 TEU
1.   Th   e Union’s competence in matters of common foreign and security policy 
shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s 
security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that 
might lead to a common defence. Th   e common foreign and security policy 
is subject to speciﬁ  c procedures. It shall be deﬁ  ned and implemented by the 
European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the 
Treaties provide otherwise. Th   e adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. 
Th   e common foreign and security policy shall be put into eﬀ  ect by the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and Security Policy and by 
Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. Th  e  speciﬁ  c role of the 
European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is deﬁ  ned by the 
Treaties. Th   e Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdic-
tion with respect to these provisions, with the exception of its jurisdiction to 
monitor the compliance with Article [III-308] and to review the legality of 
certain decisions as provided for by Article [III-376, second subparagraph].
  Th   e IGC will agree the following Declaration:
  “In addition to the speciﬁ  c procedures referred to in [paragraph 1 of Article 
11], the Conference underlines that the provisions covering CFSP including 
in relation to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Aﬀ  airs and 
Security Policy and External Action Service will not aﬀ  ect the existing legal 
basis, responsibilities, and powers of each Member State in relation to the 
formulation and conduct of its foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, 
relations with third countries and participation in international organisations, 
including a Member State’s membership of the Security Council of the UN. 
Th   e Conference also notes that the provisions covering CFSP do not give 
new powers to the Commission to initiate decisions or increase the role of 
the European Parliament. Th   e Conference also recalls that the provisions 
governing the Common Security and Defence Policy do not prejudice the 
speciﬁ  c character of the security and defence policy of the Member States.”143
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CONCLUSION
Where do we go from here? Th   e answer to that question, which underlies this 
whole exercise, implies that we should ﬁ  rst understand where we come from and 
how we got where we are.
Th   e constitutional reform process, now hopefully coming to its conclusion, was 
launched in 2001 by the Laeken declaration. Th   at document noted that “citizens 
are calling for a clear, open, eﬀ  ective, democratically controlled Community approach” 
and that therefore “the Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and 
more eﬃ   cient” in order to “bring citizens, and primarily the young, closer to the Euro-
pean design and the European institutions”. For this, it called for a broad and public 
debate inside the Convention. It also stated that “simpliﬁ  cation is essential”. 
Th   ere is no need to underline that the future Reform Treaty is in practice the exact 
opposite of what was deemed necessary six years ago: we are faced with complex 
unreadable texts, negotiated in secrecy, far from public scrutiny. Why did we move, 
in two or three years time, from a “constitutional” treaty, coherent if not concise, 
drafted in full transparency by a representative body of national and European 
elected oﬃ   cials, to the obscure document, substantially similar in content but 
totally diﬀ  erent in form, that we are now submitting to national ratiﬁ  cations ? It 
seems that rhetorical excesses and ambiguous formulations, political weakness and 
insuﬃ   cient leadership, led a large part of European public opinion to perceive the 
Constitutional treaty as a threat and not as a help, as a problem and not as a solu-
tion. Governments, in the face of this political reality, then decided to move back 
to former methods of diplomatic negotiation and less ambitious formulations. Th  e 
Laeken objectives regarding the public debate, transparency and simpliﬁ  cation 
were abandoned.
In a moment of euphoria, towards the end of the Convention, participants were 
led to believe, and to state, that the treaty they had just drafted would last for 
decennia. In fact it was never to be ratiﬁ  ed, which shows how diﬃ   cult it is to be a 
prophet. How about the Reform Treaty? It would be sad to think that this complex 
document, full of cross references and after thoughts, protocols and declarations, 
is the last word in institutional reform. Hopefully, at some future date, it will be 
possible to codify, clarify and get approved, at least informally, a readable version 
of European rules and procedures. In the medium term, however, the most prob-
able solution is that the present text will remain essentially as it is, with numerous 
minor modiﬁ  cations adopted by various ﬂ  exible procedures it has introduced.146
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Th   is apparent paradox results from two diﬀ  erent aspects of political reality. 
On the one hand it is clear that governments and public opinion have lost any 
appetite they might have had for institutional debate and constitutional reform. 
Th   e general feeling, after the June and October summit meetings, is one of relief 
that the matter has been settled one way or another, that the crisis is over, even if 
some risks continue to loom over the ratiﬁ  cation process. Th   ere is an implicit hope 
that it will be possible, for a number of years, to avoid the recurrence of tensions 
and conﬂ  icts in this ﬁ  eld, and that the Union will be able to concentrate on policies 
and actions, rather than on institutions. Public opinion is aware, and presumably 
approves, of the fact that the normal procedure for treaty modiﬁ  cation now implies 
the calling of a convention, followed by an IGC, but the general understanding is 
that this lengthy and unpredictable procedure, will, if at all possible, not be used 
in the near future. 
Th   e second element of political reality is, indeed, that the treaty introduces a variety 
of means whereby the working of the institutions, and if necessary, treaty texts, 
can be adapted to face new needs, opportunities or challenges without making use 
of the “ordinary” procedure indicated above (Convention + IGC). Many of these 
means are mentioned in diﬀ  erent sections of this study. With the assent of the 
European Parliament, the European Council can avoid calling a Convention if this 
not “justiﬁ  ed by the extent of the proposed amendments”. Th   e same article of the 
Reform Treaty allows modiﬁ  cations of part three of the Treaty on the function-
ing of the Union (concerning the internal policies and action of the Union) by a 
unanimous decision of the European Council ratiﬁ  ed by member states according 
to their constitutional procedures. Th   is may seem cumbersome, but it does avoid 
the calling of a convention and of an intergovernmental conference and gives a 
sort of routine aspect to treaty modiﬁ  cation. Furthermore a simpliﬁ  ed revision 
procedure allows the European Council to decide unanimously to move from 
unanimity to QMV, or from the special legislative procedure to the normal one, 
if no national parliament opposes this within six months. Legitimate doubts can 
be formulated as to the implementation of these clauses, but the fact is that they 
open up possibilities which were formerly non existent.
Similarly, as indicated in the relevant section of this study, the treaty opens up new 
possibilities in the ﬁ  eld of enhanced cooperation by making these more attractive 
and more eﬀ  ective, both at the initial stage, at the functioning stage and in relation 
to non-participants. In the framework of enhanced cooperation, member states can 
modify, for themselves, the procedures applying to the decision making process Conclusion
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(passerelle clauses). Here again doubts can be formulated as to the practical imple-
mentation of these innovations, but nevertheless new opportunities are on oﬀ  er. 
Th   e most rational conclusion is that in the short to medium term the European 
Council will probably avoid making use of the “ordinary” revision procedure, and 
try to face up to new challenges by making full use of various new modalities of 
simpliﬁ  ed revision procedures or, if applicable, enhanced cooperation. 
However rationality is not always the best guide to future developments in the 
European Union. Th   e implementation of some institutional reforms (on the com-
position of the Commission or QMV, for instance) has been postponed and this 
sign of weakness may, when the time comes, be a source of tension and uncertainty. 
Other reforms, on the presidency for instance, may begin to seem more problem-
atic after a certain period of time. Th   e institutional impact of future enlargements 
remains to be assessed. Th   ese elements of instability could, in given circumstances, 
combine to impose a new big institutional negotiation even if no single member 
state is really demandeur. In any case those problems will need to be addressed if 
the Union is to pursue its progress.
More fundamentally the estrangement of public opinion, identiﬁ  ed at Laeken in 
2001, is not likely to diminish, given that the causes of that estrangement have 
been, if anything, aggravated by a very technocratic solution to the constitutional 
crisis. Th   e gradual emergence of a European political space or network, where 
democratic debate on issues of common interest can be pursued, would certainly 
bring citizens “closer to the European design and the European institutions” as 
suggested in the Laeken declaration. Th   e Reform Treaty goes in that direction when 
it introduces a new role for national Parliaments, politicizes the designation of the 
Commission President and creates the instruments of a common foreign policy. 
We can only hope that member states and the common institutions will make full 
use of these potentialities.RAPPORTEURS:
CEPS
Sebastian Kurpas and Ben Crum (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam).
EGMONT - THE ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Philippe de Schoutheete, Jacques Keller, Franklin Dehousse and 
Sami Andoura.
EPC
Antonio Missiroli, Sara Hagemann and Hervé Bribosia.
––––––––––
OTHER CONTRIBUTORS: 
Graham Avery, Dan S. Felsenthal, Simon Hix, Pierre Jonckheer 
(MEP), Moshé Machover, Vivien Schmidt, Alexander Stubb 
(MEP).
––––––––––
Th   e texts of this study is a personal comment of the authors and 
does not represent a position of the institutions to which they 
belong.
CEPS
Place du Congrès 1, 1000 Brussels, Belgium 
Phone   +32-(0)2 229 39 11 — Fax +32 (0)2 219 41 51
E-mail   info@ceps.eu
Website   www.ceps.eu
EGMONT – THE ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Rue de Namur / Naamsestraat 69, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
Phone  +32-(0)2 223 41 14 – Fax +32-(0)2 223 41 16
E-mail studia.diplomatica@egmontinstitute.be
Website www.egmontinstitute.be
EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE
Résidence Palace, rue de la Loi 155, B-1040 Brussels, Belgium
Phone   +32-(0)2 231 03 40 — Fax +32 (0)2 231 07 04
E-mail info@epc.eu
Website www.epc.eu
All rights of copy, reproduction and translation in any form or by any means 
for all countries are strictly reserved to the three Institutes. Published articles 
remain the property of the Institute. Rejected manuscripts are not returned.ISBN 978-2-930432-12-0
C
E
P
S
 
-
 
E
G
M
O
N
T
 
-
 
E
P
C
.
 
Th
 
e
 
T
r
e
a
t
y
 
o
f
 
L
i
s
b
o
n
November 2007
Th   e Treaty of Lisbon:
Implementing the 
Institutional Innovations
Joint Study